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 Chapter 1 deviates from the conventional practice by highlighting an alternative to forced 
CEO turnover. An interesting puzzle in corporate finance is the week sensitivity of disciplinary 
action against CEO to poor firm performance. I show that this weak relation is in part driven by an 
overlooked alternative to firing, which in practice takes the form of splitting the CEO-Chairman 
role or demoting the incumbent CEO to the executive Chairman position. I first document that such 
demotions are a frequently used alternative disciplinary mechanism, accounting for nearly 40% of 
all involuntary CEO transitions. I further show that the use of this mechanism is concentrated 
among firms in which the CEO is most entrenched or the cost of firing its CEO is high, i.e. CEOs 
with firm or industry-specific managerial skills and those with strong long-term performance and 
weak governance. Market reactions to CEO demotions are positive, on average. Finally, I show 
that classifying CEO demotions as an alternative form of involuntary turnover magnifies the 
sensitivity of involuntary turnover to firm performance and eliminates the relation between 
performance and voluntary turnover.    
 In chapter 2, we examine the role of deferred vesting of stock and option grants in reducing 
executive turnover. To the extent an executive forfeits all unvested stock and option grants if she 
leaves the firm, deferred vesting will increase the cost (to the executive) of early exit. Using pay 
Duration proposed in Gopalan, et al., (forthcoming) as a measure of the length of managerial pay, 
we find that CEOs and non-CEO executives with longer pay Duration are less likely to leave the 
x 
 
firm voluntarily. Employing the vesting of a large prior-year stock/option grant as an instrument 
for Duration, we find the effect to be causal. CEOs with longer pay Duration are also less likely to 
experience a forced turnover and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is 
significantly lower in firms that offer longer duration pay. Overall, our study highlights a strong 
link between compensation design and turnover for top executives. 
 Finally, in chapter 3, we develop and test a new explanation for forced CEO turnover. 
Investors may disagree with management on the optimal course of corporate actions due to 
heterogeneous prior beliefs. Such disagreement may be persistent and costly to firms, and thus 
create incentives for firms to replace CEOs who investors tend to disagree with. We use this logic 
to develop and provide evidence for three hypotheses. First, firms with higher investor-
management disagreement are more likely to fire their CEOs, and this effect is more pronounced 
in more-financially-constrained firms as well as those with less-entrenched CEOs and stronger 
shareholder governance. Second, firms are more likely to hire an external CEO as a successor if 
investor-management disagreement with the departing CEO is higher. Third, investor-management 
disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover. Thus, the evidence sheds new light on how 
disagreement between management and investors shapes one important aspect of corporate 
governance—the replacement of CEOs.  
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Chapter 1: CEO-Chair Duality Split: An 
Alternative to Firing 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
A puzzling stylized fact in the corporate governance literature is the surprisingly low 
sensitivity of disciplinary action against CEOs to firm performance. The literature has viewed 
“disciplinary action” as being synonymous with forced CEO turnover and measured it accordingly. 
The prior literature (for example, see Murphy (1999), and Kaplan and Minton (2012)) documents 
at most a 35% increase in the likelihood of forced CEO turnover for a one-standard deviation 
decline in a firm’s industry-adjusted stock return. Taylor (2010) argues this corresponds to a well 
below-optimal rate,1 and attributes this modest level of firing to entrenchment costs faced by firms. 
But, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanism, the sensitivity of forced 
turnover to firm performance has not changed significantly over time (see Huson, Parrino, and 
Starks (2001)). Another puzzle is that “routine departures” of CEOs− say due to retirement (e.g., 
Parrino (1997))− appear to be negatively related to firm performance (see Kaplan and Minton 
(2012)). This is puzzling since voluntary turnover should not have any relationship to firm 
performance, or else such turnover should be classified as forced.2 Kaplan and Minton (2012) 
attribute this to the misclassification of some forced turnovers as voluntary. In this paper, I show 
that these two puzzles are in part driven by an overly narrow definition of “disciplinary action”, 
which leads to overlooking an alternative mechanism for disciplining an underperforming CEO, 
                                                 
1 This corresponds to an average of 2% of CEOs of large public companies getting fired every year, whereas the optimal 
annual rate of CEO firings is estimated to be six times this figure (see Taylor (2010)). 
2 One possible hypothesis is that CEOs ‘jump ships’ when firm performance is good. However, this doesn't seem to be 
the case for two reasons. First, this hypothesis predicts a positive relationship with firm performance, while previous 
literature documents a negative correlation. Second, there aren’t many instances of such jumps in my sample (56 in 
total) which suggest that the labor market for CEO is relatively immobile. 
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namely splitting the CEO-Chair role or demoting the incumbent CEO to the executive Chairman 
position.3 In particular, I comprehensively study the use, implications, and effectiveness of this 
mechanism, and its impact on performance-turnover sensitivity. 
In reality, firms need not always fire its CEO as a penalty for poor firm performance. Firms 
can reduce the day-to-day responsibilities of an underperforming CEO and put extra oversight on 
him by either splitting the CEO’s dual role or by demoting the incumbent CEO to the executive 
Chairman position. Anecdotal evidence of this is plentiful. For instance, following months of poor 
returns, “Chesapeake Energy stripped its co-founder and chief executive officer, Aubrey 
McClendon of his chairmanship … to placate shareholders anger.”4 And more recently (May 15, 
2014), the French cable maker Nexans split chairman and chief executive Frederic Vincent’s dual 
role, citing underperformance since he took over, “although shareholders also rejected a motion to 
oust him.”5 Although some press articles report the transition of a CEO to the executive Chairman 
position as a “promotion”, I label these transitions as well as CEO-Chair splits as demotions for 
two reasons. First, there is general consensus that the CEO is the company's top decision-maker, 
the one who runs the company and to whom all other executives report. Since the CEO is heavily 
involved in the strategic direction of the firm, all analyst reports, and the media usually emphasize 
how a CEO’s management style and vision shape a firm’s major decisions. As such, losing the 
CEO title (or the executive Chairman title) leads to loss of authority. Second, the average drop in 
                                                 
3 In the analyses that follows, CEO-Chair splits that are a result of ``passing-of-batons" are classified as retirements 
and thus, not flagged as CEO demotions. Please refer to Section 4 for more details. 
4 An excerpt from an article published on Pittsburgh Post-Gazette entitled “Chesapeake strips CEO of chairmanship” 
available via http://www.post-gazette.com/business/businessnews/2012/05/02/Chesapeake-strips-CEO-of-
chairmanship/stories/201205020239. Firms typically do not cave in to shareholders’ proposal to separate the duality 
role when the firm is performing well. For instance, an article in Forbes report that “approximately 200 shareholder 
proposals to split the CEO-Chairman roles were filed by shareholders in the last two years [2012 and 2013], and of the 
200 proposals filed, only four non-binding proposals won shareholder approval. Further, of these four, none ended up 
splitting the chairman/CEO roles.” For more detail, please refer to the article entitled “Combined Chairman/CEO 
Roles: Easier Than You Think” available via  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robinferracone/2014/03/05/combined-chairmanceo-roles-easier-than-you-think 
5 An excerpt from an article on Reuters entitled “Cable maker Nexans splits chairman, chief executive roles” 
available via http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/15/nexans-shareholders-idUSL1N0O11HM20140515 
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the CEO’s total compensation following such transition is $1.5 million on average, which 
corresponds to 30% of the CEO’s ex-ante compensation.6 
The question this paper confronts empirically is− if disciplinary action against the CEO is 
classified more broadly as including both forced CEO turnover as well as demotions, do we observe 
a sensitivity of disciplinary action to poor firm performance that is more in line with the theory? In 
addressing this question, I begin by documenting that CEO demotions are not rare events. By 
implementing a classification criterion that rules out the classification of obvious retirements as 
CEO demotions, I find that CEO demotions are a frequently used mechanism in response to poor 
firm performance, accounting for nearly 40% of all involuntary CEO transitions. From 2000 to 
2010, S&P 1500 firms in the lowest quartile of the industry adjusted annual stock return (Ind. adj. 
stock return) distribution demoted their CEOs at an average rate of 1.79% per year. This compares 
to a rate of 0.85% per year for firms in the upper quartile.7 The quantitative relationship between 
CEO demotions and firm performance is striking− I find that a one standard deviation decrease in 
Ind. adj. stock return is associated with 37.9% increase in the likelihood of CEO demotion. I find 
that the link between firm performance and the probability of CEO demotions is just as strong when 
alternative measures of firm performance are used. 
Why would firms use this alternative disciplinary mechanism? In many cases, firing the 
CEO may be very costly for the firm. These costs often involve CEO entrenchment-related 
intangibles in addition to multi-million dollar severance payments. Taylor (2010) calculates these 
intangible costs (which includes board’s perceived stress from making a management change) to 
approach $1 billion per firing. The entrenchment costs, combined with the direct cost of toppling 
                                                 
6 When the CEO stays on the company’s payroll as an executive Chairman (a well-compensated full-time position), 
the Chairman is deeply involved in the day-to-day operations. In most cases, the duties of the executive Chairman are 
clearly outlined, and the stated responsibilities covers numerous typical CEO functions such as corporate strategy and 
finance. For instance, when JDA Software demoted James D. Armstrong, they released a press statement reporting that 
Armstrong will remain “actively engaged in the business focusing on strategic planning, mergers and acquisitions, 
major product direction and key customer relationships.” 
7 Please refer to Table 1.1 for a complete statistics. 
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the CEO (including severance pay and replacement cost), generate high total costs of firing CEOs. 
Firing an experienced CEO could also disrupt relationships with key customers and suppliers, be 
internally disruptive, and could prematurely end any strategic initiatives. However, maintaining the 
status quo with the CEO might threaten the firm’s market share, and worst yet, the competitiveness 
of the firm. In such cases, CEO demotion may be the Board’s optimal decision that minimizes the 
cost of disciplining the CEO, while also making a change that alters the status quo. 
One potential source of cost firms face in firing the CEO is the loss of firm/industry-specific 
knowledge of the CEO. While poor performance often requires a change from the status quo, firing 
the CEO may result in the loss of specialized competencies and firm-specific knowledge. These 
can be especially valuable to retain when performance over the CEO’s tenure has historically been 
strong. 
Consistent with this conjecture, I find that the likelihood of CEO demotion following poor 
firm performance is significantly higher among CEOs identified as firm/industry specialists, using 
a novel measure constructed based on the CEO’s lifetime work experience. I also find that CEOs 
with long history of good prior firm performance are more likely to be demoted (rather than fired) 
following a year of bad performance. Moreover, I find that the sensitivity of such demotion to firm 
performance is concentrated entirely among specialist CEOs, and CEOs with good prior 
performance histories. This is in sharp contrast to the case of forced CEO turnover− I find that the 
performance-turnover sensitivity, measured by forced CEO turnover, is entirely confined to non-
specialist CEOs and CEOs with poor historical firm performance. These findings are robust to the 
introduction of controls for various factors previously documented to be related to CEO turnover 
as well to the inclusion of firm and year fixed effects. 
Another potential factor that could influence a firm’s decision to demote its CEO instead 
of firing him is the strength of its corporate governance. The Board of Directors would prefer not 
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to fire the CEO if the entrenchment cost is high. But at the same time, when faced with poor firm 
performance, the Board of Directors, will wish to cater to the demands of investors to penalize the 
under-performing CEO to fulfill their fiduciary duty to shareholders and maintain their reputation 
as experts. Prior studies (for example, see Fishman et al. (2014)) find that firms with weak corporate 
governance are less likely to be influenced by investor pressure and are, therefore, less likely to 
fire the underperforming CEO, especially when shareholders’ signals about management ability 
are noisy. Firms with weak corporate governance also have relatively higher entrenchment costs 
and as such are more likely to benefit from retaining the incumbent CEO. These two reasons 
suggest that the likelihood of a firm to demote its CEO, in response to poor firm performance, 
should decrease as its corporate governance gets stronger. Using three proxies for the efficacy of 
corporate governance, I find results consistent with this conjecture. Irrespective of the proxies used, 
results suggest that the sensitivity of CEO demotion to firm performance is higher for firms with 
weaker corporate governance. 
It is important to note that the CEO turnover classification algorithm used in previous 
studies (for example, see Parrino (1997)) classifies as “voluntary turnover” cases of CEO-Chair 
splits, where the departing CEO gives up the CEO title but remains as or becomes executive 
Chairman. Meanwhile, since CEO-Chair splits that involve the CEO giving up the executive 
Chairman title do not involve a CEO change, the common turnover algorithm fails to flag such 
transitions as turnovers. However, it is the Board of Directors who make the decision of whether 
or not to demote the CEO. As such, there is no reason to believe that such CEO transitions are in 
fact voluntary. Consistent with this argument, I find that the previously documented negative 
relation between firm performance and voluntary CEO turnover becomes statistically insignificant 
when CEO demotions are re-classified as involuntary turnovers. In addition, the sensitivity of 
involuntary CEO turnover to poor firm performance increases two-fold after such demotions are 
re-classified as involuntary turnovers. These findings suggest that the two previously highlighted 
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puzzles are in fact two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, some instances of turnover, 
classified as “voluntary” by the existing CEO turnover algorithm, are not truly voluntary. These 
are demotions that diminish the CEOs’ authority and scope. Therefore, consistent with this 
intuition, I find a negative correlation of demotions with firm performance. On the other hand, the 
weak sensitivity of disciplinary action to poor performance documented previously is partly due to 
the narrow definition of disciplinary action as forced CEO turnover and the failure to capture CEO 
demotions as instances of involuntary turnover. 
The majority of the extant literature on forced CEO turnover treats the Board’s decision to 
oust the CEO as an isolated event undisturbed by competing events.8 As such, the literature ignores 
competing events and estimate the cause-specific hazard of forced CEO turnover, either using the 
semi-parametric COX proportional hazard or logit models. This approach gives unbiased 
coefficients if the competing risks are rare (see Pintilie (2006)), or censoring due to competing 
events is independent of the occurrence of forced CEO turnover (Putter et al. (2007)). However, as 
discussed above, CEO demotions are a frequently used alternative disciplinary mechanism. 
Therefore, failing to account for the competing risk of CEO demotion leads to overestimation of 
the risk of forced CEO turnover and of performance-turnover sensitivity. One way of overcoming 
this potential problem is to adopt a competing risk methodology that directly factors in alternative 
mechanism available to the board when making the CEO retention decision. In doing so, I find the 
effect of firm performance on forced CEO turnover as well as on CEO demotion to be persistent 
even after factoring in the competing risk, although the economic magnitude decreases slightly. 
I take several approaches to mitigate the concern that both firm performance and CEO 
demotion are related to an omitted variable, and thus the documented correlation may be spurious. 
                                                 
8 An exception to this include Jenter and Kanaan (2014), Gregory-Smith et al. (2009), Hazarika et al. (2012), and 
Coates IV and Kraakman (2010), in which voluntary CEO turnover is treated as a competing risk. Evans et al.(2010) 
models turnover decision as a choice between three options: retain, replace but retain the CEO on the board, or fire the 
CEO without any future ties with the firm. I discuss their paper in detail further down the section. 
7 
 
First, I include industry (firm) fixed effects in all COX (linear probability) regressions to control 
for unobserved time invariant industry (firm) heterogeneity. In addition, I also include time fixed 
effects in all regression to control for the influence of time-varying variables not included in the 
model. Second, to address omitted variable issues that could be industry-time specific, I follow the 
Instrumental Variable approach outlined in Jenter and Kanaan (2014) by regressing the daily stock 
returns on daily industry returns to decompose firm performance into a predictable component 
caused by the peer group performance and a residual component attributable to the firm 
performance. The idiosyncratic component is then used as a proxy for firm performance in the 
second stage. 
Third, to provide more supporting evidence for my main hypothesis, I exploit a quasi-
natural experiment in which a group of firms experienced an exogenous increase in institutional 
ownership. The literature suggests that institutional investors play a significant role in corporate 
governance through different channels. They are generally involved in shareholder activism (see 
Gillan and Starks (2007)). Crane et al. (2014) suggest that even non-activist investors like index 
funds and ETFs have incentives to intervene and can influence corporate management through 
proxy voting and private communication with management if index tracking error constraints 
prevent them from selling their shares. Therefore, a greater concentration of share ownership in the 
hands of institutional investors may enable shareholders to exert more influence on corporate 
decisions. To this end, I examine how the turnover-demotion sensitivity changes in response to an 
exogenous increase in institutional ownership. If the demotion-performance relation is driven by 
an omitted variable, I do not expect a change in the performance-demotion sensitivity because the 
exogenous shock is unlikely to affect the omitted variable such as uncertainty. However, since I 
have shown that corporate governance is important for the performance-demotion sensitivity, my 
hypothesis predicts that an exogenous increase in institutional ownership (improvement in 
governance) will decrease this sensitivity. 
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To this end, I exploit the discontinuity in institutional ownership around the Russell 1000 
and 2000 index cutoff during the annual rebalancing of the Russell indexes as a quasi-natural 
experiment. Since the selection of a company into Russell 1000 and 2000 index only depends on 
the end-of-May market capitalization, and since I restrict my analysis to a narrow bandwidth of 
firms around the index cutoff, it is unlikely that the annual reconstitution directly affects the 
performance-demotion sensitivity. All results provide strong evidence that omitted variable bias is 
not a serious concern. 
Finally, since I use lagged explanatory variables in all of my analyses, the issue of reverse 
causality is fairly minimal. The positive market reaction at the announcement of CEO demotion 
further mitigates the concern. Nevertheless, the difficulty of fully identifying the effect naturally 
remains. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In sections 2 and 3, I discuss related literature 
and establish my testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data sample and variables used in the 
empirical tests. Section 5 presents the main empirical analysis on firm performance and CEO 
demotion. Section 6 test the impact of the composition of managerial skills, tenure-long 
performance, and the strength of corporate governance on performance-demotion sensitivity. 
Section 7 revisits performance-CEO turnover sensitivity. Section 8 describes and reports results 
from the quasi-experimental set up provided by the Russell Index reconstitution. Section 9 
discusses the market reaction to the news of CEO demotion. Finally, section 10 concludes. 
Definitions of all variables appear in the Appendix. 
1.2 Related Literature 
 
This paper is closely related to a large literature on forced CEO turnover. An extensive 
literature on CEO turnover focuses on the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance 
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(proxies include stock returns, return on assets, earnings, and earnings surprises).9 The overall 
conclusion from these studies is that the sensitivity is weaker than what is predicted by theoretical 
models. Researchers, working in this area, have made some strides in exploring factors that affect 
a firm’s decision to fire its CEO, factors that go beyond firm performance.10 While the existing 
literature has focused almost exclusively on exploring various cost and benefits of firing a CEO, 
this paper highlights an alternative mechanism to discipline an underperforming CEO when faced 
with these costs and benefits. 
This paper also contributes to the literature on relative performance evaluation (RPE). Prior 
studies on the relationship between peer group performance and forced CEO turnover have 
produced mixed results. Morch et. al (1989), Barro and Barro (1990), and Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990) find a strong evidence that industry performance is completely filtered from stock price 
performance when making CEO firing decision. Meanwhile, Warner et al. (1988), and Jenter and 
Kanaan (2014) find a strong evidence against RPE and conclude that peer firm performance is not 
completely filtered from CEO dismissal decision. I find that boards benchmark CEO performance 
against peer performance when deciding on CEO demotion and the result persist for a broader 
definition of the peer. The finding is broadly consistent with the theory that boards fail to filter 
exogenous peer performance when making CEO retention decision. 
This study also sheds insight into the literature on corporate governance and CEO turnover. 
Economists, dating back to Adam Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932), have raised concern 
about CEOs using their discretion to benefit their private interests at the expense of shareholders if 
left unchecked. CEOs may also entrench themselves in their position if left unmarked, making it 
                                                 
9 For example, see Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Weisbach (1988), Warner et al. (1988), Murphy and Zimmerman 
(1993), Parrino (1997), Jenter and Kanaan (2014), Jenter and Lewellen (2010), and Kaplan and Minton (2012). 
10 Captured boards (Fisman et al.(2014)), investor-management disagreement due to heterogeneous prior beliefs 
(Huang, Maharjan, and Thakor (2014)), importance of firm-specific skills (Gopalan, Huang, and Maharjan (2014)), 
peer firm performance (Jenter and Kanaan (2014)), product market competition (Dasgupta et al. (2014)), and various 
CEO attributes such as optimism (Campbell et al. (2011)) are some of the factors that have been found to affect a firm's 
decision to oust its CEO. 
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difficult to fire them when their performance is poor (Sheifer and Vishny (1989)). Consistent with 
this theory, empirical evidence find that the turnover decision in firms with captured boards is 
relatively less sensitive to poor performance. While this highlights the importance of strong 
corporate governance, Fisman et al. (2014) argue that the observed lower performance-turnover 
sensitivity in entrenched firms could be a favorable outcome where unlucky CEOs are retained by 
entrenched boards who do not cater to the tastes of shareholders with noisy beliefs. My findings 
supplement this literature by providing suggestive evidence that firms with dysfunctional 
governance system are relatively more likely to retain the underperforming CEO. 
Yet another strand of literature that is of immediate relevance to this study is the literature 
on the importance of managerial heterogeneity for corporate actions and executive compensation. 
Using a market based model, Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) posit that the increase in executive 
compensation observed over the past three decades is largely due to the increase in the importance 
of general managerial skills. Findings of Custadio et al. (2013) and Aivazian et al. (2009) are in 
line with this argument. Cappelli and Hamori (2008) document that firm-specific skills may be 
valued during growth, while general managerial skills may be valued during recessions. This is 
supplemented by the works of Eisfeld and Kuhnen (2009) and Gabarro (2010), who document a 
higher likelihood of external hire following forced CEO turnover. Custadio et al. (2013) document 
a higher likelihood of forced turnover for generalist CEO, but they find that this effect is not 
triggered by poor firm performance. However, neither the theoretical nor empirical studies have 
provided any guidance concerning which particular CEO abilities affect Boards’ decision to split 
CEO duality role. I extend the extant literature by showing that firm-specific skills are an important 
factor that governs a firm's decision to demote its CEO, including its sensitivity to firm 
performance. 
Lastly, this paper contributes to the recent policy debate on separating the CEO and 
Chairman role. Majority of extant literature on this topic mainly explores the merits and issues of 
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duality splits, but fail to provide a unified consensus. Advocates of splitting the roles of CEO and 
board Chair (which includes Jensen (1976, 1993), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992)) suggest that CEO duality increases agency costs since it will hinder Board's ability to 
monitor management. Meanwhile, proponents of vesting the two positions to one individual (for 
example, see Anderson and Anthony (1986), and Brickley et al. (1997)) argue that CEO duality 
reduces information cost by removing any ambiguity of accountability and responsibility for firm 
processes and allows an incentive mechanism to new CEOs during management transition. This 
paper opens a new dimension to this discussion by arguing that certain types of duality splits could 
serve as an alternative mechanism to discipline an underperforming CEO. 
A recent paper by Evans et al. (2010) is similar in spirit to my analysis. Evans et al. (2010) 
characterize the Boards’ decision as a choice between three options− retain the CEO, replace him 
as CEO but retain him on the board, or let him go and sever all ties. They exclude “passing of 
baton” cases by requiring the former CEO to remain on the board for at least two fiscal years after 
exiting as CEO. Using a sample consisting of firms covered by ExecuComp and spanning a time 
period of 1998 through 2001, they show that pre-turnover financial performance and greater 
bargaining power of CEOs are positively associated with the former CEO retaining a board position 
after leaving the CEO post.  
My paper complements and differs from the above in multiple dimensions. First, my 
analysis focuses only on those CEO successions where the departing CEO either retains the 
executive Chairman title or becomes an executive Chairman. As such, my classification of CEO 
demotion excludes cases where the former CEO becomes an independent Chairman or a 
(executive) director. One such example would be the CEO succession of John H. Maxheim. When 
Maxheim left the helm of Piedmont Natural Gas Co. Inc. in March of 2000, he remained as the 
director for three years. Second, I also consider duality splits where the CEO abdicates the 
Chairman position but remains as CEO. Third, in addition to screening out obvious “passing of 
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baton” cases, I also filter out cases which are due to retirements. For instance, August Busch III 
retired as the CEO of Anheuser-Busch Cos. Inc. in July of 2002 but remained as an executive 
Chairman for four years following the succession. No prior announcements were made regarding 
his plans to leave the helm at Anheuser-Busch. However, the press reports convincingly explain 
the departure as a planned succession and as such, is not classified as a demotion. Fourth, any CEO 
successions which are classified as forced turnover are flagged as such in my study, even if the 
departed CEO remains as a director. And finally, I also address the effect of a CEO’s tenure long 
performance on a firm’s decision to demote its CEO. 
1.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
 Firms, where the CEO also holds the Chairman title, typically do not cave in to 
investors’ proposal to separate the dual role when the firm performance is good. For instance, out 
of approximately 200 shareholder proposals filed by shareholders during 2012 and 2013 to split 
the dual role of the CEO, only four non-binding proposals won shareholder approval. Further, of 
these four, none ended up splitting the role. However, when the firm performance is poor, 
maintaining the status quo might threaten the firm’s market share and the competitiveness of the 
firm. Such situations may necessitate an extra oversight on the CEO. But, firing the incumbent 
CEO may not be optimal if the intangible costs associated with firing is substantial. In such 
situations, splitting the CEO-Chair role or demoting the incumbent CEO to the executive Chairman 
position may be the optimal course of action since such transition would result in the loss of CEO’s 
authority, while also makes a change that alters the status quo. This leads to my first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, CEO demotion is more likely in firms with a lower level of firm 
performance. 
 One potential source of switching cost firms face in firing the CEO may be the loss of 
firm/industry-specific knowledge of the CEO. The Board of Directors may demote an under-
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performing CEO instead of firing him if he has specialized competencies that the firm highly 
values. They may also discipline the CEO for recent under-performance by demoting him instead 
of rocking the boat if he has proven his worth by delivering good firm performances throughout 
his tenure as CEO. The senior management shakeup at Nautilus Group Inc. in August of 2003 
serves as a good anecdotal evidence. Gregg Hammann succeeded Brain Cook as the CEO of 
Nautilus Group Inc. in the wake of revenue revisions and ensuing drops of stock prices.11 The 
Nautilus Group Board of Directors were quick to mention in a statement that Nautilus “has 
accomplished a great deal over the last 17 years during Brian Cook’s tenure. The company’s 
leadership position in the fitness and healthy lifestyle markets and financial strength are a true 
testament to the strength of our organization and Brian’s leadership and vision during this time 
period.”12 Similarly, when Dan Warmenhoven relinquished his helm at NetApp in August of 2009, 
the press article stressed that “Warmenhoven has done an excellent job leading the company from 
the startup to a roaring tech hot shot. NetApp even noted in its press release that he also helped 
create the company’s unique corporate culture.”13 The same press release also highlighted that 
NetApp “needs to return to growth after a battering from the global recession” and that the “new 
chief executive faces some challenges as he takes the helm.”14 This leads to my second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the sensitivity of CEO demotion to poor firm performance is 
stronger for (a) CEOs with firm/industry specific skills, and (b) CEOs with good CEO tenure-long 
performance. 
 Boards may prefer to demote the under-performing CEO in lieu of firing him if the 
above outlined intangible costs are high, and if boards, to some degree, want to cater to 
shareholders’ demand, of penalizing the under-performing CEO, to maintain their reputation as 
                                                 
11 Cook remained with the company as the executive Chairman. 
12 See “Nautilus’ Troubles Lead to Shakeup” by Primedia Business Magazines & Media Inc. on August 1, 2003. 
13 See “NetApp’s new CEO has plenty of Challenge” by MarketWatch, Inc. on August 19, 2009. 
14 The firm performances (measured by industry-adjusted stock return) of Nautilus and NetApp during Cook’s and 
Warmenhoven's tenure as CEO (excluding the year prior to the split date), respectively, were in the top performance 
quartile in my sample. However, the firm performance a year prior to the split date was in the lowest quartile. 
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experts. However, boards’ tendency to demote the under-performing CEO may be higher when the 
corporate governance of the firm is weak. This is because (1) prior literature has found that firms 
with strong corporate governance are more likely to be heavily influenced by shareholders and are 
more likely to fire underperforming CEO even when shareholders’ beliefs about the management 
is inaccurate (Fisman et al. (2014)), (2) entrenched boards are more likely to benefit from retaining 
the CEO in an authoritative position, and (3) entrenched boards are more likely to retain good but 
unlucky CEOs by being less concerned about shareholders’ perception of their decision, especially 
when shareholders’ beliefs about the management are susceptive to noise (Fisman et al. (2014)). 
These reasons are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, following along this line of reasoning, I 
postulate that: 
Hypothesis 3: The performance-demotion sensitivity should be higher for firms with weaker 
corporate governance. 
 My final hypothesis corresponds to the performance-CEO turnover sensitivity. The 
current CEO turnover classification algorithm classifies a CEO turnover that involves the CEO 
giving up the helm in favor of executive Chairman position as a voluntary turnover since the 
departing CEO stays with the firm as an executive Chairman ex-post of such split. Furthermore, 
since a duality split that involves the CEO giving up the executive Chairman title does not involve 
a CEO change, the current algorithm does not classify such split as a CEO turnover. However, to 
the extent that CEO demotion is an act of diminishing the CEOs' role and authority, regardless of 
the type, and that such decisions are made by the Board, these splits are not truly voluntary. And 
if, consistent with Hypothesis 1, CEO demotion is more likely to follow a poor firm performance, 
then classifying such splits as involuntary may weaken the sensitivity of voluntary turnover to firm 
performance. The same line of reasoning also implies that the sensitivity of involuntary CEO 
turnover to firm performance should be stronger once CEO demotions are factored in as 
involuntary turnovers. This leads to my final testable hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, the sensitivity of (a) involuntary turnover to firm performance 
should increase, and (2) voluntary turnover to firm performance should decrease, once CEO 
demotions are classified as involuntary turnovers. 
 I test these hypotheses in a large sample of public firms. In the next section, I describe 
my data sample. 
1.4 Data and Description of Variables 
 
1.4.1 Data and Sample 
             I draw data from a variety of sources. My sample construction starts with all U.S. 
firms in COMPUSTAT from 2000 to 2010 that list their common stock in NYSE, NASDAQ, or 
AMEX.15 I require non-missing data on CEO characteristics (age, tenure, chairmanship, and stock 
ownership) from ExecuComp16, firm-level accounting variables, and stock price and return data 
from CRSP. 
 I identify CEO turnovers and CEO-Chair duality splits from ExecuComp and use news 
reports, BoardEx, and other public sources to classify the turnover as voluntary, forced, or 
duality splits. 
 I obtain data on CEO age, tenure, chairmanship, and stock ownership from ExecuComp 
and whenever needed, supplement it with data from BoardEx. 
 I obtain firm-level accounting data from COMPUSTAT, stock price and return data from 
CRSP, institutional ownership data from CDA/Spectrum, and board and director 
characteristics from BoardEx, and whenever needed, supplement it with data from 
RiskMetrics. 
                                                 
15 My sample spans the year 2000-10 because the coverage of firms in BoardEx database begins from 2000 and testing 
Hypothesis 2 requires tracking each CEO for two years into the future from the date of turnover or duality split. 
16 In instances where age and tenure data are missing from ExecuComp, I manually search BoardEx database to fill the 
void. 
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 I manually match CEOs in each year (as identified from ExecuComp) with profiles in the 
BoardEx database to have data on their characteristics including their past and future 
professional experience. 
 I obtain analyst's earnings forecast data and actual earnings per share data from I/B/E/S. 
 I obtain Russell index constituents, index weights, and proprietary float-adjusted market 
capitalization measures from Russell Investments for 1985-2012. Russell Investment only 
has its proprietary float-adjusted market capitalization data for 1998 and later. 
The final sample consists of 2,430 unique firms and 18,817 firm-year observations. In some of 
the tests, I also use other auxiliary data sources; I mention these when describing the respective 
tests below. 
1.4.2 Key Variable Construction 
 In this section, I describe the methodology I employ to identity CEO demotion and 
turnover. I start by identifying changes in CEO designations as documented in ExecuComp.17 I then 
search Factiva, LexisNexis, social media, and the internet (in the respective order) for news reports 
coincident with the change in designation (and backdating it to two years) to identify the causes of 
the change. From the list of potential turnovers, I drop instances that are due to misclassification in 
ExecuComp, mergers, takeovers or spinoffs, bankruptcy filings, interim positions, sudden death, 
and turnovers of turnaround CEOs. 
 I start with using the criteria of Parrino (1997), with some modifications, to classify the 
turnover as voluntary or involuntary. All turnovers for which the press reports that the CEO is fired, 
is forced out, or departs due to difference of opinion, pressure from shareholders or union, or 
unspecified policy differences with the board are classified as forced. In addition, turnovers due to 
                                                 
17 The earlier literature identifies the samples of CEO turnovers using Forbes annual compensation surveys (e.g. 
Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (1996), Parrino (1997), Huson, Parrino, and Stark (2001), Huson, Malatesta, and 
Parrino (2004), Murphy and Minton (2008)). Most recent studies (e.g. Jenter and Kanaan (2014), and Falato, Li, and 
Milbourn (2014)) use the changes in the CEO position in ExecuComp to classify CEO turnovers. 
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the board not renewing the contract18, and turnovers triggered by scandals, probes, or class action 
lawsuits are also flagged as forced. Of the remaining turnovers, if the departing CEO is under the 
age of 60, it is classified as forced if either (1) the reported reason for the departure does not involve 
death, poor health, or acceptance of another position elsewhere or within the firm (including the 
chairmanship of the board), or (2) the CEO is reported to be retiring but there is no announcement 
about the retirement made at least two months prior to the departure, and the CEO declines to make 
any comments. I then complement these criteria with few of my own. I reclassify a forced turnover 
(identified through the steps described above) as voluntary if either (1) the press doesn't specify 
any reason for the departure or there aren't any press reports on the departure, and the CEO's 
employment record, obtained from BoardEx and  Marquis Who's Who publications, suggests that 
the CEO obtained a comparable position elsewhere within three months, or (2) the press reports 
convincingly explain that the departure is due to previously undisclosed personal or business 
reasons that are unrelated to the firm's activities, and/or the departing CEO steps forward to make 
comments regarding the departure. All the CEO successions not flagged as forced are classified as 
voluntary. 
 Of the turnovers identified as voluntary, I flag turnovers where the CEO, who is also 
the Chairman, abdicates the CEO title but remains as executive Chairman, or turnovers where the 
CEO renounces the CEO title and becomes executive Chairman. I, then, search Factiva, 
LexisNexis, and the internet (in the respective order) to see if such restructuring of the executive 
suit was pre-announced. Any such turnover which were pre-announced and the age of the departing 
CEO on the effective date of turnover is 60 or above are retained as voluntary turnovers. The 
remaining successions, where (1) the announcement coincided with the turnover date (i.e., the 
turnover was immediate), or (2) the first available press report on the succession occurred prior to 
the turnover date, and the age of the CEO on the effective date of turnover is under 60, are classified 
                                                 
18 There are five such instances in my sample. 
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as CEO demotion if the press reports do not convincingly explain the succession to be a “passing-
of-baton” or due to retirement. I manually cross-reference each CEO with profiles in the BoardEx 
database to ensure that they remain with the firm as executive Chairman for at least three years ex-
post of the turnover date. Successions in which the departing CEO gives up the executive Chairman 
position within three years of being appointed in that position are re-classified as retirements. This 
is to ensure that retirements via “passing-of-baton” are excluded from being classified as 
demotions. There are all together 213 such demotions in my sample. 
 Lastly, I flag instances in ExecuComp where the CEO, who is also designated as 
executive Chairman in the previous year, no longer holds the Chairman position. In many instances, 
ExecuComp fails to identify such transitions. Therefore, for firms jointly covered by ExecuComp 
and BoardEx databases, I repeat the process using BoardEx database to identify such CEO 
transitions not otherwise identified via ExecuComp. I drop instances that are due to mergers and 
acquisitions. There are 35 instances of such demotions in my sample. 
 In panel A of Table 1.2, I assign each CEO turnover into a single category based on the 
reason cited or deduced from press reports. There are 1,552 qualified CEO departures in my sample, 
implying an annual departure rate of 8.25%. The frequency of departures assigned to each category 
is also reported. As expected, a substantial number of CEO departures (51.9%) are due to 
retirements. A fair number of CEOs (9.21%) leave the office due to performance related reasons. 
It is important to note that in many instances, the press does not explicitly mention the reason for 
departure to be performance related. The press reports either do not provide a reason or state that 
the CEO is leaving the office “to pursue other interests”. In such cases, I carefully read all available 
press articles surrounding the turnover date and flag turnovers as performance related if there were 
any instances of negative press coverage on the firm's performance within three months a priori of 
the turnover date. 6.06% of CEO terminations are due to board, union, or shareholder pressure or 
due to strategic differences. 5.03% of CEO departures is accounted by scandals, accounting probes, 
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or class action lawsuits. For 4.06% of departures, I was either unable to find any article that covered 
the turnover story or the text describing the departure simply indicates that the CEO left the office 
but there was paucity of articles covering the firm prior to the turnover date for me to deduce any 
meaning reason for the turnover. Since I flag these turnovers as forced, I examine the proxy 
statements issued ex-post of the CEO departure date to see if any severance payment was made to 
the departing CEO. In all of the 63 cases, the departing CEO received some form of severance pay. 
Meanwhile, CEO demotions, with the departing CEO retaining the title of (or becoming) executive 
Chairman, account for 13.72% of all departures. 
[TABLE 1.2 GOES HERE] 
Panel B of Table 1.2 presents the overview of forced CEO turnover and CEO demotion. It 
shows the yearly distribution and frequency of forced CEO turnover and CEO demotions between 
2000 and 2010. Out of 1,552 CEO successions that occur between 2000 and 2010, 381 (about 
24.55% of all successions) are forced, while 248 (about 15.98% of all successions) are CEO 
demotions. Both, CEO demotion and forced CEO turnover, increase over time, except in the last 
two years of the sample coverage period, where it exhibits a decline. These statistics suggest that 
there exist some extent of time-series variations in the number and frequency of forced turnover as 
well as demotion, and that the nature of the CEO labor market has changed to a certain level over 
the last decade. I, therefore, include year fixed effects in all of my regressions to control for 
potential time effects.19 
 
                                                 
19 Table IA1 (online internet appendix) reports the first ten industries (classified based on two-digit SIC code) with the 
highest frequencies of CEO demotion and forced CEO turnover in the overall sample. There seems to be a fair amount 
of overlap between industries that have the higher instances of forced CEO turnover and industries that experience the 
higher frequencies of CEO demotion. These figures provide the first clue that demotion occurs concurrently with forced 
CEO turnover and that some unobserved industry attributes are not behind a firm's decision to favor splitting the role 
over ousting the CEO. 
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1.4.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 1.3 presents descriptive statistics of the key variables I use in my analysis. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the potential impact of outliers. These 
statistics are based on the regression sample and, as such, require non-missing value for all 
variables used in the baseline regression simultaneously. Detailed definitions of these variables are 
provided in the Appendix. There are all together 18,817 CEO-year observations in my sample. For 
some variables, the total count is less than 18,817 due to missing data in some years. The average 
age of a CEO in my sample is 55.04 years and have been in office as CEO for an average of 7.6 
years. 24.9% of CEOs in my sample have at least 5% stock ownership in their firm. The mean 
(median) industry-adjusted annual stock return20 in my sample firms is 0.8% (-4.5%) while the 
average (median) volatility is 0.476 (0.413). The average equal-weighted as well as value-weighted 
annual firm specific returns are comparable to the average industry-adjusted annual stock return 
and are 0.6% and 0.5% respectively. Meanwhile, the raw annual stock return has a mean (median) 
of 16.3% (7.7%). Average equal-weighted (value-weighted) industry return is 15.8% (19.9%), 
which is comparable to findings in the prior literature (see Jenter and Kanaan (2014)). The same 
pattern exists for equal-weighted and value-weighted industry specific return but is slightly lower. 
The average size of a firm (natural log of total assets) in my sample is 7.511. Since I obtain sample 
firms from ExecuComp which covers S&P 1,500 firms, the firm characteristics of my sample are 
not significantly different from those reported in the existing literature on CEO turnover that also 
uses ExecuComp as the primary data source. 
[TABLE 1.3 GOES HERE] 
 Next, I conduct univariate tests to test the premise that CEO demotion tends to follow 
poor-firm performance. Panel A of Table 1.4 classifies CEO-year in my sample into those 
                                                 
20 Industries are defined using the two-digit SIC code. All of my findings are robust to alternative definition of 
industries including using the Fama and French (1997) classification of firms into 48 industries. 
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involving CEO demotions and those not involving demotions. Here, I exclude forced CEO 
turnovers. I have 248 instances of demotions in my sample. I find a lower level of firm performance 
in the CEO demotion group, and the t-test conducted on the difference of the mean firm 
performance parameters shows that the difference is statistically significant for all but one measure 
of firm performance. Notably, the average industry return is higher before CEO demotion 
subsample. Differences in the average industry return between the two groups for all four measures 
are statistically significant. This suggests that CEO demotions are more common in industries that 
have performed relatively better and that peer performance might also trigger such splits. On 
average, CEOs who demoted have longer tenures and higher stock holding in their firm than those 
who either voluntarily left their post or remained as CEO. In regressions that explore the 
performance-demotion sensitivity, I include these variables as controls to ensure that they do not 
bias my conclusions. 
[TABLE 1.4 GOES HERE] 
 Panel B reports results from the univariate test that assort the CEO years in the sample 
into those involving forced CEO dismissals and those involving CEO demotions. Notably, none of 
the firm and peer performance measures are statistically different across the two subsamples. This 
suggest that the state of the firm in terms of performance that triggers the Board to fire the CEO is 
no different from the level of firm performance that prompts them to demote the CEO. And the fact 
that demoted CEOs (compared to fired CEOs) are on average older, have had longer tenure, and 
more of them own 5% or more stake at their respective firms, suggest that the composition of 
managerial skills as well as entrenchment level may affect CEO retention decision. 
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1.5 Main Empirical Analysis 
In this section, I test the effect of firm performance on CEO demotion in a multivariate 
regression setting so as to control for various firm and CEO characteristics that could affect a firm’s 
decision to demote its CEO. 
1.5.1 Baseline Analysis 
 Table 1.5 presents the coefficient estimates. I first employ the Cox proportional hazard 
model (Cox (1972)) to conduct the test since survival model is arguably more suitable to study the 
likelihood of an event taking place. Several prior literature (e.g., Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata 
(2012), and Jenter and Kanaan (2014)) implement Cox proportional hazard model to analyse the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The general form of the model is: 
𝜆(𝑡|𝑋) = 𝜆0(𝛽0 𝐼 ∗ 𝑡)𝑒
𝛽′𝑋 
where 𝜆(𝑡) represents the probability that CEO demotion occurs in year t (the observed hazard 
rate), conditional on such event not happening prior to t. 𝜆0 is the baseline hazard, and X is a matrix 
containing the variables that predict demotion. The hazard model accounts for both the occurrence 
and timing of demotion and allows for the inclusion of time-varying covariates. I allow baseline 
hazards to vary across industries to capture the difference in demotion patterns in different 
industries. I treat voluntary CEO turnovers as right-censored observations in the estimation. The 
primary variable of interest is the Stock return variable. Hypothesis 1 predicts that it has a negative 
coefficient. The univariate test, from the previous section, suggest that industry performance have 
predictive power for the likelihood of CEO demotion. Therefore, I also include industry return as 
a control variable. In addition, I include a number of firm and CEO specific controls that prior 
literature has shown to affect the probability of CEO turnover. The firm-specific control variables 
I include are Firm Size, Leverage, and Volatility. The set of CEO characteristics I include are Age, 
Tenure, and Stock ownership. I add square of Age as an additional covariate to account for the non-
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linear relationship of demotion with CEO’s age. In all regressions, I include year fixed effects to 
account for time trends, and the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
firm level. 
[TABLE 1.5 GOES HERE] 
 Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 1.5 present coefficient estimates from the Cox hazard 
model. Since coefficient estimates are reported instead of hazard ratios, a positive coefficient 
implies a positive marginal impact on the hazard and therefore, higher likelihood of CEO demotion. 
On the other hand, a negative coefficient implies a negative marginal impact on the hazard. Column 
1 uses Ind. adj. stock return as the measure of firm performance, while columns 3 and 5 use Raw 
stock return. Since the earlier univariate analyses were supportive of the prevalence of peer 
performance benchmarking, I also include equal-weighted (value-weighted) industry returns as an 
additional control in column 3 (5). In all three models, stock return is negatively related to the 
hazard rate of CEO demotion and is statistically significant at 1% level. The coefficient estimates 
on Stock return is negative and the size of the coefficient indicates that the impact is economically 
significant. Conditional on the CEO not having experienced the event (demotion) as of the end of 
the last year, a percent decrease in stock return is associated with an increase in the hazard of 
demotion of 39-42% using coefficients in models 1, 3, and 5. This indicates that CEO demotion is 
more likely when the firm performance is poor. 
 Consistent with the results in the univariate test, the coefficient estimates on industry 
return are positive and statistically significant, which indicates that the effect of industry 
performance on the frequency of CEO demotions is economically large. Ceteris paribus, a percent 
increase in equal-weighted industry return is associated with slightly more than 300% increase in 
the hazard of CEO demotion. The effect of value-weighted industry return is slightly lower (115%). 
This statistics suggest that Boards take industry performance into account when assessing the 
retention decision. The relatively lower point estimates for VW industry return compared to EW 
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industry return suggest that Boards take the overall performance of their industry into account 
instead of benchmarking the firm performance against the largest and most visible firms in their 
industry. This is in sharp contrast to the findings on forced CEO turnover, where prior literature 
has found that Boards put relatively higher emphasis on the largest and most visible firms in their 
industry to form a benchmark (see Jenter and Kanaan, (2014)). For the coefficient estimates on 
control variables, I find that CEO demotion is less likely when the CEO owns a large portion of 
the firm's stock, and in firms with greater stock volatility. The magnitude and direction of the effect 
of these variables are consistent with findings on forced CEO turnover (e.g., see Gibbons and 
Murphy (1990), Barro and Barro (1990), and Jenter and Kanaan (2014)). 
 In columns 2, 4 and 6, I repeat my estimates employing a linear probability model. The 
reason for doing this is two-fold. First, employing the linear probability model helps estimate the 
economic significance of my results more easily and in an intuitive manner. Second, linear 
probability model allows me to include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm 
characteristics. Firm fixed effects cannot be included in non-linear COX proportional hazard model 
because of the incidental parameters problem (see Neyman and Scott (1948)). I include 
Ln(1+Tenure) as an additional control since linear probability model does not account for the effect 
of tenure. The results parallel earlier findings. In particular, the negative coefficient on Stock return 
implies that a one standard deviation decline in Stock return results in an increase in the annual 
probability of CEO demotion by 31.56%. Similarly, one standard deviation increase in the industry 
return results in a 43% increase in the likelihood of CEO demotion. 
 Prior literature on CEO turnover implement logit model. To ensure readers that my 
results are not driven by my choice to use hazard model, I re-estimate all the regressions using logit 
model. The results from the logit regressions are consistent with those obtained using the COX and 
OLS models. I choose not to tabulate the results for brevity. The marginal effect of one percent 
decrease in Stock return (all other independent variables left at their mean value) on the implied 
25 
 
probability of CEO demotion is 0.5%. Meanwhile, a percent increase in EW (VW) industry return, 
holding rest constant at their mean value, leads to 1.1% (0.8%) increase in the implied probability 
of CEO demotion. The average probability of CEO demotion increases to 1.4% (1.3%) when stock 
return (industry-adjusted stock return) is at its lowest quintile, compared to 0.7% when the 
performance is at the highest quintile. 
1.5.2 Instrumental Variable Approach 
 Thus far, results are in line with the main hypothesis that poorly performing firms are more 
likely to demote their CEOs. It also suggest that Boards consider peer group performance while 
making these decisions. However, since the models described above include both firm and peer 
performances in the same regression, it may not completely filter peer performance from the firm 
performance. The implication of this would be that the coefficient estimates on Stock return in the 
previous table might be underestimating the impacts of firm performance. To this end, I follow the 
procedure outlined in Jenter and Kanaan (2014) to estimate the sensitivity of CEO demotion to 
firm and industry performance using a two-stage regression approach. In the first stage, I regress 
the daily stock returns on daily industry returns (equal-weighted and value-weighted, separately) 
to decompose firm performance into a predictable (systematic) component caused by the peer 
group performance and an idiosyncratic component attributable to firm performance. This 
procedure is effectively an instrumental variable approach where the firm performance is 
instrumented by the peer group performance. Panel A of Table 1.6 shows results from the first 
stage. The coefficient estimates are similar to those in Jenter and Kanaan (2014). In the second 
stage, I re-run the baseline regression with Stock return and industry return replaced by the 
estimated idiosyncratic firm performance component and the estimated industry performance 
component from the first stage. The results are reported in panel B of Table 1.6. 
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[TABLE 1.6 GOES HERE] 
The coefficient estimates on Stock return from both COX hazard and linear probability 
models are identical to those from the previous table and are statistically significant at 1% level. 
However, the coefficient estimates on predicted equal-weighted industry return component are 
slightly weaker in magnitude and in significance as compared to the point estimates from the 
previous table. The point estimates are 0.709 in the COX hazard model and 0.006 in the linear 
probability model. The point estimate on predicted industry return is of almost the same magnitude 
as in the previous table when industry returns are value weighted, although the significance level 
drops. These findings are in sharp contrast to the ones in forced CEO turnover literature. Jenter and 
Kanaan (2014) document a negative relationship between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover 
and the systematic component of firm performance. 
1.5.3 Robustness Check: Alternative Measures of Firm Performance 
Prior literature studying the performance-forced CEO turnover sensitivity suggests that 
firms may use different measures of firm performance in their decisions to oust the CEO. As for 
instance, Engle, Hayes, and Wang (2003) document an interesting cross-sectional variation in the 
weights placed on accounting-based and market-based firm performance measures, which they 
relate to the properties of these performance measures. In this section, I re-estimate the baseline 
model outlined above using alternative measures of firm performance. In particular, I examine 
whether my results are robust to using Actual - mean forecasted EPS and Ind. adj. ROA instead of 
stock return in the baseline regression. Actual - mean forecasted EPS is defined as the difference 
between a firm’s earnings per share (EPS) and its mean analyst forecast. It proxies for the 
investors’/Boards’ expectation of firm performance and as such, any deviation of the realized 
earnings from analysts’ expectations is attributable, to a degree, to CEO performance. Prior 
literature on forced CEO turnover (see Puffer and Weintrop (1991), DeFond and Park (1999), 
Goyal and Park (2002), and Farrell and Whidbee (2003)) find an inverse relation between forced 
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CEO turnover and the realized earnings falling short of mean consensus earnings. On a different 
note, Ind. adj. ROA is defined as the net income scaled by the mean of lagged and current total 
assets, adjusted for the median ROA of the respective industry. This measure of performance 
provides an indication of a firm’s recent accounting performance relative to the peer group 
performances. Extant literature provides ample evidence on the impact of ROA on forced CEO 
dismissals (e.g., see Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001)). Therefore, to the extent that demotion is 
an alternative to firing, I hypothesize that the likelihood of CEO demotion will increase when (1) 
realized earnings fall short of the mean consensus, and (b) industry-adjusted level of accounting 
performance decline, controlling for other CEO and firm-specific attributes. 
[TABLE 1.7 GOES HERE] 
The point estimates are reported in Table 1.7. Both measures of firm performance are 
lagged by a year. In regressions that employ Actual - mean forecasted EPS, I also include analyst 
dispersion to control for difference in opinions among analysts. Irrespective of the alternative 
measures of firm performance used, the results support the hypothesis that poor firm performance 
increases firm's tendency to demote its CEO. Point estimates from linear probability model (column 
2) indicates that a standard deviation decrease in Actual - mean forecasted EPS results in 25% 
increase the likelihood of CEO demotion. The negative point estimate of -0.693 on Actual - mean 
forecasted EPS obtained using COX hazard model (column 1) also suggest that the likelihood of 
demotion increases after bad firm performance. Using Ind. adj. ROA as firm performance measure 
yields similar results. The probability of demotion increases by 40.6% for one standard deviation 
drop in Ind. adj. ROA. This finding is augmented by the negative coefficient on Ind. adj. ROA from 
COX hazard model (column 3). The implied marginal probabilities of CEO demotion calculated 
from the logit models are -0.6% and -1.5% for one unit increase in Actual - mean forecasted EPS 
and Ind. adj. ROA, respectively (leaving the rest of the controls at their mean values). All in all, my 
earlier findings are robust and conclusions derived from earlier models remain intact in both 
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statistical significance and economic magnitude when alternative measures of firm performance 
are used. 
1.6 Factors that Affect a Firm’s Decision to Demote the 
CEO 
 
Analyses in the previous section suggest that poorly performing firms may decide to retain 
the service of the incumbent CEO in the capacity of executive Chairman, or make him abdicate the 
Chairman position, instead of ousting him. CEO demotion is more attractive when the incumbent 
CEO has firm/industry-specific skills that are hard to acquire, replace and highly valued by the 
firm. CEO demotion is also more attractive if the CEO has performed well throughout his CEO 
tenure but the market conditions dictate the need for a new direction. In addition, the Board of 
Directors would prefer not to fire the CEO if the entrenchment cost is high. In this section, I 
formally test if the composition of managerial skills, CEO’s tenure-long performance, and the 
strength of a firm’s corporate governance are determinants of CEO retention decision.  
1.6.1 Firm/Industry-Specific Skills 
I construct a measure of managerial firm/industry-specific skills using data on CEOs’ 
lifetime work experience in publicly traded firms prior to the year being considered. In particular, 
I consider the following five facets of a CEO's professional career21: 
 Founder (Founder): Starting-up a firm and keeping it profitable/operational requires a 
comprehensive knowledge of the product market, and the industry. Therefore, I flag CEOs 
who are also the founder of the company. 
                                                 
21 Custodio et al. (2013) also construct a measure of general managerial skills using a CEO’s past number of positions, 
firms, industry in which he has worked, whether he held a CEO position at a different company, and whether he worked 
for a conglomerate. Although this measure yields significant results, I chose slightly different CEO attributes in 
constructing my version of firm/industry-specific measure because these are more relevant in this study. 
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 Serve as director of firms operating in the same industry (Directorship Dummy): Serving 
on the board of other firms operating in the same industry exposes the CEO to different 
industry-specific business environment. Directorship Dummy flags all CEOs who have 
only sat on the board of directors of firms that operate in the same industry prior to the 
observation year. 
 Tenure with the firm: The longer the tenure of the CEO with the firm (in any capacity), the 
more firm/industry-specific skills he will amass. 
 Number of firms previously worked in: A CEO who have worked for multiple firms is more 
likely to acquire general skills as opposed to firm-specific skills. This is also true for 
industry-specific skills if those firms (where the CEO was previously employed) operated 
in different industries. 
 Number of industries previously worked in: A CEO who have worked in multiple industries 
is less likely to acquire a industry-specific skills and more likely to acquire general ability. 
Since the above five CEO attributes are correlated, including all five variables in the same 
regression could lead to multicollinearity issues and minimize measurement error. Therefore, I use 
principal component analysis with orthogonal, varimax rotation method (see Kaiser (1958)) to 
create an aggregated firm/industry-specific ability (specialist) index. Panel A of Table 1.8 reports 
the loadings on the factor with an eigenvalue (1.852) higher than one and with easy to interpret 
loadings.22 It has negative loadings on the first three CEO characteristics mentioned above, and 
positive loading on the last two. Thus, we can interpret a lower value of this index as measuring 
firm/industry-specific ability. The specialist index of a CEO in a given year is calculated by 
applying the scores to the variable. As a robustness, in addition to this continuous variable, I use a 
                                                 
22 The second factor (with an eigenvalue of 1.16) had positive loading on all but one variable (Directorship Dummy). 
This is a typical problem with factor analysis. However, note that the principal factor with orthogonal, varimax rotation 
method produces completely independent factors. 
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dummy variable (specialist index dummy), which takes a value of one for CEO-year observations 
with an index value below the yearly 40th percentile and zero if it is above the 60th percentile. 
[TABLE 1.8 GOES HERE] 
Panel B reports coefficient estimates from COX proportional hazard model that re-
estimates the baseline model with an additional explanatory variable− specialist index dummy in 
columns 1, and 3, and specialist index in columns 2, and 4. The coefficient estimates on both 
measures of firm/industry-specific skills have predicted signs and are statistically significant. In 
particular, for a CEO classified as a specialist, the hazard of CEO demotion increases by 137.8%, 
while the hazard of forced CEO turnover decreases by 40.9%. 
 Panel C presents frequencies of CEO demotion and forced CEO turnover for different 
quintiles of specialist index. Consistent with the prediction, the frequency of CEO demotion is the 
highest for the lowest quintile of the index and it monotonously decreases as we move towards the 
top quintile. The spread in the instances (frequencies) of demotion between the lowest and the 
highest quintile is 78 (2.14%). But then, the frequencies of forced CEO turnover is lowest for 
bottom quintiles, while it is significantly higher for the top two quintiles. 
 To test Hypothesis 2(a), firms with specialist CEOs (i.e. specialist index dummy = 1) are 
grouped and labeled as “Specialist”, while firms with general ability CEOs (specialist index dummy 
= 0) are grouped and labeled as “Non-Specialist”. Panel D reports coefficient estimates from COX 
proportional hazard model that re-runs the baseline regressions on the two groups of firms, 
respectively. I find that the previously documented effect of firm performance on CEO demotion 
is restricted to specialist CEOs. The point estimates on stock return for the non-specialist sample 
is not statistically different from zero. On the contrary, the performance-forced CEO turnover 
sensitivity is restricted only to non-specialist CEO subsample. The marginal effects calculated from 
logit regressions show an increase of 58% in the average implied probability of CEO demotion for 
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one standard deviation decrease in the Ind. adj. stock return. For specialist CEOs, the average 
probability of demotion is 1.3% when the firm performance is at the top quintile of firm 
performance, which increases to 2.6% when the firm performance is at the lowest quintile. For non-
specialist CEOs, the corresponding average probabilities are 0.2% and 0.4%, respectively. 
Similarly, the increase in the average implied probability of forced CEO turnover for a standard 
deviation decrease in Ind. adj. stock return is 53% for non-specialist CEOs, while it is statistically 
indifferent from zero for specialist CEOs. 
1.6.2 CEO Tenure Performance 
My analyses, to this point, focuses on the effect of short-term firm performance on CEO 
demotion and implicitly assumes that Boards ignore firm performance (under the incumbent CEO) 
that are older than a year prior to the split date. However, Boards could very well take the CEO’s 
entire performance history into account when evaluating him. Furthermore, his entire performance 
history could also govern the amount of weight Boards put on his recent performance when making 
retention decision. 
To examine this (Hypothesis 2(b)), I factor in the CEO’s entire performance history in the 
baseline regression. Following Jenter and Lewellen (2010), I define the CEO’s tenure-long firm 
performance as the average abnormal return from his first month in office as CEO through the end 
of year t-2, where t is the year of duality split or turnover.23 Therefore, 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝛬 =
∑ 𝑤(𝑘,𝛬)𝑅𝐸−𝑘
𝐸
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑤(𝑘,𝛬)
𝐸
𝑘=1
 
where E is the total months the CEO has been in office as of the end of year t-2, R is the excess 
return in E-k month as CEO, and 𝑤(𝑘,𝛬) = (
𝐸−𝑘
𝐸
)
𝛬
 is the weighting function with the slope 
                                                 
23 A similar weighting function is implemented in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) to calculate weighted average of past 
stock returns and inflation. 
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determined by the parameter Λ. It is in the Boards’ discretion to decide if they want to equally 
weigh all past return or overweigh the more recent performances. To allow for this possibility, I 
use a range of values for the parameter Λ. Λ = 0 implies that boards place the same weight on 
performance in the most recent and distant past. Meanwhile, a higher values of Λ imply that boards 
put more emphasis on the most recent performance. 
 Table 1.9 presents the results. Panel A re-estimate the baseline regression of Table 1.5 with 
Tenure return as an additional control variable. For brevity, only results from COX hazard model 
are reported. The coefficient estimates on Tenure return is positive and statistically significant only 
for Λ={0,1}, which suggest that Boards factor in the entire history and past same weight on 
performance in the most recent and more distant place when considering the option of demoting 
the CEO. In contrast, the coefficient estimates of Tenure return in panel B (which is similar to 
Panel A but uses forced CEO turnover as the dependent variable) is negative, and the magnitude is 
higher for higher values of Λ, implying that the Boards consider multiple years of firm performance 
when making firing decision, but that they put higher weights on performance from the most recent 
past. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates of Ind. adj. stock return is statistically insignificant for 
higher values of Λ, which, again, stress that Boards consider more recent firm performance in 
addition to the performance a year prior to the turnover date in making the firing decision. 
[TABLE 1.9 GOES HERE] 
 In Panel C, I divide the sample into quintiles based on the entire performance history of the 
CEO. The first three columns corresponds to Λ = 0, while the last three corresponds to Λ = 3. For 
Λ = 0, the frequency as well as the number of CEO demotions increases monotonously as we move 
from the lowest to the highest quintiles of Tenure return. The spread between demotion frequencies 
at the lowest and highest quintiles is 1.35%. The corresponding spread for forced CEO turnover is 
-1.42%. When Λ = 3, the monotonous increase in the instances of CEO demotion that was observed 
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in the previous case disappears. 1.41% of CEOs in the lowest quintile, and 1.39% of CEOs in the 
highest quintile were demoted, resulting in a spread of 0.02%. On the contrary, the corresponding 
spread for forced CEO turnover is more pronounced when Λ = 3, and is equal to -2.76%. 
 In Panels D and E, I test the above findings in a regression framework. Specifically, I run 
the baseline regressions separately on two subsamples of firms− one where the Tenure return is 
less than 40th percentile in the sample, and the other with Tenure return greater than 60th 
percentile.24 The point estimates from COX hazard model, reported in panel D, suggest that the 
effect of firm performance on the likelihood of CEO demotion (documented earlier) is concentrated 
entirely in the subsample where the Tenure return (regardless of the value of Λ) is at the top two 
quintiles. The marginal effect of a standard deviation decrease in Ind. adj. stock return on the 
implied probability of CEO demotion is 32 − 53% for subsample of firms in the top two quintiles 
of Tenure return. Meanwhile, the performance-forced CEO turnover sensitivity is entirely 
concentrated in the subsample where the Tenure return is relatively bad. To put things into 
prospective, the marginal effect of a standard deviation decrease in stock return increases the 
implied probability of forced CEO turnover by 111 − 126% if the Tenure return is relatively bad. 
1.6.3 Corporate Governance 
I now test Hypothesis 3. In particular, I examine the impact of firm performance on CEO 
demotion based on the strength of firms’ corporate governance. Since there are no ultimate 
measures of corporate governance, I proxy for the efficacy of corporate governance in three ways. 
First, I replicate the baseline analysis of Table 1.5 for two subsamples of the data divided based on 
the Corporate Governance Index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003).25 This index is based on 
the prevalence of 24 corporate governance provisions at each firm published by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). These provisions are associated with the balance of power 
                                                 
24 Using 50th percentile as a cutoff works equally well. 
25 Data on this is available from Andrew Metrick’s webpage. 
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between shareholders and management, and as such the GIM index proxies for the strength of 
shareholder rights. The higher the index score, the more tools the management has to resist 
shareholder activism, and therefore, the more restricted the shareholders are to discipline the 
management. Therefore, higher values of the GIM index are associated with weaker governance, 
while lower values of the index correspond to stronger corporate governance.26 In my sample, the 
index ranges from 1 to 17, with 9 being the median. As such, I employ 9 as a cutoff to classify 
firms into strongly and weakly governed.  
Second, I re-classify the sample into two subsamples based on the entrenchment index (E-
index) constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2009).27 E-index is composed of six out of the 24 provisions 
featured by the IRRC− staggered board, limit to shareholder amendments of bylaws, supermajority 
approval requirement for mergers and charter amendments, poison pill and golden parachute. 
Therefore, E-index is inversely related to the strength of shareholder rights. In my sample, the index 
ranges from 0 to 6, with the median value of 3. Thence, firms for which an E-index is less than 3 
are classified as having weak governance, whereas firms with an E-index of 3 or more are classified 
as strongly governed. 
Finally, I replicate the baseline analysis for two subsamples of the data divided based on 
the fraction of independent (outside) directors on the Board of Directors. To the extent that 
independent directors monitor the management more effectively, the presence of relatively higher 
proportion of outsiders on the Board should proxy for better governance. The median fraction of 
outsiders in my sample is 0.84 and as such the distribution of fraction of outsiders is right skewed. 
                                                 
26 Following Gompers et al. (2003), I assume that firms have the same governance provisions as in the previous 
publication year during the years between two consecutive publications. The results are quantitatively similar if I 
assume that firms have the same governance provisions as in the next publication year. The same is true when E-index 
is used. 
27 Data on E-index is available from Lucian A. Bebchuk’s webpage. 
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Therefore, I use 40th and 60th percentiles as cutoffs when dividing the sample into low and high 
fraction of outsiders subsample. 
Table 1.10 reports the results. For brevity, I only report coefficient estimates from COX 
proportional hazard model and firm performance proxied by Ind. adj. stock return.28 When either 
GIM- or E- indices are used, the point estimates on Ind. adj. stock return in both subsamples are 
negative and statistically significant. Notably, the magnitude of point estimates on stock return for 
the subsample of firms with weak governance is twice of those in the strong governance subsample. 
However, when fraction of outsiders are used as the proxy for the strength of corporate governance, 
only the coefficient estimates on Ind. adj. stock return for weakly governed firms are statistically 
significant. All in all, the results are consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
[TABLE 1.10 GOES HERE] 
1.7 Involuntary and Voluntary CEO Turnover 
 
In this section, I re-estimate the sensitivities of forced and voluntary CEO turnover to firm 
and industry performances, after re-classifying CEO demotions as involuntary turnovers.  
1.7.1 Involuntary CEO Turnover 
To the extent that the act of diminishing the role of the CEO is a disciplining mechanism, 
and is enforced by the Board of Directors, CEO demotions are involuntary in nature. Therefore, in 
this section, I re-estimate the performance-forced CEO turnover sensitivity after classifying CEO 
demotions as involuntary turnovers.  
[TABLE 1.11 GOES HERE] 
                                                 
28 As in previous cases, the results are identical when linear probability or logit models are used. 
36 
 
Results reported in Table 1.11 are consistent with Hypothesis 4(a). For an ease of 
interpretation, the coefficient estimates from linear probability models are tabulated. Models 1-3 
estimate the likelihood of forced CEO turnover without accounting CEO demotions as involuntary. 
Meanwhile, models 4-6 re-estimate the performance-involuntary CEO turnover sensitivity after 
classifying demotions as involuntary. The sensitivity of involuntary CEO turnover to firm 
performance are stronger in the latter case, irrespective of the firm performance measured used. 
For instance, model 1 suggest that a standard deviation decrease in Ind. adj. stock return increases 
the probability of involuntary CEO turnover by 31.6%, while this sensitivity increases to 68.4% 
after demotions are factored in as involuntary turnovers . Similarly, a unit decrease in Actual - mean 
forecasted EPS is associated with 0.9% and 1.4% increase in the likelihood of involuntary CEO 
turnover before and after accounting for CEO demotions as involuntary turnovers, respectively.  
1.7.2 Voluntary CEO Turnover 
Studies that examine performance-voluntary CEO turnover sensitivity document a negative 
and statistically significant relation (see Kaplan and Minton (2012), and Jenter and Lewellen 
(2010)). This is a surprising stylized fact since voluntary CEO turnover, by definition, should be 
uncorrelated to firm fundamentals. Kaplan and Minton (2012) assert that the negative sensitivity 
of voluntary CEO turnover to firm and industry performances is due in part to a number of 
involuntary turnovers being classified as voluntary. In this study, apart from modifying the current 
classification criterion for forced CEO turnover, I also argue that firms may demote CEOs when 
faced with poor firm performance. The current CEO turnover classification algorithm classifies 
duality splits, where the departing CEO abdicates the CEO title, as voluntary turnovers. 
Furthermore, since CEO-Chair splits that involves the CEO giving up the executive Chairman title 
do not involve a CEO change, the existing turnover algorithm fails to flag such demotions as 
turnovers. To the extent that the decision to demote the CEO is made by the Board, there is no 
reason to believe that such splits are voluntary in nature. As such, I re-examine the sensitivity of 
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firm and industry performances on unforced turnover after factoring demotions as involuntary 
turnovers.  
[TABLE 1.12 GOES HERE] 
Table 1.12 reports the coefficient estimates from COX proportional hazard model.29 The 
dependent variable is the voluntary CEO turnover which excludes forced CEO turnovers and CEO 
demotions. Not surprisingly, the point estimates of firm as well as industry performances are 
statistically insignificant. The results are robust to alternative measures of firm and industry 
performances.  
1.7.3 Competing Risk Framework 
Prior literature on forced CEO turnover treats Board’s firing decision as an event that is 
undisturbed by competing events. As such, the extant literature ignore competing events and 
estimate the cause-specific hazard of the event of interest, either using the semi-parametric COX 
proportional hazard or logit models. This approach gives unbiased coefficients if either competing 
risks are rare (Pintilie (2006)) or censoring due to competing events is independent of the 
occurrence of the event of interest (Putter et al. (2007)). However, my above findings suggest that 
Boards have an alternative to firing the CEO− split the CEO-Chair role or demote the incumbent 
CEO to the executive Chairman position. Therefore, in the presence of this competing risk, the 
coefficient estimates from the standard COX hazard regression (and logit regression) could 
overestimate the risk of forced CEO turnover and thus, the coefficient estimates of firm 
performance may not reflect the actual sensitivity.  
                                                 
29 Results are qualitatively similar when linear probability or logit models are used. 
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In this section, I adopt a competing risks methodology of Fine and Gray (1999)30 to directly 
compare the above two alternative options available to the Board.31 The risk of forced CEO 
turnover and demotion are competing in the sense that these events are mutually exclusive and 
thus, each event censors the other event. Competing-risks methodology proposed by Fine and Gray 
(1999) is quite similar to COX regression. However, unlike COX model which focuses on the 
survivor function for the event of interest, the semiparametric proportional hazard model of Fine 
and Gray (1999) focuses on the failure function, also known as the cumulative incidence function. 
Given covariates X, the model is of the following form: 
?̅?(𝑡|𝑋) = ?̅?0(𝛽0 𝐼 ∗ 𝑡)𝑒
𝛽′𝑋 
where ?̅? is the hazard of the subdistribution, interpreted as the hazard that generates the failure 
event of interest in the next period while being aware that the subject at risk has not experienced 
the event of interest but it might already have experienced the competing event. ?̅?0 is the baseline 
subdistribution hazard for the event of interest. A positive (negative) point estimates imply a 
positive (negative) effect of increasing the covariate on the sub-hazard and thus, on the cumulative 
incidence function. 
[TABLE 1.13 GOES HERE] 
Results from the Fine and Gray regression model are displayed in Table 1.13. For brevity, 
only results for Ind. adj. stock return are tabulated. As expected, the coefficient estimate on Ind. 
adj. stock return is negative and statistically significant. The hazard of forced CEO turnover 
increases by 20.62% for one standard deviation decrease in stock return, taking into account the 
possibility that the Board could demote the CEO. Similarly, a standard deviation decrease in stock 
                                                 
30 Multinomial logistic regression models can also be implemented in the presence of competing risks. However, the 
competing risk model of Fine and Gray (1999) is more suitable since multinomial logit models are less appropriate 
when data is censored or truncated, or when covariates are time dependent. 
31 I exclude voluntary turnover since these decisions are primarily made by the CEO and not by the Board. 
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return corresponds to 17.1% increase in the likelihood of CEO demotion, accounting for the 
possibility of CEO being fired. 
1.8 Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment 
 
In this section, I explore how the sensitivity of CEO demotion to firm performance changes 
in response to an exogenous increase in institutional ownership. To this end, I exploit the quasi-
experimental set up provided by the Russell Index reconstitution to estimate the effect of higher 
institutional investors on the performance-demotion sensitivity. If the above documented relation 
between firm performance and CEO demotion is driven by an omitted variable (such as 
uncertainty), then this sensitivity should not change following the Russell Index reconstitution 
since the annual reconstitution is unlikely to affect the omitted variable. However, prior literature 
find convincing evidence that institutional investors are relatively effective monitors of 
management because of their sophistication and lower-cost of monitoring (e.g., see Black (1991), 
and Gillan and Starks (2000)). As such, the previous analysis on corporate governance shows that 
it is important to the performance-demotion sensitivity.  
I will first describe the construction of the Russell Index and how the annual reconstitution 
of the index leads to an exogenous shock to the institutional holdings. It is followed by a discussion 
of the empirical design, results, and a detailed discussion on the identification. 
1.8.1 Russell Index Construction 
Russell indexes are constructed using an open, published, market capitalization based 
methodology making it transparent and predictable. As of December 2012, “$4.1 trillion in assets 
are benchmarked to the Russell Indexes and more institutional funds track them than all other U.S. 
equity indexes combined.”32 It captures 98% of investable global equity. The broadest U.S. index 
                                                 
32 “Russell U.S. Equity Indexes Construction and Methodology” (March 2014) 
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is the Russell 3000 index, which contains the largest 3000 U.S. companies. The members of the 
Russell 3000 index and its subsets are determined each year during annual reconstitution. On the 
last trading day in May each year, all eligible securities33 are ranked by Russell Investments by 
their proprietary market capitalization measure. The first 1000 largest firms, based on stock market 
capitalization, fall under Russell 1000 and the remaining 2000 firms are classified into Russell 
2000. The breakpoint of Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes is the rank of 1000th. Once the index 
membership is defined, the membership is locked for an entire year. That is, a stock that is classified 
as a member of Russell 1000 will remain in Russell 1000 for the entire year even if its market 
capitalization in the next twelve months (before the next reconstitution) falls below that of stocks 
in the Russell 2000. Likewise, a stock in the Russell 2000 will remain in the Russell 2000 index 
even if the market capitalization in the next twelve months exceeds that of stocks in the Russell 
1000.  
Annual reconstitution occurs on the last Friday in June. After membership to Russell 1000 
and 2000 is determined, Russell adjusts security shares of firms to include only those shares that 
are available to the public. Unlisted share classes, IPO lock-ups, ESOP or LESOP shares, shares 
held by large corporate and private holdings, and government holdings are excluded during the free 
float adjustment.34 The main objective of this “free float” adjustment is to exclude shares that are 
not available for purchase and is not part of the investable opportunity set. The float adjustment 
only determine which price to use in the case of multiple share classes and do not affect the 
membership of indexes. 
                                                 
33 Companies with a total market capitalization of less than $30 million or companies with 5% or less shares available 
in the marketplace are not eligible for inclusion in Russell U.S. indexes. Furthermore, a stock with a closing price at 
or above $1 on its primary exchange on the last trading day in May will be ineligible for inclusion if the average of the 
daily closing prices from its primary exchange during the month of May is also less than $1. 
34 Please see “Russell U.S. Equity Indexes Construction and Methodology” (March 2014) for more on this and Russell 
indexes construction. 
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Once the index membership is determined, stocks in each index are assigned a value 
weighted index weight. The weights are determined by the float-adjusted market capitalization at 
the end of June. Since weights assigned to stocks in Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes are value 
weighted, the index weights for stocks just included in Russell 2000 (i.e. stocks in Russell 2000 
just below the 1000th index cutoff) are significantly larger than the index weights for stocks just 
above the 1000th cutoff. It is because stocks that just missed being included to Russell 1000 will be 
compared to other small stocks in Russell 2000 index, while stocks that just made it to Russell 1000 
index will be weighed against other relatively larger firms. Indeed, in the time period covered by 
our sample, the mean index weight for the top ten firms in Russell 2000 was 0.002, while the mean 
index weight for the bottom ten firms in Russell 1000 was 0.00004.35 
The dollar amount and total number of products benchmarked to Russell 2000 is 
substantially larger than that for Russell 1000. Chang et al. (2014) report that the dollar amount 
benchmarked to Russell 2000 (Russell 1000) in 2002 was 198.2 billion (47.6 billion). The figures 
were 201.4 billion (90 billion) in 2005, and 291.4 billion (172.7 billion) in 2007. Similarly, the 
number of products benchmarked to Russell 2000 (Russell 1000) were 289 (29) in 2002, 275 (48) 
in 2005, and 511 (52) in 2007 (see Chang et al. (2014)). Therefore, when benchmarking is 
concerned, the Russell 2000 is more popular than the Russell 1000. This coupled with the fact that 
firms just excluded from Russell 1000 have a large index weight while firms just included into 
Russell 1000 have trivial weights suggest that most index funds or funds benchmarked to Russell 
1000 or 2000 are unlikely to hold the smallest stocks but are likely to hold the largest stocks in the 
index in order to track it. This is because funds benchmarked to either of the two indexes can 
minimize the tracking error by simply holding stocks with the highest index weights while the 
exclusion of stocks with small index weights will have little to no real impact on performance 
                                                 
35 Chang et al. (2014) report that the mean index weights for top 10 stocks in Russell 2000 that were just excluded 
from Russell 1000 to be 10 times the index weights of bottom 10 stocks just included in Russell 1000. However, their 
sample spans the period of 1996 to 2012 while ours spans 1984 to 2006. 
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metrics. (Roll (1992)). The popularity (based on total amount and total number of products 
benchmarked) and the higher index weights of largest firms in Russell 2000 relative to smallest 
firms in Russell 1000 are the primary vehicles that drives the differences in institutional ownership 
between these two groups of firms, which are otherwise identical in other firm characteristics. 
[FIGURE 1.1 GOES HERE] 
1.8.2 Empirical Design 
The plausibly exogenous variation in institutional ownership I explore centers on the annual 
rebalancing of the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes. Specifically, my empirical strategy utilizes the 
discontinuity in institutional ownership around the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 index cutoff. To 
the extent that the shock to institutional ownership is exogenous and that the exclusion restriction 
is valid, I can investigate how the sensitivity of CEO demotion to firm performance evolve around 
the index breakpoint. Specifically, I will use specifications of the following form:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛼1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +  𝛼2𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑋 𝑅2 + 𝛽1𝑅2 +  𝛽2 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 +  𝛽3 𝑅2 𝑋 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘
+  𝛺 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝛾𝑡 +  𝛾𝑗   
where the subscripts i, j, and t refer to the firm, the industry, and the time in years, respectively. R2 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm is a member of Russell 2000 after 
reconstitution and is zero if the firm is listed as a member of Russell 1000 after reconstitution. Rank 
is the market capitalization ranking centered at zero around the 1000th cutoff. I include Rank and 
the interaction term between Rank and R2 to identify variation near the index breakpoint. My 
discussion above implies that the difference in institutional ownership will be more pronounced 
among firms just excluded from Russell 1000 and firms just included in Russell 1000. Therefore, 
I isolate any discontinuity in the outcome variable around the index cutoff by controlling for any 
mechanical relationship of my outcome variables with market capitalization ranking on either side 
of the benchmark cutoff point and the distance to the breakpoint on either side. For the same reason, 
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i.e. to isolate any discontinuity near the threshold, all the regressions are estimated by triangular 
kernel weighted local linear regressions separately on either side of the threshold.36 Although I run 
a local linear regression in a narrow bandwidth around the index cutoff to non-parametrically 
estimate the effect of institutional ownership on our outcome variables of interest, thus deeming it 
unnecessary to control for other variables or fixed effects, I do include a vector of control variables 
and industry fixed effects for robustness. All regressions include year and firm fixed effects to 
control for unobserved time-related effects. All standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
The expectation from our test is that 𝛼1 < 0< 0 and 𝛼2 > 0. 
[TABLE 1.14 GOES HERE] 
 Table 1.14 reports the results. Ideally, we would like to focus only on firms that are similar 
in every firm characteristics but differ only in terms of total institutional holdings. This can be 
achieved by focusing on a narrow bandwidth of firms around the index cutoff point since the choice 
of bandwidth governs the number of firms to be included on each side of the cutoff. However, there 
is a tradeoff. A narrow bandwidth decreases bias as firms within that narrow bandwidth will be 
more alike. But, small bandwidth also means lower statistical power. As we widen the bandwidth, 
we gain additional statistical power but at a cost of increased bias. Since not all firms in Russell 
3000 are covered by ExecuComp, I choose a bandwidth of 300 firms on each side of the threshold 
to have at least 1000 observations on both sides.37 Panel A of Table 1.14 shows that most of the 
firm characteristics on either side of the cutoff are not statistically different. Panels B present the 
coefficients from local linear regressions (with triangle kernel) of the difference at the cutoff of the 
regression functions to the left and to the right of the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. As predicted, 
the coefficient on Stock return is negative, whereas the coefficient on the interaction term is 
                                                 
36 Results are robust when rectangular kernel is used instead of triangular kernel. 
37 In an untabulated result, I use a bandwidth of 400 firms, in which both magnitude and significance decreases. 
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positive, suggesting that the effect of firm performance on demotion is stronger in weakly governed 
firms. 
1.8.3 Identification 
The validity of this natural experiment hinges on the fact that the exogenous shock to 
institutional holdings is driven only by index inclusion and not by differences in policy choices. 
Here, I provide discussions to mitigate threats to the identification strategy.  
First, my identification strategy relies on the fact that firms’ inclusion to Russell 1000 and 
2000 indexes are not a function of firms’ corporate policy. The fact that Russell indexes are 
constructed using an open, published, market capitalization based methodology makes it 
transparent and the assignment procedure a sole function of stock market capitalization. Given the 
nature of the index construction, reverse causality is out of the window. However, starting with its 
2007 reconstitution, Russell implemented a banding methodology based on the market 
capitalization of the 1000th largest firm to mitigate index turnover. Based on this “banding” policy, 
firms that were in the Russell 1000 (Russell 2000) in the previous year but rank below (above) the 
end of May breakpoint between the Russell 1000 and the Russell 2000 need not be slated to be 
moved to the Russell 2000 (1000). The move takes place only if an index member’s market 
capitalization deviate far enough (outside of the cumulative 5% market capitalization range around 
the new 1000th breakpoint) to warrant an index membership change. For example, a firm that is 
ranked 990 in year t-1 and 1020 in year t stays in Russell 1000 in year t if its cumulative market 
capitalization falls within the cumulative 5% of the market capitalization breakpoint. Therefore, 
starting with 2007, the assignment of firms into Russell 1000 and 2000 is not completely 
determined by the end of May market capitalization. Therefore, I end my sample period in 2006. 
Second concern would be the possibility for firms to self-select into Russell 1000 and 
Russell 2000 indexes. Indeed, if firms are able to manipulate their end of May market capitalization, 
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especially firms around the breakpoint, then the shock to institutional holding will no longer be 
independent of firm policy. However, as pointed out by Chang et al. (2014) and Crane et al. (2014), 
there is no incentive for hedge funds to manipulate when there is a price impact of trading and 
firms cannot precisely control their ranking especially when other firms are also simultaneously 
manipulating. Since firms at the threshold are identical in terms of market capitalization, firms are 
very unlikely to be able to precisely control their rank relative to other firms near the cutoff (Crane 
et al. (2014). Even hedge funds have no incentive to unload their position in stocks that are in 
Russell 2000 but whose market capitalization at the end of May (before reconstitution) is enough 
to place it in Russell 1000. For instance, hedge fund holding stocks of firm A which was ranked 
1001 in year t-1 and has a market capitalization rank of 999 at the end of May, may wish to short 
A. But shorting stock A will make the price of A fall causing its market capitalization to drop as 
well. If this drop in market capitalization is sufficient to move the stock of A above the rank of 
1000, then it will remain in Russell 2000 index, making the shorting self-defeating (Chang et. al. 
(2014)). 
Third, since I capitalize on the actual index assignment made by Russell, I can perfectly 
identify firms assigned to the Russell 2000 index (treatment group) and firms that are placed into 
Russell 1000 index (control group). Finally, since I are running a local linear regressions in a 
narrow bandwidth of firms around the 1000th rank firm, ideally, I would like to have comparable 
firms on either side of the threshold. Although the shock to institutional ownership is a combined 
effect of index assignment and index weights received by each stock (as we have argued above), 
using index weight ranks instead of market capitalization rank may lead to the comparison of firms 
that are not identical in firm characteristics (as pointed out by Chang et al. (2014), Crane et al. 
(2014), and Mullins (2014)). This is because once index membership is determined by Russell 
based on end of May market capitalization data, the market capitalization is adjusted for free floats 
based on Russell’s proprietary float calculation. Note that this adjustment does not re-assign firms 
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into indexes; the float adjustment only influences the weights received by each stock after the 
reconstitution. Nonetheless, the float adjustment could potentially shift the ranking of the firms 
within each index as compared to the market capitalization ranking. For example, a firm that is 
ranked 1000th based on market capitalization might be ranked 900th based on index weights 
received, meanwhile a firm ranked 500th based on market capitalization but with larger free float 
might end up being the lowest ranked firm in terms of index weights. Although possible, I don’t 
see a large difference in ranks generated by market capitalization and index weights.38 Panel A of 
Table 1.14 shows that most of the firm characteristics of firms on either side of the cutoff are not 
statistically significant. Although I include control variables as well as firm fixed effects in all 
regressions, in an untabulated results, I also remove all observations with unadjusted end of May 
market capitalization rank greater than 1300 and less than 700 and re-run all baseline regressions. 
The objective here is to remove any observation with large float adjustment so that we can ensure 
local continuity in potential firm characteristics around the threshold. The results are similar, which 
suggest that my identification strategy is unlikely to be invalid. 
1.9 Market Reaction 
 
Prior studies document a significant positive abnormal return following forced CEO 
turnover (see Furtado and Rozeff (1987), Denis and Denis (1995), Kang and Shivadasani (1996), 
and Huson et al. (2001)).39 These results imply that Boards act in favor of shareholders’ interest. 
However, if the CEOs’ firm/industry specific skills are hard to acquire and replace, and the recent 
poor firm performance dictates a need for a fresh perspective going forward, then demoting the 
CEO might be the optimal course of action for shareholder's interest. In addition, CEO demotion, 
in theory, increase the Board's independence from management and thus, improve monitoring, 
                                                 
38 I obtained Russell’s proprietary end of May/June float-adjusted market capitalization data for 1998-2013. 
39 An exception to this is Jenter and Kanaan (2014) and Kind and Schlapfer (2011). Kind and Schlapfer (2011) find a 
positive abnormal return to forced turnovers of underperforming CEOs, while a negative market reaction to over 
performing CEO turnover. 
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accountability, and provides checks and balances in the boardroom, all of which are a welcome 
news to shareholders. Therefore, even an entrenched boards’ decision to demote the CEO may be 
viewed positively by investors since it diminishes the CEO's authority and scope.  
To assess market reactions to news of CEO demotion, I follow the standard event-study 
methodology. For each firm i, the abnormal return for the stock on day t, ARit, is specified as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡) 
where Rit and E(rit|Xt) are the actual and normal returns respectively for day t, and Xt is the 
conditioning information for the model. Assuming that stock returns follow a single factor market 
model, the abnormal return is defined as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 
where Rit is the return on the stock of i
th firm on day t; Rmt is the return of a market index on day t, 
proxied with the CRSP value-weighted index. The coefficients ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 are ordinary least squares 
estimates of coefficients from the single factor market model, estimated over a 250 trading-day 
period ending 11 days before the split announcement date. I employ different event windows that 
extends from two days before to two days after the split announcement date. I include days prior 
to the first announcement date to account for potential information leakage. The cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAR) over an interval [T1, T2] is given by: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
∑ ∑ 𝐴𝑇2𝑡=𝑇1 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 
 Table 1.15 reports the average CAR along with test statistics obtained from the 
Standardized Cross-Sectional test (Boehmer et al. (1991) and the nonparametric rank test 
introduced by Corrado (1989).40 I drop 35 observations corresponding to CEO demotions because 
                                                 
40 Non-parametric rank test does not rely on specific assumptions about the stock return distribution. 
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the announcement of such splits coincided with other firm/performance related announcements.41 
Panel A shows that the average CAR is significantly positive for all event windows considered. 
The average CAR is highest (1.46%) for the period covering two days before and two days after 
the day of press release, and is lowest (1.13%) for the period covering one day before and one day 
after the announcement date. Panel B (which corresponds to duality splits involving the CEO 
abdicating the Chairman title) shows that the average CAR is positive and statistically significant 
in all but one case. The return is highest (4.52%) for the event window [-2, +2], whereas it is 
statistically indifferent from zero for the event window [-1, +1]. 
[TABLE 1.15 GOES HERE] 
 I also investigate the cross-sectional variation of CARs around the announcement of CEO 
demotion, based on whether or not the CEO is a specialist. Interestingly, the positive CAR 
documented above is concentrated entirely among specialist CEOs. Figure 1.2 further illustrates 
this finding. These results suggest that the market, on average, views CEO demotions positively. 
1.10 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I deviate from the conventional practice and analyze the role of poor firm 
performance on CEO demotion. I find that poorly performing firms have a higher tendency of 
demoting their CEOs. My results are robust to alternative firm performance measures, as well as 
to the inclusion of firm and time fixed effects. Such splits are more likely if the CEO has 
firm/industry specific skills and good performance throughout the tenure as CEO. Using the annual 
reconstitution of Russell indices as an exogenous shock to institutional holdings, I show that such 
splits are more pronounced among entrenched CEOs. Market reactions to such splits are positive 
on average. Finally, I revisit the sensitivity of voluntary and forced CEO turnover to firm 
                                                 
41 The news were typically about poor firm performance and as such, inclusion of these observations decreases the 
significance of the results. 
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performance taking into account CEO demotions as involuntary turnovers. I find that (1) the 
previously documented negative performance-voluntary CEO turnover becomes statistically 
insignificant, and (2) the sensitivity of involuntary turnover to firm performance increases 
significantly, when demotions are classified as involuntary turnovers. These results suggest that 
the two puzzles documented in corporate governance literature are, in fact, two sides of the same 
coin. On the one hand, some voluntary turnovers are not truly voluntary− they are demotions to 
diminish the CEO’s authority and scope. Therefore, it is natural that we see a correlation of 
voluntary turnovers with firm performance. And since these demotions are not captured as 
involuntary turnover, we find a weaker relation with poor firm performance.  
All in all, the purpose of this paper is to take a step towards understanding the role of 
performance and the disciplinary action against the CEO. This study highlights an alternative to 
forced CEO turnover. Although this study only looks at the effect of poor firm performance on 
CEO demotion, other factors may play a role. For instance, in January of 2011, Eric Schmidt left 
the helm of Google Inc. to take on the role of executive Chairman at a time when Google reported 
“earnings that comfortably topped Wall Street forecasts”.42 However, the same press article 
reported that the management shake-up “comes as Google faces a new competitive challenge from 
Facebook, which has taken over from the search company as the internet's most-watched company. 
Google’s failure to come up with a response to Facebook, despite several attempts at developing 
its own social networking services, has prompted the first deep-soul searching at the company, 
which has faced few direct challenges up until now.” I leave it for future research to explore such 
potentially interesting factors that could lead to CEO demotion, and in the process, widen our 
understanding of the corporate governance mechanisms. 
  
                                                 
42 An excerpt from an article in Financial Times entitled “Page becomes Google chief executive”. 
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1.11 Appendix 
 
1.11.1  Variable Definitions 
 Actual – mean forecasted EPS is the difference between a firm's earnings per share (EPS) 
and its mean analyst forecast. 
 Age is the age of the CEO (in years). 
 Age2 is the square of Age. 
 Dispersion is the standard deviation of raw (i.e. not split-adjusted) analysts’ forecasts. 
 E index is the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. 
 EW firm specific return is the residual component from the regression that decomposes firm 
performance into a systematic component caused by peer group performance (equally 
weighted) and a firm-specific component. Put differently, we run the following regression: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1. The 𝜀?̂?,𝑡−1 term is the estimated idiosyncratic 
stock return. 
 EW industry return is the equally-weighted average stock returns for all firms on CRSP 
from the same two-digit SIC industry as the sample firm. I exclude each sample firm from 
the construction of its industry benchmark to eliminate any artificial correlation. 
 EW industry specific return is ?̂?0 +  ?̂?1𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝,𝑡−1 from the above regression. 
 Firm size is the natural log of the total assets of the firm. 
 Fraction of outsiders is the fraction of outsiders on the firm's Board of Directors in a given 
year. 
 G index is the Corporate Governance Index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003). 
 Ind. adj. ROA is the net income scaled by the mean of lagged and current total assets, 
adjusted for the median ROA of the respective industry. 
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 Ind. adj. stock return is the two-digit SIC industry adjusted daily stock return compounded 
for the four quarters. 
 Leverage is the total book value of debt normalized by the sum of the total book value of 
debt and market value of equity. 
 Ln(1+Tenure) is the natural log of 1 + number of years the CEO was in office. 
 Raw stock return is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the fraction of outstanding 
shares owned by the CEO is greater than 5%, and 0 otherwise. 
 Volatility is the volatility in the firm’s stock return over the 12 months. 
 VW firm specific return is the residual component from the regression that decomposes firm 
performance into a systematic component caused by peer group performance (value 
weighted) and a firm-specific component. Put differently, we run the following regression: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑖,𝑡−1. The 𝛾𝑖,𝑡−1 term is the estimated idiosyncratic 
stock return. 
 VW industry return is the value-weighted average stock returns for all firms on CRSP from 
the same two-digit SIC industry as the sample firm. I exclude each sample firm from the 
construction of its industry benchmark to eliminate any artificial correlation. 
 VW industry specific return is ?̂?0 + 𝛼1𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝,𝑡−1 from the above regression. 
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1.11.3  Figures and Tables 
 
TABLE 1.1 
CEO Demotions and Forced Turnover by Performance Level 
The following table shows the number and the frequency of (i) CEO-Chair duality splits where the incumbent CEO leaves the post of 
CEO but remains as (or becomes) the executive Chairman, (ii) CEO-Chair duality splits where the incumbent CEO abdicates the 
Chairman position but retains the CEO position, and (iii) forced CEO succession, in the subsample of firms divided based on the firm 
performance (industry adjusted stock performance). The sample consists of all firms between 2000 and 2010 covered mutually by 
ExecuComp, Compustat and CRSP databases. Successions due to mergers, spin-offs, bankruptcies and interim appointments are 
excluded.   
 
Quartiles Demoted to exec. 
Chairman position (%) 
Retained CEO title but 
left as Chairman (%) 
Forced successions (%) 
1 (Lowest) 66 (1.44%) 16 (0.35%) 161 (3.47%) 
2 68 (1.48%) 7 (0.15%) 97 (2.12%) 
3 42 (0.91%) 9 (0.20%) 58 (1.26%) 
4 (Highest) 37 (0.79%) 3 (0.06%) 65 (1.39%) 
Total (average %) 213 (1.16%) 35 (0.19%) 381 (2.06%) 
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TABLE 1.2 
CEO Turnover Classification 
 
The sample consists of 1,552 CEO successions between 2000 and 2010 for firms whose CEOs are covered by ExecuComp, Compustat and 
CRSP databases. Panel A presents reasons (based on the Factiva news database search) behind each CEO turnover. Successions due to 
mergers, spin-offs, bankruptcies and interim appointments are excluded. Panel B shows the number and the frequency of CEO 
demotions and forced CEO successions in the sample. Classification of each succession into demotions or forced is based on press 
releases surrounding the succession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Reasons # of turnovers 
Voluntary  
     CEO Jump 56 
     Death/Health related 47 
     Family Related 7 
     Retire 805 
     Within Firm Shuffle 27 
     Resigned due to personal reason 
 
14 
Forced  
     Board/Shareholder/ Union Pressure or Strategic Differences 93 
     Contract not renewed 5 
     No reason available 62 
     Performance Related 143 
     Scandal/Probe 
 
78 
Demoted to Chairman Position  
     Became Executive Chairman 36 
     Duality Split 177 
Total 1,552 
Panel B 
Year 
Demoted to exec. 
Chairman position (%) 
Retained CEO title but left as 
Chairman (%) 
 
Forced successions 
(%) 
2000 15 (1.02%) 0 (0.00%)  53 (3.54%) 
2001 15 (0.98%) 2 (0.13%)  25 (1.62%) 
2002 19 (1.20%) 1 (0.06%)  46 (2.90%) 
2003 19 (1.15%) 2 (0.12%)  28 (1.69%) 
2004 24 (1.49%) 6 (0.38%)  35 (2.15%) 
2005 20 (1.27%) 7 (0.45%)  36 (2.27%) 
2006 25 (1.44%) 2 (0.12%)  34 (1.96%) 
2007 21 (1.13%) 4 (0.22%)  33 (1.77%) 
2008 31 (1.70%) 3 (0.17%)  44 (2.44%) 
2009 14 (0.78%) 5 (0.28%)  25 (1.38%) 
2010 10 (0.56%) 3 (0.17%)  22 (1.22%) 
Total 213 (1.16%) 35 (0.19%)  381 (2.06%) 
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TABLE 1.3 
Summary Statistics 
 
The following table presents descriptive statistics of the sample. All variables are defined in Appendix. All continuous control variables 
are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 N Mean SD Median 
Firm performance measures     
Ind. adj. stock return 18817 0.008 0.526 -0.045 
Raw stock return 18817 0.163 0.601 0.077 
EW firm specific return 18817 0.006 0.522 -0.05 
VW firm specific return 18817 0.05 0.527 -0.015 
Actual - mean forecasted EPS 15787 -0.083 0.352 -0.008 
Ind. adj. ROA 16998 0.039 0.123 0.026 
     
Industry performance measures     
EW industry return 18817 0.158 0.389 0.114 
VW industry return 18817 0.199 0.388 0.17 
EW industry specific return 18817 0.157 0.361 0.115 
VW industry specific return 18817 0.113 0.244 0.095 
     
CEO characteristics     
Age 18817 55.043 7.174 55 
Tenure (in years) 18817 7.575 7.32 5.332 
Stock ownership (dummy) 18817 0.249 0.432 0 
     
Firm characteristics     
Volatility 18817 0.476 0.249 0.413 
Firm size 18817 7.511 1.747 7.363 
Leverage 18817 0.344 0.281 0.325 
Dispersion 16037 0.22 0.262 0.124 
Number of segments 15879 2.723 1.829 3 
     
Board characteristics     
Fraction of outsiders 16608 0.825 0.096 0.857 
G index 11991 9.22 2.576 9 
E index 12105 2.485 1.286 3 
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TABLE 1.4 
Univariate Test 
The following tables present univariate evidence of the relation between relatively poor firm performance and CEO 
demotion/turnover. Panel A pertain to subsamples of CEO demotions, while panel B pertain to subsamples of forced CEO turnover. 
In each panel, the sample is further segmented into two groups of CEO demotion/turnover versus non-turnover years. T-test is 
conducted on the difference between the two groups, which is reported in the last column. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix. All continuous control variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent 
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A 
 Demotion years Non-Demotion years  
 N Mean N Mean Difference 
Ind. adj. stock return 248 -0.085 18101 0.012 -0.097*** 
Raw stock return 248 0.101 18101 0.165 -0.064* 
EW firm specific return 248 -0.086 18101 0.01 -0.096*** 
VW firm specific return 248 -0.043 18101 0.054 -0.097*** 
EW industry return 248 0.196 18101 0.157 0.039 
VW industry return 248 0.252 18101 0.198 0.030** 
EW industry specific return 248 0.191 18101 0.155 0.036 
VW industry specific return 248 0.146 18101 0.112 0.034** 
Age 248 55.768 18101 55.069 0.700 
Tenure 248 10.606 18101 7.562 3.045*** 
Stock ownership (dummy)  248 0.423 18101 0.248 0.175*** 
Panel B 
 Demotion years Forced turnover years  
 N Mean N Mean Difference 
Ind. adj. stock return 248 -0.085 381 -0.127 0.042 
Raw stock return 248 0.101 381 0.062 0.039 
EW firm specific return 248 -0.086 381 -0.127 0.041 
VW firm specific return 248 -0.043 381 -0.079 0.036 
EW industry return 248 0.196 381 0.196 0 
VW industry return 248 0.252 381 0.261 -0.009 
EW industry specific return 248 0.191 381 0.191 0 
VW industry specific return 248 0.146 381 0.152 -0.006 
Age 248 55.768 381 52.877 2.891*** 
Tenure 248 10.606 381 5.507 5.101*** 
Stock ownership (dummy)  248 0.423 381 0.152 0.271*** 
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TABLE 1.5 
 
Main Empirical Analysis 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from COX proportional hazard model and linear probability model that examine the likelihood 
of CEO demotions. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Industry adjusted stock return is employed in columns 1 and 2, while annual 
unadjusted stock return is used in columns 3-6. Other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Ind. adj. stock return Raw stock return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 COX OLS COX OLS COX OLS 
Stock return -0.536*** -0.006*** -0.515*** -0.006*** -0.490*** -0.006*** 
 (0.146) (0.002) (0.137) (0.002) (0.136) (0.002) 
EW industry return   1.118*** 0.011**   
   (0.357) (0.005)   
VW industry return     0.773*** 0.010*** 
     (0.299) (0.004) 
Age -0.041 -0.000 -0.038 -0.000 -0.043 -0.000 
 (0.097) (0.003) (0.096) (0.003) (0.096) (0.003) 
Age2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ln(1+ Tenure)  0.026***  0.026***  0.026*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Stock ownership 0.537*** 0.022*** 0.543*** 0.022*** 0.532*** 0.022*** 
 (0.151) (0.005) (0.152) (0.005) (0.151) (0.005) 
Volatility 0.997*** 0.003 1.051*** 0.004 0.987*** 0.003 
 (0.366) (0.007) (0.365) (0.007) (0.363) (0.007) 
Firm Size 0.066 0.001 0.071 0.001 0.066 0.001 
 (0.050) (0.004) (0.050) (0.004) (0.050) (0.004) 
Leverage -0.343 -0.001 -0.346 -0.001 -0.329 -0.000 
 (0.284) (0.008) (0.283) (0.008) (0.285) (0.008) 
Constant  -0.027  -0.032  -0.033 
  (0.092)  (0.092)  (0.092) 
Observations 18349 18349 18349 18349 18349 18349 
Adjusted R2  0.034  0.034  0.034 
Pseudo R2 0.032  0.033  0.032  
Fixed effects Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Firm 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Firm 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Firm 
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TABLE 1.6 
Instrumental Variable Approach 
Panel A presents the coefficient estimates from the first stage regressions that uses industry stock returns to predict firm stock returns. 
Column 1 uses equally weighted industry return while column 2 uses value weighted industry stock return. Panel B presents 
coefficient estimates from COX proportional hazard model and linear probability model that examine the likelihood of CEO demotions 
using the predicted values and residuals from the first stage regression as estimates of peer-group performance and idiosyncratic 
component of firm stock performance, respectively. All controls used in the baseline model are also included but is not reported for 
brevity.  Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A 
 (1) (2) 
EW industry return 0.927***  
 (0.008)  
VW industry return  0.628*** 
  (0.007) 
Constant 0.010*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.065 
Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 COX OLS COX OLS 
EW firm specific return -0.510*** -0.006***   
 (0.140) (0.002)   
EW industry specific return 0.709* 0.006   
 (0.387) (0.005)   
VW firm specific return   -0.508*** -0.007*** 
   (0.144) (0.002) 
VW industry specific return   0.764 0.011* 
   (0.474) (0.006) 
Observations 18349 18349 18349 18349 
Adjusted R2  0.034  0.034 
Pseudo R2 0.033  0.032  
Fixed effects Time & Industry Time & Firm Time & Industry Time & Firm 
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TABLE 1.7 
 
Alternative Measures of Firm Performance 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from COX proportional hazard model and linear probability model that examine the likelihood 
of CEO demotions. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Actual - mean forecasted EPS is used in columns 1-2, while industry adjusted 
Return on Assets (ROA) is employed in columns 3-4. Other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 COX OLS COX OLS 
Actual - mean forecasted EPS -0.475* -0.006*   
 (0.283) (0.003)   
Ind. adj. ROA   -1.274** -0.033** 
   (0.587) (0.016) 
Age -0.165 -0.003 -0.048 0.000 
 (0.101) (0.004) (0.099) (0.004) 
Age2 0.001* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ln(1+ Tenure)   0.028***  0.029*** 
   (0.003)  (0.003) 
Stock ownership 0.556*** 0.024*** 0.599*** 0.024*** 
 (0.168) (0.005) (0.155) (0.005) 
Volatility 1.423*** 0.010 0.741* -0.001 
 (0.407) (0.009) (0.386) (0.008) 
Firm Size 0.097* 0.001 0.076 0.002 
 (0.056) (0.004) (0.050) (0.004) 
Leverage -0.447 -0.004 -0.269 0.002 
 (0.304) (0.010) (0.296) (0.009) 
Dispersion -1.147** -0.009*   
 (0.490) (0.006)   
Constant   0.043  -0.051 
   (0.109)  (0.102) 
Observations 15376 15376 16569 16569 
Adjusted R2  0.031  0.031 
Pseudo R2 0.036  0.022  
Fixed effects Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Firm 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Firm 
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TABLE 1.8 
 
Firm/Industry Specific Skills 
 
Panel A presents the results of applying principal component analysis to five proxies of specialist based on CEOs’ past work 
experience. The index is calculated by applying the scores to each components. Panel B re-estimates the baseline regression (COX 
regression) with an additional control variable: Specialist index dummy (columns 1, and 3), and Specialist index (columns 2, and 4). 
Panel C summarizes the number and frequency of CEO demotion and forced CEO turnover in different sub-samples. Finally, panel D 
presents coefficient estimates from COX proportional hazard model that examine the likelihood of CEO demotion (columns 1 and 2), 
and forced CEO turnover (columns 3 and 4) in a subsample of firms divided based on whether the CEO is a specialist. All controls 
used in the baseline model are also included but is not reported for brevity. Time-to-turnover is right censored. All explanatory 
variables are defined in Appendix. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.    
 
 
Panel A 
 Founder Directorship 
Dummy 
Tenure with the 
firm 
# of firms 
previously 
worked in 
# of industries 
previously worked 
in  
Loadings -0.273 -0.020 -0.600 0.882 0.825 
Scores -0.059 -0.173 -0.217 0.462 0.503 
Eigenvalue 1.852 
Panel B 
Dependent Var: CEO Demotion Forced Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ind. adj. stock return -0.585*** -0.523*** -0.466*** -0.484*** 
 (0.163) (0.144) (0.146) (0.134) 
Specialist index dummy 0.866***  -0.526***  
 (0.180)  (0.130)  
Specialist index   -0.495***  0.118*** 
  (0.131)  (0.044) 
Observations 14288 17889 14396 18024 
Fixed effects Time & Industry Time & Industry Time & Industry Time & Industry 
Panel C 
 Demoted to exec. 
Chairman position  
Retained CEO title but left 
as Chairman  
Forced turnover 
1 (lowest) 2.67% (97) 0.26% (9) 1.49% (53) 
2 1.19% (43) 0.14% (5) 1.30% (47) 
3 0.88% (32) 0.22% (8) 1.63% (59) 
4 0.62% (22) 0.17% (6) 3.11% (112) 
5 (highest) 0.53% (19) 0.17% (6) 2.67% (97) 
Panel D 
Dependent Var: CEO Demotion Forced Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Specialist Non-Specialist Specialist Non-Specialist 
Ind. adj. stock return -0.709*** -0.364 -0.417 -0.456*** 
 (0.213) (0.226) (0.271) (0.162) 
Observations 7208 7079 7161 7235 
Fixed effects Time & Industry Time & Industry Time & Industry Time & Industry 
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TABLE 1.9 
 
CEO Tenure Performance 
 
Panel A re-estimates the baseline regression with an additional control variable: Tenure returnΛ, which for a CEO in year t is the 
weighted average of the monthly excess return from the CEO’s start in office to the end of t-2. Slope of the weighting function is 
governed by Λ, where Λ=0 implies that Tenure return is equally weighted while higher values of Λ implies that return from months 
further away from current year are given smaller weights. Panel B is similar to panel A but uses forced CEO turnover as the dependent 
variable. Panel C summarizes the number and frequency of CEO demotions and forced CEO turnover in different sub-samples. Panel 
D (and E) presents coefficient estimates from COX proportional hazard model that examine the likelihood of CEO demotion (forced 
CEO turnover) in a subsample of firms divided based on Tenure return. All controls used in the baseline model are also included but 
is not reported for brevity. Time-to-turnover is right censored. All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.    
Panel A 
Dependent Var: CEO Demotion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Λ=0 Λ=0.5 Λ=1 Λ=1.5 Λ=2 Λ=2.5 Λ=3 
Ind. adj. stock return -0.555*** -0.549*** -0.543*** -0.533*** -0.520*** -0.507*** -0.497*** 
 (0.155) (0.158) (0.161) (0.165) (0.169) (0.175) (0.180) 
Tenure returnΛ 3.765** 2.777* 2.084 1.473 0.895 0.411 0.072 
 (1.679) (1.666) (1.720) (1.853) (2.089) (2.361) (2.559) 
Observations 14616 14616 14616 14616 14616 14616 14616 
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 
Fixed effects Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
 
 
Panel B 
Dependent Var: Forced Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Λ=0 Λ=0.5 Λ=1 Λ=1.5 Λ=2 Λ=2.5 Λ=3 
Ind. adj. stock return -0.525*** -0.455*** -0.390** -0.340* -0.306* -0.288 -0.283 
 (0.172) (0.173) (0.174) (0.175) (0.176) (0.178) (0.179) 
Tenure returnΛ -4.165 -6.394* -7.784** -8.479** -8.635*** -8.429*** -8.014*** 
 (3.014) (3.330) (3.376) (3.301) (3.178) (3.045) (2.916) 
Observations 14680 14680 14680 14680 14680 14680 14680 
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.068 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 
Fixed effects Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C 
 Demoted to 
exec. Chairman 
position 
Retained CEO 
title but left as 
Chairman 
Forced 
turnover 
Demoted to 
exec. Chairman 
position 
Retained CEO 
title but left as 
Chairman 
Forced 
turnover 
Tenure returnΛ 
quintile Λ=0 Λ=0 Λ=0 Λ=3 Λ=3 Λ=3 
1 (lowest) 0.76% (22) 0.14% (4) 3.50% (105) 1.05% (30) 0.36% (10) 4.29% (126) 
2 0.99% (29) 0.31% (9) 1.65% (48) 1.80% (53) 0.28% (8) 1.44% (42) 
3 1.59% (47) 0.07% (2) 1.06% (31) 1.62% (48) 0.10% (3) 1.23% (36) 
4 1.49% (44) 0.31% (9) 1.27% (37) 1.21% (36) 0.14% (4) 1.11% (33) 
5 (highest) 2.08% (62) 0.17% (5) 2.08% (61) 1.25% (37) 0.14% (4) 1.53% (45) 
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Panel D 
Dependent Var: CEO Demotion 
 Tenure returnΛ=0 ≥ 
60th percentile 
Tenure returnΛ=0 ≤ 
40th percentile 
Tenure returnΛ=3 ≥ 
60th percentile 
Tenure returnΛ=3 ≤ 
40th percentile 
Ind. adj. stock return -0.644*** -0.370 -0.632*** -0.345 
 (0.194) (0.573) (0.221) (0.462) 
Observations 5871 5798 5896 5770 
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.064 0.081 0.044 
Fixed effects Time & Industry Time & Industry Time & Industry Time & Industry 
 
 
 
 
Panel E 
Dependent Var: Forced Turnover 
 Tenure returnΛ=0 ≥ 
60th percentile 
Tenure returnΛ=0 ≤ 
40th percentile 
Tenure returnΛ=3 ≥ 
60th percentile 
Tenure returnΛ=3 ≤ 
40th percentile 
Ind. adj. stock return -0.178 -1.284*** -0.108 -1.105*** 
 (0.161) (0.305) (0.197) (0.310) 
Observations 5867 5882 5897 5852 
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.100 0.085 0.091 
Fixed effects Time & Industry Time & Industry Time & Industry Time & Industry 
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TABLE 1.10 
 
Corporate Governance 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from COX proportional hazard model that examine the cross-sectional variation in the 
likelihood of CEO demotion. The sample is divided into two subsamples based on the corporate governance level of the firm. Three 
different measures of corporate governance are used: G-Index (constructed by Gompers et al. (2003)), E-index (constructed by Bebchuk 
et al. (2009)), and fraction of outsiders on the board. Since the distribution of fraction of outsiders is right skewed, we use 40th and 60th 
percentiles as cutoffs when dividing the sample into low and high fraction of outsiders subsample. Time-to-turnover is right censored. 
Time-to-turnover is right censored. Industry-adjusted stock return is used as the Stock return measure. Other explanatory variables 
are defined in Appendix. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 G -index< 9 G-index ≥ 9 E -index< 3 E-index ≥ 3 Fraction of 
outsider≥60th 
percentile 
Fraction of 
outsider≤40th 
percentile 
Stock return -0.457** -0.831** -0.499** -0.855** -0.876 -0.542*** 
 (0.221) (0.362) (0.230) (0.406) (0.554) (0.197) 
Age 0.338** -0.165 -0.084 0.053 0.510 0.069 
 (0.163) (0.221) (0.129) (0.318) (0.442) (0.126) 
Age2 -0.003** 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
Stock ownership 0.454 1.139*** 0.637** 0.738*** 0.916** 0.114 
 (0.289) (0.270) (0.266) (0.282) (0.422) (0.201) 
Volatility 2.497*** 0.276 1.940*** 0.133 1.137 0.745 
 (0.651) (0.676) (0.592) (0.729) (0.945) (0.530) 
Firm Size 0.149 0.086 0.187** 0.002 -0.080 0.128* 
 (0.092) (0.083) (0.079) (0.105) (0.135) (0.068) 
Leverage -0.326 -0.038 -0.330 0.263 -0.287 -0.465 
 (0.520) (0.462) (0.434) (0.583) (0.693) (0.372) 
Observations 4613 7077 5742 6067 6468 6542 
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.067 0.067 0.048 0.100 0.044 
Fixed effects Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
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TABLE 1.11 
 
Involuntary CEO Turnover Revisited 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from linear probability model that examine the likelihood of involuntary CEO turnover. 
Models in columns 1-3 follows traditional approach and as such treats CEO demotions as voluntary. Meanwhile, models in columns 
4-6 treat CEO demotions as involuntary turnover. Time-to-turnover is right censored. All controls used in the baseline regression are 
also used but is not tabulated for brevity. All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
firm and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 CEO demotions treated as voluntary CEO demotions treated as involuntary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Ind. adj. stock 
return 
-0.006**   -0.013***   
 (0.003)   (0.003)   
Actual - mean 
forecasted EPS 
 -0.009***   -0.014***  
  (0.003)   (0.004)  
Ind. adj. ROA   -0.130***   -0.157*** 
   (0.023)   (0.027) 
Observations 18817 15727 16998 18817 15727 16998 
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.008 0.057 0.051 0.008 0.055 
Fixed effects Time & Firm Time & Firm Time & Firm Time & Firm Time & Firm Time & Firm 
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TABLE 1.12 
 
Voluntary Turnover Revisited 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from COX proportional hazard model that examine the likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover. 
Models in columns 1-3 follows traditional approach and as such treats CEO demotions as voluntary. Meanwhile, models in columns 
4-6 treat CEO demotions as involuntary turnover. All controls used in the baseline model are also included but is not reported for 
brevity. Time-to-turnover is right censored. All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Robust standard errors are clustered 
by firm and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 CEO demotions treated as voluntary CEO demotions treated as involuntary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ind. adj. stock return -0.150**   -0.108   
 (0.066)   (0.069)   
EW firm specific 
return 
 -0.146**   -0.104  
  (0.066)   (0.069)  
EW industry specific 
return 
 0.144   0.144  
  (0.182)   (0.190)  
VW firm specific 
return 
  -0.153**   -0.108 
   (0.068)   (0.070) 
VW industry 
specific return 
  0.210   0.260 
   (0.198)   (0.207) 
Observations 18436 18436 18436 18188 18188 18188 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.080 0.080 0.080 
Fixed effects Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
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TABLE 1.13 
 
Competing Risk Framework 
 
The table below reports the coefficient estimates from competing risk survival regressions. The dependent variable used in each 
regression is indicated in the first row while the competing risk is indicated in the third row. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Other 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Var: Type 1 and Type 2 Splits Forced Turnover 
 (1) (2) 
Competing Risk: Forced Turnover Type 1 and Type 2 Splits 
   
Ind. adj. stock return -0.392*** -0.498*** 
 (0.142) (0.128) 
Age -0.073 0.202 
 (0.095) (0.123) 
Age2 0.001 -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Stock ownership 0.656*** -0.657*** 
 (0.144) (0.152) 
Volatility 0.803** 1.725*** 
 (0.323) (0.226) 
Firm Size 0.053 0.051 
 (0.044) (0.042) 
Leverage -0.645** 0.109 
 (0.283) (0.173) 
Observations 18727 18817 
Log pseudolikelihood -1791.17 -2868.99 
Fixed effects Time & Industry Time & Industry 
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TABLE 1.14 
Quasi-Natural Experiment: Russell Index Reconstitution 
 Panel A of this table presents the baseline summary statistics for a bandwidth of 300 firms on each side of the index cutoff.  All 
continuous control variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent level. Panel B presents coefficients from local linear regressions (with 
triangle kernel) of the difference at the cutoff of the regression functions to the left and to the right of the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. 
The dependent variable is the indicator variable for CEO demotion. Coefficients should be interpreted as the effect on the dependent 
variable of being assigned to the top of Russell 2000 index instead of bottom of Russell 1000 index among firms close to the cutoff, in 
12 months following Index reconstitution. To avoid misclassification, only those firms that are also covered by COMPUSTAT, CRSP, 
and ExecuComp are included in the regression. Robust standard errors are used. *, **, and *** indicate significance level of 0.1, 0.05, 
and 0.01 respectively. 
         Panel A 
 
Firms in the Russell 1000 
Index 
  
Firms in the Russell 2000 
Index 
   
Variable N Mean SD  N Mean SD  Difference 
Ind. adj. stock return 1086 0.065 0.472  1242 0.085 0.468  -0.02 
EW firm specific return 1086 0.066 0.471  1242 0.086 0.467  -0.02 
VW firm specific return 1086 0.126 0.472  1241 0.153 0.467  -0.027 
EW industry specific return 1086 0.145 0.226  1242 0.148 0.235  -0.003 
VW industry specific return 1086 0.083 0.181  1241 0.08 0.19  0.003 
Age 1086 54.346 7.119  1242 54.306 6.872  0.04 
Tenure (in years) 1086 7.693 7.587  1242 7.031 6.907  0.662** 
Stock ownership (dummy) 1086 0.021 0.04  1242 0.015 0.03  0.006*** 
Volatility 1086 0.407 0.218  1242 0.436 0.214  -0.029** 
Firm size 1086 7.513 1.042  1242 7.02 0.975  0.493*** 
Leverage 1086 0.347 0.263  1242 0.346 0.266  0.001 
          
 
       Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ind. adj. stock return EW firm specific return VW firm specific return 
R2 -0.010 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Stock Return -0.027** -0.025** -0.023** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
R2 X Stock Return 0.021** 0.022** 0.025** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 2319 2319 2318 
Bandwidth 300 300 300 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Time & Firm Time & Firm Time & Firm 
 
 
  
72 
 
TABLE 1.15 
 
Market Reaction 
 
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal stock returns surrounding the CEO demotion date for different event windows. 
The parameters for the market model are estimated over a period of 250 trading days ending 11 days prior to the CEO demotion 
announcement date. Standardized cross-sectional test statistics (introduced by Boehmer et. al. (1991)) and non-parametric rank test 
statistics (introduced by Corrado (1989)) are reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Panel A 
Demoted to exec. Chairman position 
   Specialist 
 
Non-Specialist 
Days N Mean 
CAR 
Standardi
zed cross-
sectional 
test 
Non-
parametr
ic rank 
test 
N Mean 
CAR 
Standardiz
ed cross-
sectional 
test 
Non-
parametric 
rank test 
N Mean 
CAR 
Standardized 
cross-sectional 
test 
Non-
parametr
ic rank 
test 
[0,+1] 183 1.21% 2.038** 2.959*** 110 1.97% 3.266*** 3.720*** 40 0.35% 0.494 0.530 
[0,+2] 183 1.32% 2.116** 3.054*** 110 2.05% 2.935*** 3.496*** 40 0.34% 0.311 0.200 
[-1.+1] 183 1.13% 1.865** 2.339*** 110 1.89% 2.945*** 3.009*** 40 -0.34% 0.002 -0.549 
[-2,+2] 183 1.46% 2.419*** 2.564*** 110 2.04% 2.676*** 2.428*** 40 -0.50% -0.113 -0.777 
 
 
 
 
Panel B 
Retained CEO title but left as Chairman 
   Specialist 
 
Non-Specialist 
Days N Mean 
CAR 
Standardiz
ed cross-
sectional 
test 
Non-
parametr
ic rank 
test 
N Mean 
CAR 
Standardize
d cross-
sectional 
test 
Non-
parametric 
rank test 
N Mean 
CAR 
Standardized 
cross-sectional 
test 
Non-
parametr
ic rank 
test 
[0,+1] 30 2.14% 1.490* 0.729 13 3.30% 1.463* 1.307* 12 0.91% 0.347 -0.826 
[0,+2] 30 4.40% 2.304** 1.999** 13 7.04% 2.230** 2.597*** 12 1.74% 0.500 -0.497 
[-1.+1] 30 1.05% 0.562 0.210 13 1.83% 0.647 0.997 12 -0.59% -0.597 -1.532* 
[-2,+2] 30 4.52% 2.488*** 2.248** 13 6.80% 1.914** 2.055** 12 1.34% 0.344 -0.007 
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FIGURE 1.1 
Institutional Holdings after Annual Russell Index Reconstitution 
The graphs in this section presents the total institutional holding  in a narrow window centered on the index cutoff. 
Firms to the left of the cutoff are in the larger Russell 1000 index while firms to the right of the cutoff are in the Russell 
2000. Figure 1.1 adds local linear regression estimates (with triangle kernel) and the associated 95% confidence bands 
while figure 1.2 adds local polynomial regression estimates (with triangle kernel) and the associated 95% confidence 
bands using the Rule of Thumb (ROT) optimal plug-in bandwidth estimate. There is also a superimposed scatterplot of 
the data’s average value in bins. No year fixed effects are included in either specificaiton for the purpose of clarity 
regarding the ultimate data. Institutional holding data is winsorized at 1 and 99% level to mitigate the effects of outliers.  
 
  
Figure 1.1.1     Figure 1.1.2   
    
 
  
0
.3
0
0
.4
0
0
.5
0
0
.6
0
0
.7
0
T
o
ta
l 
In
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
a
l 
H
o
ld
in
g
-300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300
Russell Index Rank
Bins of 10 rank positions
Institutional Holding immediately post-reconstitution
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
T
o
ta
l 
In
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
a
l 
H
o
ld
in
g
-300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300
Russell Index Rank
Bins of 10 rank positions
Institutional Holding immediately post-reconstitution
74 
 
FIGURE 1.2 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Figure 2.1 (figure 2.2) shows the 5-day average cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date of demotion 
of the CEO to the executive Chairman position (CEO remains as CEO but abdicates the Chairman title) estimated using 
the market model where the parameters for the model are estimated over a period of 250 trading day ending 11 days 
prior to the duality split announcement date.   
 
     Fig. 1.2.1: Demoted to exec. Chairman position 
                                                      
      Fig. 1.2.2: Retained CEO title but left as Chairman 
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Chapter 2: The Role of Deferred Pay in 
Retaining Managerial Talent 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Retaining and motivating talented executives is a key ingredient for firms to create 
shareholder value. This is especially the case for human capital-intensive firms where value 
creation requires executives to acquire and develop firm-specific knowledge. Frequent turnover 
among executives will not only result in loss of valuable firm-specific knowledge but will also 
affect the incentives of the executive to acquire the knowledge in the first place. Understanding 
this, in practice, firms use a number of implicit and explicit contractual features to retain talented 
executives. The recent controversy about information technology firms colluding in their hiring 
practices to limit poaching talent from each other highlights the extent to which firms are willing 
to go to retain talent.43 Chief among the explicit (and legal!) contractual provisions employed by 
firms to retain talent is deferred pay. To the extent an executive forfeits all deferred pay if she 
leaves the firm, deferring pay will increase the cost (to the executive) of early exit.  
Despite its importance, the effectiveness of deferred pay in helping firms retain talent has 
received limited research attention. This is mainly because of lack of data on the extent of deferred 
pay. In this paper, we use information on the vesting provisions of stock and option grants for a 
sample of S&P 1500 firms to study the role of deferred stock and option grants (deferred pay from 
now on) in executive turnover. Our analysis also helps us understand the importance of executive 
talent and firm-specific knowledge for both the design of deferred pay and executive turnover.  
                                                 
43 See Wall Street Journal articles titled “Ebay settles recruiting allegations” dated May 1, 2014 and “Tech 
companies agree to settle wage suit” dated April 24, 2014. 
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       Specifically, we study the effectiveness of deferred pay in helping firms retain the top five 
highest paid executives of the firm. We focus on the top five executives because of availability of 
detailed data on deferred pay and also because the highest paid executives are likely to be among 
the most valuable employees of the firm and their retention should be of utmost importance to the 
firm.  
       A typical compensation package for a top executive includes both a cash (salary and bonus) 
and a stock component (restricted stock and stock options). Firms typically defer the stock 
component of pay. Every stock and option grant is associated with a vesting schedule and the 
manager is not allowed to exercise or sell (or hedge) the grant until it vests. A manager who 
voluntarily or involuntarily leaves the firm typically forfeits all the unvested grants. The retention 
incentives provided by a stock or option grant depends both on the size of the grant and the length 
of the remaining vesting schedule. All else equal, a larger grant and one with a longer vesting 
schedule will provide greater retention incentives. To capture these twin effects, we employ the 
measure of executive pay duration (Duration), introduced by Gopalan et. al., (forthcoming), to 
quantify the extent of long-term retention incentives provided by an incentive contract. Duration 
is the weighted average of the vesting periods of all four components of pay (salary, bonus, 
restricted stock, and stock options), with each component’s weight being the fraction of that 
component in the executive’s total compensation.44 In our empirical analysis, we estimate the effect 
of Duration on the probability of an executive turnover.45 
       We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the relation between pay Duration and the 
likelihood of voluntary executive turnover. We classify a CEO turnover as involuntary following 
                                                 
44 The vesting periods of cash and bonus are zero, and thus the magnitude of the calculated pay duration 
depends on the vesting periods of stock options and restricted stocks, and their relative weights in the total 
compensation.  
45 In constructing Duration, we do not include any vesting provisions embedded in the pension provisions 
of the firm. To this extent, Duration may be a noisy measure of the extent of deferred pay. We discuss this 
further in Section 3.2. 
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the criteria in Parrino (1997) complemented by two of our own. We reclassify an involuntary 
turnover according to Parrino (1997) as voluntary if the CEO’s employment record, obtained from 
Boardex and Marquis Who’s Who publications, suggests that the CEO takes a comparable position 
elsewhere, or if the press reports announcing the turnover convincingly explain that the departure 
is due to previously undisclosed personal or business reason that is unrelated to the firm’s activities. 
All the CEO turnovers not classified as forced or due to mandatory or planned retirements are 
classified as voluntary. We identify turnover of other senior executives using ExecuComp and 
BoardEx. We classify a non-CEO senior executive turnover as voluntary if it is not due to 
retirement, health reasons and if we are able to identify the executive’s new employment from 
ExecuComp or BoardEx. We call such voluntary turnovers as executives “jumping ship”. 
       We expect a longer pay Duration to reduce the likelihood of a voluntary turnover because 
any outside opportunity should be sufficiently valuable to the executive so as to compensate for 
the lost unvested pay. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that senior executives with longer 
pay Duration are less likely to voluntarily leave the firm. This is true both for CEOs and for other 
senior executives. The effects we document are economically very large. We find that a one 
standard deviation increase in Duration (an increase by 0.97 years) is associated with a 58% 
decrease in the likelihood of a voluntary CEO turnover in a given year. For other senior executives, 
we find that a one standard deviation increase in Duration (an increase by 0.88 years) is associated 
with a 150% reduction in the probability of an executive jumping ship. We find that the link 
between pay duration and executive turnover becomes stronger when we complement our measure 
of pay duration by including unvested stock and option grants from prior years (Duration-2). 
       A negative correlation between Duration (or Duration-2) and voluntary executive turnover 
may not imply a causal effect of deferred pay on turnover. Firm-level and executive-level omitted 
variables can bias the coefficient. The important firm-level omitted variable that may affect both 
Duration and the likelihood of executive turnover is the importance of firm-specific knowledge. 
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All else equal, in situations where firm-specific knowledge is more important, firms are likely to 
offer longer Duration pay and executives of such firms may also remain longer with the firm 
because of the difficulty of applying their (firm-specific) knowledge elsewhere. The important 
executive-level omitted variable is executive talent. All else equal, executives perceived to be more 
talented by the board will obtain longer duration pay and such executives may also remain longer 
with the firm, given their favorable internal perception.46 
       To overcome this endogeneity issue, we implement an IV regression where we instrument 
for Duration-2. Our instrument identifies years in which a large prior-year stock or option grant 
vests (Large vesting) so that the executive’s overall pay duration decreases. To ensure our 
instrument is truly exogenous, we focus on grants that were granted more than two years prior. A 
similar instrument is used by Edmans, Fang and Lewellen (2014) to study the effect of stock vesting 
schedules on managerial myopia. We use these vesting episodes as instances that shock pay 
duration and estimate its effect on executive turnover. To the extent that these grants were awarded 
in the distant past, their vesting is unlikely to be correlated with (time-varying) firm and executive-
level omitted variables. In the IV specification, we control for all time invariant firm-specific 
factors by including firm fixed effects. Our IV results corroborate our OLS estimates and indicate 
a causal effect of Duration on executive turnover. We find our IV estimates to be larger than the 
OLS estimates. The relationship between stock and option vesting and executive turnover that we 
uncover may also help explain why such episodes are associated with managerial myopia (Edmans, 
Fang, and Lewellen 2014).  
       In our next set of tests, we estimate the effect of pay duration on the likelihood of 
involuntary executive turnover. To the extent that the decision to remove a CEO is taken by the 
                                                 
46 Since neither firm-specific knowledge nor executive talent is observable, we implicitly use these terms as 
a catch-all for all firm-specific and executive-specific factors that may both increase pay duration and 
decrease the likelihood of a voluntary turnover. 
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board in the shareholders’ best interest, one does not expect a causal relationship between Duration 
and the likelihood of forced turnover. The board should not be concerned with the executive losing 
(or not losing) her unvested stock/option grants when deciding to remove her. On the other hand, 
there are three non-mutually exclusive reasons why Duration and forced executive turnover may 
be negatively correlated. The negative correlation may arise due to the two omitted variables 
mentioned before, executive talent and the importance of firm-specific knowledge. Whenever an 
executive is perceived to be talented or firm-specific knowledge is more important, not only will 
the board offer a longer Duration pay ex ante, but will also be reluctant to fire such an executive.  
Duration and forced executive turnover may also be negatively related due to poor firm-level 
corporate governance. To the extent the executive forfeits unvested pay when being forced out, 
boards (that act in the executive’s best interest) may be reluctant to fire an executive with long-
duration pay. We perform tests to understand the validity of these three reasons. 
       We find that CEOs (and non-CEO executives) are less likely to experience an involuntary 
turnover if they have a longer Duration pay. The effect of Duration on involuntary turnover is also 
economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in Duration is associated with a 57.5% 
(60.3%) decrease in the likelihood of an involuntary CEO (senior executive) turnover. 
       To the extent executive talent is time invariant, we expect time-invariant executive-specific 
factors to proxy for executive talent. To isolate the effect of CEO talent on the relationship between 
pay duration and forced CEO turnover, we repeat our baseline estimation after including CEO fixed 
effects. We find that the inclusion of CEO fixed effects marginally reduces the size of the 
coefficient on Duration but significantly increases the standard errors and hence the coefficient 
becomes insignificant. This is consistent with time-invariant executive-level factors having an 
effect on the relation between Duration and forced CEO turnover (Graham et al. 2011). In 
additional tests looking at time-invariant executive factors, we find that an executive’s pay duration 
in prior employment (Prior duration) is negatively related to the likelihood of a forced turnover. 
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This offers further support for the effect of time-invariant executive-level factors on the duration-
forced turnover relationship.  
       To isolate the effect of the importance of firm-specific knowledge on the relationship 
between pay duration and forced executive turnover, we perform two sets of tests. First, we repeat 
our baseline estimation after including firm fixed effects. To the extent that the importance of firm-
specific knowledge is time-invariant, firm fixed effects should capture it. Surprisingly, we find that 
inclusion of firm fixed effects does not significantly affect the size of the coefficient on Duration 
as compared to the OLS estimate, where we include industry fixed effects. This highlights that 
time-invariant firm-specific factors do not appear to have a significant effect on the relation 
between Duration and forced CEO turnover.  
       The importance of firm-specific knowledge could be time varying. In situations where firm-
specific knowledge is important, firms are likely to offer longer Duration pay for all the top 
executives of the firm. The average duration of the other senior executives in the firm in any year 
could therefore measure the importance of firm-specific knowledge for that firm during that year. 
Consistent with the importance of firm-specific knowledge, we find that CEOs are less likely to 
experience forced turnover if the firm offers higher average duration pay to the other senior 
executives in the firm.47 
       To estimate the extent to which the negative association between pay duration and forced 
executive turnover is due to poor firm-level corporate governance, we repeat our tests after 
including an interaction term between Independent, a dummy variable that identifies firms with 
above-median fraction of independent directors in the board and Duration. We find that the 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant. Thus, the negative relation between 
                                                 
47 The average duration of the other executives could proxy for factors other than the importance of firm-
specific knowledge. To this extent, we do not interpret this evidence as causal.  
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Duration and forced CEO turnover is stronger in the subsample of firms with more independent 
boards. This suggests that poor corporate governance is unlikely to account for the negative 
association between pay duration and forced turnover.  
       An interesting puzzle in the empirical corporate governance literature is the low sensitivity 
of forced CEO turnover to firm performance. That is, CEOs are not fired immediately on poor 
stock performance. Taylor (2010) uses a structural model to argue that the low correlation may be 
due to firms facing switching costs when they replace CEOs. To the extent that Duration captures 
these switching costs, one would expect executives with longer Duration to have a lower 
performance-turnover sensitivity. Our results support this conjecture. We find that the forced 
turnover of CEOs with above-median Duration is not sensitive to stock return. On the other hand, 
for CEOs with below-median Duration, turnover is very sensitive to stock return.  
       In our final set of tests, we look at the choice between an insider versus an outside to replace 
the firm’s CEO. Consistent with longer pay duration indicating the importance of firm-specific 
knowledge, we find that firms that offer a longer-duration pay contract to their executives are more 
likely to recruit an insider to replace the CEO. Hiring CEOs from inside the firm, in turn, also help 
retain insiders and motivate them to invest in the acquisition of firm-specific knowledge.  
       Our paper makes a number of contributions to the empirical compensation literature. We 
are the first to use detailed information on vesting schedules to estimate the effect of deferred pay 
on executive turnover. Prior research that looks at the link between compensation and turnover 
relate the level of stock-based pay to managerial turnover (e.g., Balsam and Miharjo 2007; Fee and 
Hadlock 2003; Hasenhuttl and Harrison 2002; Mehran and Yermack 1997). In comparison, our 
duration measure, which accounts for both the level and the vesting period of stock-based pay, 
better captures the cost that managers incur when they leave the firm and reveals the firm’s 
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retention intention. Our detailed vesting data also allow us to design sharper tests to estimate the 
causal effect of deferred pay on turnover. 
       Our paper also contributes to the literature that studies the performance-turnover sensitivity 
of CEOs. Prior literature shows that, in contrast to what economic theories predict, the sensitivity 
of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is rather modest (e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; 
Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; Huson, Parrino, and Starks 2001; Warner, Watts, and Wruck 1988; 
Weisbach 1988). We find that pay Duration has an important moderating role on the performance-
turnover relationship. This suggests that the switching costs in replacing talented executives may 
go towards explaining the weak performance- turnover relationship.  
       The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops testable hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the sample and variables used in the empirical tests. Section 4 presents our 
main analysis on pay duration and executive turnover. Section 5 concludes. Definitions of other 
variables appear in Appendix B.  
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
   In this section, we outline the hypotheses that have predictions for our setting. Firms often 
defer pay to retain valuable talent. Deferring pay will also enable the firms to provide incentives 
for the executives to invest in firm-specific knowledge. Lately, the preferred mode for firms to 
defer pay is to award a large part of the executive’s annual compensation in the form of restricted 
stock and stock options and to get these awards to vest over a long period. The awards are structured 
such that the executive will forfeit the unvested portion of the grant if she leaves the firm. This 
increases the cost to the executive of leaving the firm. Any organization that wants to hire the 
executive has to compensate for the loss resulting from the forfeiture of unvested options and 
restricted stocks. This would predict that the amount and vesting schedule of option and stock 
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grants will affect the executive’s likelihood of voluntarily leaving the firm. To test this prediction, 
we employ the measure of pay duration developed in Gopalan et al. (forthcoming). The advantage 
of the duration measure is that it takes into account both the amount of unvested grants and their 
remaining vesting schedule. This leads to our first hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Managers with longer pay durations are less likely to leave the firm voluntarily.  
      To the extent that long pay duration indicates the importance of firm-specific knowledge 
or/and the perceived managerial talent, the boards of such firms may be more reluctant to fire such 
executives and choose to wait longer before reaching the firing decision even following poor firm 
performance. This would predict that executives with longer pay duration are less likely to be 
forced out. This forms our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Managers with longer pay duration are less likely to experience involuntary 
turnover.  
If, consistent with Hypothesis 2, boards are less likely to force out executives with longer pay 
duration, it could be due alternatively to poor corporate governance. That is, a captured board (that 
acts in the interest of executives instead of shareholders) may be reluctant to force out executives, 
who otherwise would have had to forfeit all unvested pay if being forced out. We examine these 
different explanations underlying Hypothesis 2 in our empirical analysis later.    
       An important puzzle in the corporate governance literature is the low explanatory power (in 
economic magnitude) of stock performance on forced CEO turnover. That is, CEOs are not 
significantly more likely to be fired following poor stock performance. Taylor (2010) uses a 
structural model to argue that the low turnover-performance correlation may be due to firms facing 
switching costs when they replace CEOs. One possible source of switching cost may be the loss of 
firm-specific knowledge from the departing CEO. That may explain why boards have greater 
forbearance in tolerating poor performance and wait longer before the turnover decision in some 
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firms. To the extent that pay duration is longer in situations where firm-specific knowledge is more 
important (see Hypothesis 1), we expect the correlation between firm performance and forced CEO 
turnover to be especially low in the subsample of executives with long pay duration. This forms 
our next hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: The sensitivity of forced turnover to firm performance should be lower for CEOs 
with longer pay duration. 
       To the extent that firms offer longer-pay duration in situations where firm-specific 
knowledge is more important, it has implications for the firm’s choice between an insider versus 
an outsider for the new CEO, conditional on CEO succession. To the extent that an insider has 
better firm-specific knowledge, we expect firms that on average offer longer-pay duration to be 
more likely to hire an internal candidate. Hiring CEOs from inside the firm, in turn, also motivate 
talented insiders’ investment in the acquisition of firm-specific knowledge and help retain them. 
This leads to our final hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: Firms that on average offer longer duration pay contracts to their executives are 
more likely to hire an internal candidate as a CEO.  
2.3 Data and Variables 
2.3.1 Data and Sample 
 
We obtain the data for our analysis from six sources: Equilar Consultants, Execucomp, 
Riskmetrics, Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f) database, the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), and Compustat. 
 We identify executive turnovers from ExecuComp and use news reports, Boardex and other 
public sources to classify the turnover as voluntary or involuntary.  
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 Data on the vesting schedules of restricted stock and stock options are obtained from 
Equilar Consultants (hereafter, Equilar). Similar to S&P (provider of ExecuComp), Equilar 
collects compensation data from firms' proxy statements. We obtain details of all stock and 
option grants to all named executives covered by Equilar for the years 2006-2009. Equilar 
also provides the grant date and the present value of the grants as reported in the proxy 
statements. Equilar also identifies if the size or the vesting schedule of the grant is linked 
to firm performance. 
 We obtain data on other components of executive pay, such as salary and bonus, from 
ExecuComp. We carefully hand-match Equilar and ExecuComp using firm tickers and 
executive names. Since prior studies on executive compensation predominantly use 
ExecuComp, we ensure comparability of Equilar and ExecuComp by making sure the total 
number of options granted during the year for each executive in our sample is the same 
across the two data sets.48 
 We obtain data on the composition of the Board of Directors from RiskMetrics and 
whenever needed, supplement it with data from Boardex. Our data on block holders is from 
Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f) database.  
 We complement the compensation and board data with stock returns from CRSP and firm 
accounting data from Compustat. 
Our final sample consists of the executives covered by both Equilar and ExecuComp for 
the time period 2006-2009. This results in 6,127 firm-years involving 1,803 firms, 2,406 CEOs and 
6,974 other senior executives. 
                                                 
48 We drop 2,470 executive-year observations for which we cannot match the number of option grants across 
Equilar and ExecuComp. This amounts to 9.3% of the total executive-year observations in our sample. 
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2.3.2 Key Variables 
Pay duration 
       We follow Gopalan et al. (forthcoming) to construct our measure of pay duration 
(“Duration”). To construct this measure, we use data on annual stock and option grants. 
Specifically, it is the weighted average of the lengths of the vesting periods of the four pay 
components (i.e., salary, bonus, restricted stocks, and stock options), with the weight for each 
component being the fraction of that component in the executive’s total compensation. If the stocks 
and options are granted with a cliff vesting schedule, we calculate pay duration as: 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠) × 0 +  ∑ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖  ×  𝑡𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑖  ×  𝑡𝑜𝑖 
𝑂
𝑜𝑖=1
𝑆
𝑠𝑖=1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 +  ∑ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖  +  ∑ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑖
𝑂
𝑜𝑖=1
𝑆
𝑠𝑖=1
, 
where 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 and 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 are the dollar values of salary and bonus as of the year end. Since salary 
and bonus are paid out in full by the end of the year they have a vesting period of zero in the above 
formula.  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖  and 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑖 are the dollar value of restricted stock grant si and stock option 
grant oi, which have a final vesting period of 𝑡𝑠𝑖 and 𝑡𝑜𝑖 years, respectively. The value of a restricted 
stock grant is estimated as the product of the stock price on the grant date and the number of stocks 
granted, while the value of a stock option grant is estimated using Black-Scholes option pricing 
model by Equilar. S and O, respectively, are the total number of stock and option grants to the 
executive in a year. If the stock and option grants vest equally over the vesting periods (graded 
vesting schedule),  𝑡𝑠𝑖 (𝑡𝑜𝑖) is replaced with 
𝑡𝑠𝑖+1
2
 (
𝑡𝑜𝑖+1
2
).  
       Our baseline measure of pay duration does not include grants from prior years. To account 
for such grants, we construct an alternative measure (“Duration-2”) by expanding the estimation 
to include all unvested stock and option grants from prior years. Specifically, Duration-2 is 
calculated as: 
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𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 2 =  
(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠) × 0 +  ∑ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖  ×  𝑡𝑠𝑖 +  ∑ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑖  ×  𝑡𝑜𝑖 
?̂?
𝑜𝑖=1
?̂?
𝑠𝑖=1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 +  ∑ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖  +  ∑ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑖
?̂?
𝑜𝑖=1
?̂?
𝑠𝑖=1
, 
where ?̂?  is the sum of the number of stock grants during the year and the number of unvested stock 
grants from prior years. For an unvested stock grant si, tsi  is the remaining time to final vesting. 
Similarly, ?̂?  is the sum of the number of option grants during the year and the number of unvested 
option grants from prior years, and for an unvested option grant oi, toi  is the remaining time to final 
vesting. As before, if the stock and option grants vest equally over the vesting periods (graded 
vesting schedule),  𝑡𝑠𝑖 (𝑡𝑜𝑖) is replaced with 
𝑡𝑠𝑖+1
2
 (
𝑡𝑜𝑖+1
2
). More details on the construction of 
Duration-2 are provided in the Appendix. 
       Our measure of duration does have a limitation as a proxy for the extent of deferred pay. 
We do not include severance and post-retirement benefits that may be important for providing long-
term incentives. The main reason for this exclusion is the difficulty in obtaining the vesting 
schedules of these benefits. To the extent that the retirement benefits are in the form of a defined 
contribution retirement account and to the extent that the executive has spent sufficient time with 
the firm, the retirement account is likely to have vested fully and is unlikely to prove problematic. 
Furthermore, our subsequent empirical analysis shows that our measure of pay duration is 
significantly associated with the likelihood of voluntary turnover.  
 
Management turnover 
       In this section, we describe the methodology we employ to identify turnover of a named 
executive of the firm for whom we can obtain pay data from the firm’s proxy statements. We start 
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by identifying changes in executive designations as documented in ExecuComp.49 We then search 
Factiva, LexisNexis, and Boardex for news reports coincident with the change in designation to 
identify the causes for the change. From our list of potential turnovers, we drop instances that are 
due to misclassification in ExecuComp, takeovers or spinoffs, interim positions, sudden death of 
the manager and mandatory or planned retirement. Our final sample includes 1081 management 
turnovers, of which 239 involve a CEO.  
       For turnovers involving a CEO, we start with using the criteria in Parrino (1997) to classify 
the turnover as voluntary or involuntary. All turnovers for which the press reports that the CEO is 
fired, is forced out, or departs due to difference of opinion or unspecified policy differences with 
the Board, are classified as forced. Of the remaining turnovers, if the departing CEO is under age 
60, it is classified as forced if either (1) the reported reason for the departure does not involve death, 
poor health, or acceptance of another position elsewhere or within the firm (including the 
chairmanship of the board)50, or (2) the CEO is reported to be retiring but there is no announcement 
about the retirement made at least two months prior to the departure. We then complement these 
criteria with two of our own. We reclassify a forced turnover (identified using the steps described 
above) as voluntary if either (1) the CEO’s employment record, obtained from Boardex and 
Marquis Who’s Who publications, suggests that the CEO obtained a comparable position 
elsewhere, or (2) the press reports convincingly explain that the departure is due to previously 
undisclosed personal or business reasons that are unrelated to the firm’s activities. All the CEO 
                                                 
49 The earlier literature identifies the samples of CEO turnovers using Forbes annual compensation surveys 
(e.g., Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani 1996; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 2004; Huson, Parrino, and 
Stark 2001; Parrino 1997). More recent studies (e.g., Jenter and Kanaan forthcoming) use the changes in the 
CEO position in ExecuComp to classify CEO turnovers.   
50 In case of health being a reported reason for the departure, we track backward the press reports about the 
CEO’s health status, and ensure that the departure is indeed due to the health problem. Otherwise, we still 
treat the departure as being forced.   
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turnovers not classified as forced or due to mandatory or planned retirements are classified as 
voluntary.51  
       For some of our tests, we classify a new CEO as being external/internal to the firm if she 
has been with the firm for no more/more than a year before the succession. We do this by relying 
on ExecuComp and Boardex for information on a manager’s career path, supplemented by Marquis 
Who’s Who publications, Bloomberg Businessweek, and Standard & Poor’s register of 
corporations, directors, and executives.  
       For turnovers involving other senior executives, there are fewer detailed press reports about 
the circumstances involving their departure. Hence, it is difficult to employ the same criteria as 
those for CEOs to distinguish between forced and voluntary turnovers. We thus employ an 
alternative classification. We first try to identify if a departing executive takes up a position in a 
new firm. Specifically, we classify an executive turnover as “jump-ship” (employing the 
terminology in Fee and Hadlock (2003)) either if (1) the press reports that the executive is leaving 
to join another firm, or (2) the employment record of the executive as obtained from Boardex and 
Marquis Who’s Who publications indicates that the executive took up a position in a new firm 
within three months of departure from the old firm and there is no convincing evidence in the press 
that the executive was ousted by the old firm. All other senior executive turnovers except those 
involving mandatory retirements are classified as involuntary.  
       Given the paucity of information about non-CEO executive turnovers, we are likely to 
classify some voluntary executive turnovers as involuntary. This is unlikely to be a problem for us 
because our primary interest is in understanding how pay duration affects the probability of a 
                                                 
51 Among CEOs who depart voluntarily in our sample, 27 join other firms as CEOs. Given the small number 
of them, we do not conduct a separate analysis of them from the overall group of voluntary turnovers.  
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voluntary executive turnover. Moreover, Hypotheses 1 & 2 predict that pay duration is negatively 
correlated with both voluntary and involuntary executive turnover. 
2.3.3 Summary Statistics 
         Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of the key variables we use in our analysis. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the potential impact of outliers. 
Detailed definitions of these variables (except pay duration and management turnover that are 
discussed earlier) are provided in the Appendix. Panel A summarizes the data for CEOs while Panel 
B summarizes the data for non-CEOs. From Panel A, we find that the average Duration (Duration-
2) for CEOs in our sample is 1.45 (1.48) years, consistent with the numbers in Gopalan et al. 
(forthcoming). We find that the average CEO is 54.87 years old, has spent 7.48 years in her current 
position and has about 0.13% of the firm’s equity. We also find that about 51% of the CEOs in our 
sample are also the Chairman of their board as seen from the mean value of Duality.  
       From Panel B, we find that the mean value of Duration (Duration-2) for non-CEOs in our 
sample is 1.26 (1.29) years. The non-CEOs have an average age of 50.39 years and have spent 
14.84 years in the firm. Note that while Tenure for CEOs indicates the number of years the 
executive has been the CEO, for non-CEOs, Tenure refers to the number of years the executive has 
been with the firm.  
       In Panel C, we present the summary statistics of the characteristics of the firms in our 
sample. We use industry adjusted stock return (Ind. adj. stock return), which is the difference 
between the annual return on the firm’s stock and the average stock return of firms in the same 
industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level  as our main measure of firm performance. 52 We 
                                                 
52 Our main findings hold for alternative measures of firm performance, namely, two year industry adjusted 
stock returns, industry adjusted returns using Fama-French 49 industry classification and industry adjusted 
performance measure used by Jenter and Kanaan (forthcoming). The latter is estimated as the annualized 
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find that, on average, firms in our sample outperform the industry as seen from the mean value of 
Ind. adj. stock return of 0.03%. The average Volatility of the firms in our sample is 42%. The firms 
in our sample are on average large, as seen from the mean value of Firm size, of 7.75. In 
comparison, the average value for all firms in Compustat during the same sample period is 5.47. 
The firms in our sample have valuable growth opportunities as seen from the average value of 
Market to book ratio of 1.71. The average Leverage of our sample firms is 23%, and on average, 
they spend about 2.4% of the book value of total assets on R&D as seen from the mean value of 
R&D/Asset.  
       In Table 2.2, we conduct a set of univariate tests on the different turnovers in our sample. 
In Panel A, we classify the CEO years in our sample into those involving a voluntary turnover and 
those not involving a voluntary turnover, and provide the average CEO and firm characteristics. 
We have 125 voluntary CEO turnover events during our sample period. The average value of 
Duration of CEOs who voluntarily leave the firm is 1.07, significantly below the average value of 
Duration for CEOs who stay with the firm (1.46). We observe a similar pattern with Duration-2. 
This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. We also find that firm-years with a voluntary CEO turnover 
have lower industry adjusted stock return. CEOs who voluntarily leave their firm are younger, have 
shorter tenures and lower stock holding in their firm. In our regressions that explore the effect of 
Duration and Duration-2 on voluntary CEO turnover, we include these variables as controls to 
ensure that they do not bias our conclusions.  
       In Panel B, we classify the non-CEO executive years in our sample into those before a non-
CEO executive jumps ship and others, and present the average executive and firm characteristics.53 
We have 289 instances where a non-CEO executive leaves the firm for another firm. We find that 
                                                 
residual obtained from regressing the monthly return on the firm’s stock on the return of the value weighted 
index of all firms in the same industry.  
53 We focus on the year before the executive jumps ship because executive pay information is usually not 
available in the proxy statements if the executive leaves in the middle of a year. 
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the average value of Duration (Duration-2) of non-CEO executives who “jump-ship”, 0.41 (0.46), 
is significantly below the average value for non-CEO executives who stay with the firm, 1.21 
(1.31). This again is consistent with Hypothesis 1. We also find that firm-years before a non-CEO 
executive “jumps-ship” have lower industry adjusted stock return. Non-CEO executives who 
voluntarily leave their firm are younger and non-surprisingly have shorter tenures with their firm.  
       In Panel C, we divide our sample into firm-years before a forced CEO turnover and other 
firm-years, and present the average CEO and firm characteristics. We have 114 forced CEO 
turnover events during our sample period. We find that while the average Duration (Duration-2) 
of CEOs who are forced out of their firms is 0.87 (0.87), it is significantly below the average value 
for CEOs who stay with the firm, 1.47 (1.50). This is consistent with Hypothesis 2. We also find 
that firm-years with a forced CEO turnover have lower Ind. adj. stock return. CEOs who are forced 
to leave their firm are also younger, have shorter tenures and lower stock holding in their firm, and 
are less likely to be the Chairman of their Board. In our regressions exploring the effect of Duration 
on forced CEO turnover, we include these variables as controls to ensure that they do not bias our 
conclusions.  
       Finally, in Panel D, we compare non-CEO executive-years before those involving an 
involuntary turnover to all others. We have 553 non-CEO turnover events in our sample that we 
classify as involuntary. We find that while the average value of Duration (Duration-2) of non-CEO 
executives who involuntarily leave the firm is 0.79 (0.80), it is significantly below the average 
value for non-CEO executives who stay with the firm, 1.21 (1.31). This again is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. We also find that executive-years with an involuntary turnover have lower Ind. adj. 
stock return. Non-CEO executives who involuntarily leave their firm are younger and have shorter 
tenures with their firm.  
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       To summarize, our univariate evidence indicates that executives (both CEOs and non-
CEOs) with longer pay duration are less likely to leave their firms. This evidence is consistent with 
both Hypotheses 1 & 2.  
2.4 Main Analysis of Pay Duration and Turnover 
       In this section, we conduct multivariate tests of the effect of pay duration on executive 
turnover. We first discuss the tests that study voluntary turnovers, which are followed by those that 
look at involuntary turnovers.  
2.4.1 Pay Duration and Voluntary Turnover 
Baseline analysis 
       In Table 2.3, we test Hypothesis 1 by relating CEO pay Duration to the likelihood of 
voluntary turnover. Following prior literature (e.g., Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata 2012; Jenter 
and Kanaan forthcoming), we first employ the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972) to 
conduct our test: 54  
𝜆(𝑡|𝑋) =  𝜆0(𝛽0𝐼 ∗ 𝑡) exp(𝛽
′𝑋). 
       The dependent variable in the model is whether there is a voluntary CEO turnover at the 
time of a year. The hazard model accounts for both the occurrence and timing of turnover and 
allows for the inclusion of time-varying co-variates. We allow baseline hazards to vary across 
industries to capture the difference in turnover patterns in different industries. Our key independent 
variable is Duration, and Hypothesis 1 predicts that it has a negative coefficient. We also include 
as controls a number of firm and CEO characteristics that prior literature has shown to affect the 
                                                 
54 We repeat all the analyses using a Logit model and find that the results, not reported for brevity, are 
robust.  
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probability of CEO turnover. The firm characteristics we include are Ind. adj. stock return, Firm 
size, Volatility and Block holder. The last variable is a dummy variable that identifies the presence 
of a block holder with more than 5% shareholding in the firm. The set of CEO characteristics we 
include are Tenure, Age, Stock holding, and Duality. In all regressions, we also include year fixed 
effects, and the standard errors we estimate are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
three-digit SIC code industry level.  
       The results from Column (1) of Table 2.3 show that the coefficient on Duration is negative 
and significant. This indicates that a CEO with longer pay duration is less likely to leave the firm 
voluntarily. From the coefficient on the control variables, we find that older CEOs and CEOs who 
have higher equity ownership in the firm are less likely to leave the firm voluntarily. In Column 
(2), we repeat our estimates employing a linear probability model. We do this for two reasons. 
First, employing the linear probability model helps us estimate the economic significance of our 
results more easily and in an intuitive manner. Second, with the linear probability model, we can 
control for firm fixed effects. The inclusion of firm fixed effects ensures that we control for all 
time-invariant firm characteristics. We are unable to include firm fixed effects in the non-linear 
COX hazard model because of the incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott 1948). Our 
results in Column (2) are consistent with those in Column (1) and show that CEOs with longer 
duration pay are less likely to voluntarily leave their firm. Our findings are also economically 
significant. The negative coefficient on Duration in Column (2) implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in Duration (0.97) results in a decrease in the annual probability of a voluntary 
CEO turnover by 1.16%. In comparison, the unconditional probability of a voluntary CEO turnover 
any year in our sample is 2.0% with a standard deviation of 14.1%. Thus, a one standard deviation 
increase in Duration is associated with a 58% decrease in the likelihood of a voluntary CEO 
turnover as compared to the sample mean or a 8.2% decrease in the standard deviation of the 
voluntary CEO turnover probability.  
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       In Columns (3)-(4), we estimate the effect of pay duration on the likelihood of a non-CEO 
executive jumping ship. In Column (3), we employ the COX model with the dependent variable 
being the indicator of a senior executive jumping ship at the time of a year. Apart from the usual 
set of controls, we also control for incidences of CEO turnover during the previous two years (CEO 
Turnover) and for incidences when there is an external hire in replacing the departing CEO during 
the previous two years (External hire). We do this to ensure that executive turnovers, which may 
result from a change in the top management of the firm, do not affect the coefficient on Duration.   
       The result in Column (3) shows that the coefficient on Duration is negative and statistically 
significant. This highlights that a longer pay duration lowers the likelihood of a senior executive 
jumping ship. We also find that senior executives of larger firms (positive coefficient on Firm size), 
those with shorter tenure (negative coefficient on Ln(Tenure)), and  younger executives (negative 
coefficient on Age) are more likely to jump ship. Also, the likelihood of an executive jumping ship 
does not appear to be associated with firm performance. Column (4) presents the result of the linear 
probability model with time and firm fixed effects. Here again, we find that the coefficient on 
Duration is negative and significant. Our estimates are also economically significant. The 
coefficient on Duration in Column (4) implies that a one standard deviation increase in Duration 
(0.88) is associated with a 2.4% reduction in the probability of an executive jumping ship. In 
comparison, the unconditional probability of an executive jumping ship in our sample is 1.6% with 
a standard deviation of 12.6%. Thus, our estimates are extremely significant.  
       In Table 2.4, we repeat our tests in Table 2.3 with our alternative measure of pay duration 
that includes all the unvested stock and option grants from prior years. In this sense, it is a more 
comprehensive measure of all outstanding deferred pay from stock and option grants. We find that 
the coefficient on Duration-2 is negative and significant in all the columns. The economic 
significance of the result is comparable to those in Table 3. The coefficient in Column (2) (Column 
(4)) implies that a one standard deviation increase in Duration-2 that is 0.86 years (0.80 years) is 
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associated with a 1.29% (2.48%) reduction in the probability of a voluntary CEO turnover (non-
CEO executive jumping ship). Thus, our results are robust to the alternative measure of pay 
duration.  
Test of causality 
       The negative correlation between Duration (or Duration-2) and voluntary executive 
turnover, documented in Tables 3 and 4, may be subject to an omitted variable bias, and thus may 
not necessarily imply a causal effect of deferred pay on turnover. The important firm- and 
executive-level omitted variable that may affect both pay duration and the likelihood of executive 
turnover are the importance of firm-specific knowledge and perception of executive talent by the 
board, respectively. Specifically, as discussed earlier, firms where firm-specific knowledge is 
valuable may offer longer duration pay to incentivize executives’ investment in such knowledge. 
To the extent such firm-specific knowledge is less valuable outside the firm, executives of such 
firms may have less valuable outside options and hence may stay longer with the firm. Similarly, 
all else equal, boards may grant longer duration pay to executives who they perceive to be more 
talented. Given the favorable internal perception, such executives may also find it optimal to remain 
with the firm. 
       We implement a two-stage instrumental variable regression to examine the causal effect of 
pay duration on voluntary turnover. Our strategy is to identify executive-years in which a large 
prior-year stock or option grant vests (Large vesting). We use these lumpy vesting episodes as 
instances that significantly reduce an executive’s pay duration, and estimate its effect on executive 
voluntary turnover. To circumvent the endogeneity of stock/option grant, we focus on grants that 
were awarded more than two years ago. To the extent that these grants were awarded in the distant 
past, their vesting is unlikely to be correlated with time-varying firm- and executive-level omitted 
variables and executive voluntary turnover. Edmans, Fang and Lewellen (2014) use a similar 
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instrument to study the effect of stock vesting schedules on managerial myopia as reflected in 
corporate investment decisions. 
       Our identifying assumption in this test is two-fold. First, we assume Large vesting will be 
correlated with Duration-2. This is mechanical because Duration-2 includes prior year grants in its 
calculation. Vesting of a large stock or option grant during a year is likely to reduce Duration-2.55 
The second identifying assumption is the exclusion restriction which assumes that Large vesting is 
correlated with voluntary turnover only to the extent it affects Duration-2. We believe this is 
reasonable because, a) Duration-2 adequately captures the effect of Large vesting on the amount 
and length of deferred pay; b) since we focus on the vesting of grants that are more than two years 
old, the vesting is unlikely to be correlated with time-varying firm and executive specific factors.  
       We present the results of this two-stage IV regression in Table 2.5. Given the consistent 
effect of pay duration on voluntary turnover for CEOs and non-CEO executives, as shown in Tables 
3 and 4, and the expected identical marginal impact of Large vesting on pay duration across these 
two groups of executives, we pool CEOs and non-CEOs in this regression. Moreover, IV regression 
only allows the linear probability model to be employed here. In the first stage, we regress 
Duration-2 on Large vesting and the set of control variables in Table 2.4, where Large vesting is 
defined as a dummy that equals one if the largest stock/option grant in prior years vests and zero 
otherwise. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that Large vesting results in a decrease in 
Duration-2 and the effect is significant. We also find that Large vesting is a strong instrument as 
seen from the F-value for the first stage regression of 12.51.56 More interestingly, the results of the 
second stage regression show that the coefficient on Duration-2 remains negative and significant, 
                                                 
55 Note that vesting of a large grant will increase Duration-2 only if the firm does replenish the vested stock 
and options with an equal sized grant with a longer vesting schedule. In our data, we find that the 
correlation between Large vesting and Duration-2 is negative and significant. This is consistent with firms 
not replenishing a vested grant.  
56 Note that a F-value over 10 is typically considered the sign of a strong instrument (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005).  
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consistent with the findings in Table 4. In Columns (3) and (4), we repeat the estimate after 
including firm fixed effects and again find that the coefficient on Duration-2 is negative and 
significant.  
       In comparing Column (4) to Column (2), we find that the coefficient on Duration-2 drops 
to a sixth after inclusion of firm fixed effects. This highlights the importance of unobserved, firm-
level, time-invariant factors for executive turnover. The second interesting fact is when we compare 
the coefficient on Duration-2 in Column (4) to those in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2.4, we find 
that the coefficient in our IV specification is significantly larger than that in the OLS specification. 
Note that when we estimate with an OLS specification combining CEO and non-CEO voluntary 
turnover, we find that the coefficient on Duration-2 is -0.049 and statistically significant. The larger 
coefficient in the IV specification as compared to that in the OLS specification indicates that 
unobserved omitted factors that affect both Duration-2 and voluntary turnover are likely to be 
biasing the coefficient downward.  
       A possible reason for the negative bias is the presence of other factors that may bond an 
executive to the firm and reduce the likelihood of voluntary turnover. In the presence of such 
factors, firms may find it optimal to reduce the risk imposed on the executive and award pay with 
short vesting schedule. One such bonding mechanism could be if the executive is also one of the 
promoters. Such executives are unlikely to leave the firm voluntarily and in response, firms may 
award a low duration pay. Similarly, older executives with significant firm-specific skill may also 
be less likely to leave the firm voluntarily. For such executives as well, firms may find no need to 
award pay with long vesting schedule, especially if the executive’s remaining time to retirement is 
short.  
       To summarize, consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that the likelihood of a voluntary CEO 
turnover and that of a non-CEO executive jumping ship are lower when they have longer pay 
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duration. And our further test suggests that the effect of pay duration on voluntary executive 
turnover is causal. 
2.4.2 Pay Duration and Forced Turnover 
       In Table 2.6, we analyze the effect of CEO pay duration on the likelihood of a forced CEO 
turnover. To the extent that a longer pay duration identifies firms with higher costs of changing 
CEOs, Hypothesis 2 predicts that a CEO with longer pay duration is less likely to experience a 
forced turnover. In Column (1), we present the results of estimating the Cox hazard model on forced 
CEO turnovers. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the negative and significant coefficient on Duration 
shows that CEOs with longer pay duration are less likely to be forced out. We also find that firms 
with lower industry adjusted stock returns (negative coefficient on Ind adj. stock return) and firms 
with more volatile stock (positive coefficient on Volatility) are more likely to experience a forced 
CEO turnover. Also, CEOs of larger firms (positive coefficient on Size), younger CEOs (negative 
coefficient on Age) and those with lower shareholding (negative coefficient on Shareholding) are 
more likely to be forced out.  
       In Column (2), we repeat our estimates with a linear probability model and find consistent 
results as in Column (1). Our estimates are economically significant. The coefficient on Duration 
in Column (2) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in CEO pay duration (0.97) is 
associated with a 1.07% reduction in the probability of a forced CEO turnover. In comparison, the 
average probability of a forced CEO turnover in our sample is 1.86%. Another way to put the 
economic significance of the effect of Duration in context is to compare its effect to that of firm 
performance. The coefficient on Ind adj. stock return in Column (2) implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in Ind adj. stock return (0.33) is associated with a 0.76% reduction in the annual 
probability of a forced CEO turnover. Thus, the effect of pay duration is about 1.4 times that of 
firm performance.  
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       Although the effect of pay duration on forced turnover is not expected to be causal, there 
are three potential explanations, outlined in Section 2, that might account for a negative correlation 
between pay duration and forced turnover. These are managerial talent, the importance of firm-
specific knowledge, and weak corporate governance. In the subsequent tests, we explore the 
importance of these explanations for the observed negative correlation. 
       Boards may grant a longer duration pay to more talented CEOs and may also be more 
reluctant to fire such CEOs. To the extent managerial talent is time invariant, we follow prior 
literature and use managerial fixed effect to proxy for managerial talent (Bertrand and Schoar 2003) 
and repeat our tests in Column (3). Thus, the specification in column (3) includes CEO fixed effects 
in addition to industry and time fixed effects. Comparing the coefficient in column (3) to that in 
column (2), we find that inclusion of executive fixed effect has a marginal effect on the size of the 
coefficient on Duration but significantly increases the standard errors which results in the 
coefficient turning insignificant. This provides evidence consistent with manager fixed effects 
being important for the Duration-forced turnover relationship. 
       One disadvantage of using manager fixed effects to account for executive talent is that one 
does not have an average point estimate of the effect of talent. To get such an estimate in alternate 
tests (results are untabulated, but available upon request), we identify a set of CEOs for whom we 
can obtain pay duration in their prior employment, Prior duration. To the extent executive talent 
is time invariant and to the extent it affects pay duration, we expect talented executives to obtain 
longer duration pay in their prior employment as well. To the extent executive talent affects the 
duration-turnover relationship, we expect a negative correlation between Prior duration and the 
likelihood of forced turnover. Consistent with CEO talent being an important explanation for the 
negative pay-duration-forced-turnover correlation, we find that the coefficient on Prior duration is 
negative and statistically significant.  
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       Second, in firms where managers’ firm-specific knowledge is more important, the board is 
likely to be more tolerant in its executive force-out decision in order to encourage executives’ 
investment in acquiring firm-specific knowledge. There are two possible ways to isolate the effect 
of the importance of firm-specific knowledge in driving the forced turnover-duration relationship. 
Similar to using manager fixed effects to estimate the role of talent, one can use firm fixed effects 
to proxy for the importance of firm-specific knowledge and estimate its effect on the coefficient on 
Duration. We do this in column (4) and find that inclusion of firm fixed effects does not 
significantly affect the size of the coefficient on Duration. Thus, the negative correlation between 
Duration and forced CEO turnover in Column (2) appears mainly due to within-firm changes in 
Duration and forced CEO turnover.  
       Note that the small effect of firm fixed effects on the duration-forced CEO turnover 
relationship does not necessarily imply that investment in firm-specific knowledge is not important 
for the duration-forced CEO turnover relationship. The need for investment in firm-specific 
knowledge could be time varying and firm fixed effects are unlikely to capture this. To isolate the 
effect of time-varying importance of firm-specific knowledge on the duration-forced turnover 
relationship, in unreported tests, we estimate the effect of Average duration on the likelihood of a 
forced CEO turnover. Average duration is the mean pay duration of all other senior executives in 
the firm in a given year. When firms want executives to invest in firm-specific knowledge, they are 
likely to offer long duration pay to all the top executives. We find that the coefficient on Average 
duration is negative and significant.  This is consistent with the importance of firm-specific 
knowledge as an important channel that underlies the negative correlation between CEO pay 
duration and forced turnover. 57 
                                                 
57 We have Prior Duration for only a small fraction of our executives. This limits our ability to compare the 
relative importance of firm-specific knowledge and executive talent in affecting the Duration-forced 
turnover relationship by including both Average duration and Prior duration in the same specification. When 
we do so in unreported tests, we find that the coefficients on both variables are negative but insignificant. 
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       Third, we examine if the negative pay-duration-forced-turnover correlation may result from 
poor corporate governance. This can happen if a captured board (that acts in the interest of the 
CEO) is reluctant to fire a CEO with significant unvested stock and option grants as the CEO may 
lose the unvested grants. To test this, we use the fraction of independent directors on the firm’s 
board as our proxy for board strength and corporate governance, and create a dummy variable, 
Independent, that takes a value one if the fraction of outsiders on a firm’s board of directors is 
above the sample median in a given year. We then repeat our tests after including an interaction 
term between Independent and Duration to see if the negative effect of pay duration on the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover is concentrated in firms with less independent boards. This 
would imply a positive coefficient on the interaction term. We present the results in Table 7. In 
Column (1), we repeat the estimate from Column (1) of Table 6 (the Cox hazard model) which 
relates CEO pay duration to the likelihood of a forced turnover. In Column (2), we repeat this 
estimate after including Independent and an interaction term Duration X Independent. We find that 
the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant, which suggests that the 
correlation between pay duration and forced CEO turnover is stronger in firms with more 
independent boards. In the next two columns, we repeat the analysis with the linear probability 
model and find consistent results. This finding is inconsistent with poor corporate governance as 
an explanation for the negative duration-forced-turnover relation. Instead, combined with our 
findings about the other two explanations, it suggests that more independent boards are more likely 
to incorporate the considerations of CEO talent and the importance of firm-specific knowledge into 
their CEO force-out decisions.                   
       We also analyze the effect of pay duration on the likelihood of involuntary turnover for 
non-CEO senior executives. As mentioned before, due to the paucity of details on non-CEO 
turnovers from public sources, we classify non-CEO turnovers that do not involve the executive 
retirement or the executive jumping ship to another firm as being involuntary. Note that this 
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classification is bound to be noisy, and this set of turnovers could also include some voluntary 
turnovers. This is not a serious problem for us qualitatively, because we expect Duration to lower 
the likelihood of both voluntary and involuntary turnovers according to Hypotheses 1 & 2. The 
caveat is with the precision of the estimate of the pay duration sensitivity of non-CEO executives’ 
involuntary turnover. To this end, we choose to not tabulate the results of our analysis in this part 
(available upon request). The untabulated results strongly support Hypothesis 2. They show that 
non-CEO executives with longer pay duration are less likely to experience an involuntary turnover. 
Also, the estimates of the effect of pay duration are highly significant in economical magnitudes. 
The coefficient estimated from the linear probability model implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in Duration (0.88) is associated with a 1.85% decrease in the probability of an involuntary 
executive turnover. In comparison, the average probability of an involuntary executive turnover in 
our sample is 3.07%. 
       Overall, our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2 that executives with longer pay 
duration are less likely to experience an involuntary turnover. And this negative duration-turnover 
association is not due to poor corporate governance, but can be explained by the importance of 
firm-specific knowledge and managerial talent, both of which are positively related to pay duration 
and negatively related to forced turnover.     
2.4.3 Pay Duration and Performance-Sensitivity of Forced Turnover 
       To test Hypothesis 3, we estimate how pay duration affects the sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to firm performance in Table 2.8. In Column (1), we repeat the estimate from Column (1) 
of Table 2.6 which relates CEO pay duration to the likelihood of a forced turnover. In Column (2), 
we repeat the estimation of the Cox hazard model after including an interaction term Duration X 
Ind. adj. stock return. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. 
This indicates that, for CEOs with longer duration pay, the likelihood of a forced turnover is less 
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sensitive to stock returns. In Column (3), we repeat the estimates with a linear probability model 
and again find that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. In Column (4), 
we repeat our estimates with firm (in addition to time) fixed effects and obtain similar results.  
       Since our duration measure is a continuous variable, it is difficult to interpret the economic 
significance of the coefficient on the interaction term. To get a better sense of the economic 
significance, in Column (5), we repeat our estimation after replacing Duration with a dummy 
variable, High duration, that takes a value one for the CEOs whose pay duration is above the sample 
median for that year. The coefficient on Ind. adj. stock return is an estimate of the sensitivity of 
forced CEO turnover to stock returns for a CEO with below the sample median pay duration, while 
the sum of the coefficients on Ind. adj. stock return and Duration X Ind. adj. stock return is an 
estimate of the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to stock returns for a CEO with above the sample 
median pay duration. Our estimates show that the coefficient on Ind. adj. stock return is -.038. This 
is twice the estimate in Column (3). It indicates that forced CEO turnover is twice as sensitive to 
stock returns for CEOs with below the sample median pay duration as compared to the sample 
average sensitivity. We also find that the coefficient on the interaction term is .034. And in 
unreported tests, we find that we cannot reject the null that the sum of the coefficients on Ind. adj. 
stock return and the interaction term Duration X Ind. adj. stock return is equal to 0. This indicates 
that in our sample, forced CEO turnover is not sensitive to stock performance for CEOs with above 
the sample median pay duration. That is, all the sensitivity to stock returns found in Column (3) is 
driven by CEOs with below the sample median pay duration. 
        Our finding is consistent with perceived switching costs affecting the turnover-performance 
sensitivity (Taylor (2010)). Specifically, higher perceived switching cost may explain the board’s 
greater forbearance in tolerating poor firm performance and waiting longer before firing the CEO. 
Possible sources of switching costs could be the loss of firm-specific knowledge and high perceived 
managerial talent. Our results of the lower performance-turnover sensitivity among CEOs with 
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high duration pay is consistent with pay duration capturing both the importance of firm-specific 
knowledge and managerial talent.  
2.4.4 Pay Duration and Internal CEO Hiring  
       In this section, we perform tests of Hypothesis 4 that has predictions on whether a firm will 
select an internal or external candidate as the replacement CEO. To the extent that the average 
duration of the top executives of a firm is a proxy for the importance of firm-specific knowledge 
in the firm, we expect firms that offer longer average pay duration to their top executives to be 
more likely to hire an internal candidate to replace the CEO. On the other hand, internal hiring is 
also an important means of talent retention because insiders would have stronger incentives in 
investing in acquiring firm-specific knowledge. In Table 2.9, we estimate a linear probability model 
where the dependent variable is External, a dummy variable that identifies firms that select an 
external candidate as the replacement CEO. Our main independent variable is Average duration, 
the average pay duration of all senior executives (except the departing CEO) of the firm included 
in ExecuComp. We include as a control variable, Forced turnover, a dummy variable that identifies 
if the departing CEO was forced out. We include this variable because prior research shows that 
firms are more likely to hire an outsider if the predecessor was forced out (e.g., Parrino 1997). We 
also include Ind. adj. stock return, Volatility, Firm size, and Block holder as additional control 
variables.  
       The result in Column (1) of Table 2.9, estimated with industry and year fixed effects, shows 
that firms are less likely to hire an external candidate if the senior executives in the firm have longer 
pay duration. This finding is robust after including other control variables in the regression, as 
shown in Column (2). One concern with our estimates is that they could be biased by the quality 
of the internal candidate who is chosen to be the CEO. Firms that have a better quality internal 
candidate are likely to offer her a contract with longer pay duration and also select her to be the 
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replacement CEO. To address this concern, we repeat our tests by calculating Average duration 
after excluding the pay duration of the internal candidate who becomes the replacement CEO. In 
untabulted results, we again find that firms that offer longer duration pay contracts to their senior 
executives are less likely to hire an external candidate.  
       To the extent that the importance of firm-specific knowledge is common across firms in an 
industry, we expect firms in industries with higher pay duration to be more likely to hire an internal 
candidate to replace their CEO. We test this in Column (3) after replacing Average duration in 
Column (1) with Industry duration, which is defined as the average pay duration of CEOs in the 
industry (defined based on three-digit SIC codes).58 We find that firms from industries with higher 
average pay duration are more likely to hire an internal candidate, as seen from the negative and 
significant coefficient on Industry duration. In Column (4), the coefficient on Industry duration 
remains negative but becomes insignificant after including other control variables. The impact of 
Industry duration appears to be encapsulated by that of the variations of firm characteristics across 
industries.    
       As a summary, we document that firms are more likely to choose an insider as their new 
CEO if other senior executives have been granted pay with longer duration. It is consistent with 
the firm-specific knowledge being an important consideration in firms’ CEO succession decision.    
2.5 Conclusion 
       We argue that deferred pay enables firms to retain managerial talent. Firms typically defer 
the stock component of pay. The forfeiture of all unvested stock pay upon executive turnover, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, increases the cost of managerial departure. Using the duration measure 
of executive compensation, introduced by Gopalan, et al. (forthcoming), that captures both the 
                                                 
58 In this test, only year fixed effect is included.  
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magnitude and the vesting length of stock pay, we find that there is a negative causal effect of pay 
duration on voluntary executive turnover. We also find that pay duration is negatively correlated 
with involuntary executive turnover, the sensitivity of involuntary turnover to firm performance, 
and the likelihood of external hiring in CEO succession. These findings are consistent with a 
significant role of the importance of firm-specific knowledge and managerial talent that underlie 
both the design of pay duration and executive turnover decisions in firms.       
         Our study suggests that firms’ compensation policy and management turnover decisions 
are interlinked. It highlights the effectiveness of explicit compensation contract in talent retention, 
which has received little attention in the prior literature on managerial compensation. We leave it 
for future research to explore potentially interesting implications of the joint roles of managerial 
compensation contract – incentive provision and talent retention – on firms’ financial policies and 
corporate decisions.   
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2.6 Appendix 
2.6.1 Construction of the Alternative Duration Measure – Duration-2 
       Duration-2 augments the baseline duration measure Duration by including all grants 
awarded in prior years. Among them, all vested stocks and stock options awarded in prior years are 
assigned a vest period of 0; detailed vesting schedule of all unvested grants that were awarded 
during 2006-2009 is obtained from Equilar; for all unvested grants that were awarded prior to 2006, 
we need to estimate their vesting schedule using the detailed information provided in ExecuComp 
on the total outstanding unvested stocks and stock options as of each year end. The procedure of 
estimating the vesting schedule of unvested pre-2006 grants is described as follows. 
       For stock options, we first isolate the unvested pre-2006 grants by subtracting the unvested 
post-2006 grants (aggregated from Equilar) from the total outstanding unvested grants obtained 
from ExecuComp. To do so, we need to merge Equlilar and ExecuComp using executive identity, 
year, exercise price, and expiration date. We then use the year-on-year change in the total unvested 
pre-2006 grants to gauge their vesting schedule with the assumption that these grants vest at the 
end of 2011. For restricted stocks, we do not need such an assumption since there is no expiration 
date or exercise price for restricted stocks. And we follow the same procedure in the estimation of 
their vesting schedule except that we merge Equilar and ExecuComp using executive identity and 
year only.        
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2.6.2 Variable Definitions  
 Age is the age of the executive (in years) 
 Block holder is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if there is at least one 
institution holding more than 5% of the firm’s outstanding stocks, and zero otherwise. 
 Duality is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the CEO is also the chairperson, 
and zero otherwise.  
 External hire is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if an outsider is hired as a 
CEO, and zero otherwise. 
 Firm size is the natural log of the total assets of the firm. 
 High duration is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the pay duration of the 
executive is above the sample median, and zero otherwise.  
 Ind. adj. stock return is the firm’s annual stock return from the previous year net of the 
mean industry stock return. 
 Independent is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the fraction of outsiders on 
the firm's Board of Directors is above the median in a given year. Any director who is an 
employee of the firm or has some affiliation with the firm is classified as an insider. 
 Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. 
 Market to book is the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. 
 R&D/Asset is the ratio of research and development expenditure over the book value of 
total assets. Missing values are replaced with zero. 
 Stock holding is the fraction of outstanding shares owned by the executive. 
 Tenure is the number of years an executive has been in office. 
 Volatility is the standard deviation of the firm’s stock return over the 12 months. 
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2.6.4 Tables 
 
Table 2.1  
 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of our sample. Panels A and B present characteristics of CEOs and other executives, 
respectively. Panel C presents firm characteristics. Duration and Duration-2 are measures of executive pay duration discussed in Section 
3.2. All other variables are defined in Appendix B.  
 
PANEL A: CEOs 
 
 N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Duration 6127 1.455 0.969 0.637 1.658 2.134 
Duration-2 6100 1.487 0.858 0.947 1.624 2.040 
Age 6127 54.865 7.194 50 55 60 
Tenure 6127 7.481 7.096 2.499 5.419 10 
Stock holding 6127 12.724 23.884 0.71 2.911 10.381 
Duality 6127 0.514 0.5 0 1 1 
 
 
PANEL B: Other executives 
 
 N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Duration 18005 1.259 0.882 0.491 1.377 1.891 
Duration-2 17979 1.291 0.804 0.722 1.397 1.826 
Age 18005 51.101 7.358 46 51 56 
Tenure 18005 14.873 11.707 6 12 22 
Stock holding 18005 3.31 14.956 0.11 0.495 1.456 
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Panel C: Firm characteristics 
 
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Ind adj. stock return 6127 0.03 0.328 -0.172 -0.003 0.184 
Volatility 6127 0.42 0.228 0.26 0.361 0.509 
Firm size 6127 7.745 1.747 6.489 7.622 8.894 
Market to book 6108 1.706 0.99 1.073 1.367 1.967 
Leverage 6104 0.226 0.196 0.058 0.197 0.341 
R&D/Asset 6125 0.024 0.047 0 0 0.024 
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Table 2.2 
 
Univariate Evidence on Pay Duration and Turnover 
This table presents univariate evidence on pay duration and turnover. Panels A through D pertain to subsamples of voluntary CEO 
turnover, senior executives jump-ships, forced CEO turnover, and involuntary executive turnovers, respectively. Duration and 
Duration-2 are measures of executive pay duration discussed in Section 3.2. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. In each 
panel, the sample is further segmented into two groups of turnover vs non-turnover years. T-test is conducted on the difference 
between the two groups, which is reported in the last column. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
PANEL A: Voluntary CEO Turnover 
 Turnover years 
Non-turnover 
years  
 N Mean N Mean Difference 
Duration 125 1.066 6002 1.463 -0.397*** 
Duration-2 124 1.077 5976 1.496 -0.419*** 
Ind adj. stock 
return 
125 -0.044 6002 0.031 -0.075** 
Age 125 52.744 6002 54.909 -2.165*** 
Tenure 125 6.661 6002 7.499 -0.838 
Stock holding 125 6.661 6002 12.851 -6.19*** 
Duality 125 0.464 6002 0.515 -0.051 
 
PANEL B: Executives jumping ship 
 
Turnover 
years 
Non-turnover 
years  
 N Mean N Mean Difference 
Duration 289 0.413 17716 1.273 -0.86*** 
Duration-2 289 0.461 17690 1.310 -0.844*** 
Ind adj. stock 
return 
289 -0.009 17716 0.041 -0.05** 
Age 289 49.197 17716 51.132 -1.935*** 
Tenure 289 12.014 17716 14.92 -2.906*** 
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PANEL C: Forced CEO turnover 
 
Turnover 
years 
Non-turnover 
years  
 N Mean N Mean Difference 
Duration 114 0.869 6013 1.466 -0.597*** 
Duration-2 113 0.869 5987 1.499 -0.630*** 
Ind adj. stock 
return 
114 -0.18 6013 0.034 -0.214*** 
Age 114 51.579 6013 54.927 -3.348*** 
Tenure 114 5.001 6013 7.528 -2.527*** 
Stock holding 114 6.614 6013 12.84 -6.226*** 
Duality 114 0.307 6013 0.518 -0.211*** 
 
PANEL D: Involuntary turnover of other executives 
 Turnover years 
Non-turnover 
years  
 N Mean N Mean Difference 
Duration 553 0.794 17452 1.274 -0.48*** 
Duration-2 552 0.802 17427 1.307 -0.505*** 
Ind adj. stock 
return 
553 -0.142 17452 0.046 -0.188*** 
Age 553 48.915 17452 51.17 -2.255*** 
Tenure 553 12.221 17452 14.957 -2.736*** 
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Table 2.3 
 
Pay Duration and Voluntary Turnover  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard model and linear probability model that examine the likelihood 
of voluntary executive turnovers. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Duration is the baseline measure of executive pay duration 
discussed in Section 3.2. Other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered by three-digit 
SIC industry and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 Voluntary CEO 
turnover 
Voluntary executive 
turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cox OLS Cox OLS 
Duration -0.604*** -0.012*** -1.518*** -0.027*** 
 (0.118) (0.004) (0.121) (0.003) 
Ind adj. stock return -0.429 -0.011 0.083 0.002 
 (0.283) (0.007) (0.137) (0.003) 
Volatility -0.307 -0.012 -0.493 -0.016 
 (0.780) (0.022) (0.455) (0.010) 
Firm size -0.017 -0.010 0.187*** 0.002 
 (0.065) (0.012) (0.054) (0.006) 
Block holder -0.121 0.002 -0.237 0.007 
 (0.206) (0.011) (0.177) (0.005) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.093 0.037*** -0.185*** -0.002 
 (0.158) (0.008) (0.063) (0.002) 
Age -0.034** -0.001 -0.028*** -0.000** 
 (0.013) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) 
Stock holding -0.023*** -0.000   
 (0.008) (0.000)   
Duality 0.303 0.008   
 (0.249) (0.014)   
CEO turnover   0.254 0.005 
   (0.216) (0.006) 
External hire   -0.110 -0.011 
   (0.371) (0.011) 
Constant  0.125  0.048 
  (0.106)  (0.047) 
Observations 6113 6127 17986 18005 
Adjusted R2  -0.015  0.053 
Pseudo R2 0.060  0.174  
Fixed effects Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Firm 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Firm 
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Table 2.4 
 
Pay Duration and Voluntary Turnover – Alternate Duration Measure  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard model and linear probability model that examine the likelihood 
of voluntary executive turnovers. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Duration-2 is the alternative measure of executive pay duration 
discussed in Section 3.2. Other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered by three-digit 
SIC industry and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 Voluntary CEO 
turnover 
Voluntary executive 
turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cox OLS Cox OLS 
Duration-2 -0.841*** -0.015*** -1.670*** -0.031*** 
 (0.152) (0.005) (0.119) (0.003) 
Ind adj. stock return -0.444 -0.012 0.131 0.002 
 (0.286) (0.007) (0.135) (0.003) 
Volatility -0.555 -0.012 -0.522 -0.015 
 (0.823) (0.022) (0.447) (0.010) 
Firm size -0.006 -0.010 0.199*** 0.002 
 (0.061) (0.012) (0.053) (0.006) 
Block holder -0.112 0.002 -0.203 0.008* 
 (0.204) (0.011) (0.183) (0.005) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.102 0.037*** -0.168*** -0.002 
 (0.153) (0.008) (0.063) (0.002) 
Age -0.035** -0.001 -0.026*** -0.000** 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) 
Stock holding -0.024*** -0.000   
 (0.008) (0.000)   
Duality 0.326 0.008   
 (0.252) (0.014)   
CEO turnover   0.240 0.005 
   (0.225) (0.006) 
External hire   -0.156 -0.010 
   (0.417) (0.012) 
Constant  0.128  0.056 
  (0.108)  (0.047) 
Observations 6086 6100 17960 17979 
Adjusted R2  -0.016  0.056 
Pseudo R2 0.072  0.185  
Fixed effects Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Firm 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Firm 
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Table 2.5 
 
Pay Duration and Voluntary Turnover – IV estimation  
 
This table presents the results of a two-stage instrument variable regression that regress voluntary turnover of CEOs and non-CEO 
executives on instrumented Duration-2. In the first stage regression, Duration-2 is regressed on Large vesting, an indicator variable that 
takes a value of one if the largest stock and option grants from prior years (at least two years prior) vest, and other explanatory 
variables. Duration-2 is the alternative measure of executive pay duration discussed in Section 3.2. Other explanatory variables are 
defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 Voluntary turnover (CEOs and non-CEOs combined) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
Large vesting -0.025***  -0.162***  
 (0.013)  (0.011)  
Duration-2  -1.336*  -0.219*** 
  (0.686) 
 
 (0.021) 
Ind adj. stock return 0.124*** 0.160* -0.022 -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.088) (0.015) (0.004) 
Volatility -0.567*** -0.755* -0.123*** -0.043*** 
 (0.039) (0.393) (0.042) (0.012) 
Firm size 0.162*** 0.216* -0.014 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.111) (0.023) (0.006) 
Block holder 0.159*** 0.205* 0.035 0.014** 
 (0.014) (0.110) (0.022) (0.006) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.047*** -0.067** -0.069*** -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.033) (0.005) (0.002) 
Age -0.007*** -0.009** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.674*** 0.949** 1.871*** 0.439*** 
 (0.053) (0.470) (0.178) (0.064) 
Observations 24079 24079 
9.51 
Time & Firm 
F-statistic 12.51 
Fixed effects Time & Industry 
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Table 2.6 
Pay Duration and Forced CEO Turnover  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard model and linear probability model that examine the likelihood 
of forced CEO turnover. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Duration is the baseline measure of executive pay duration discussed in 
Section 3.2. Other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix B.  Robust standard errors are clustered by three-digit SIC industry 
and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cox OLS OLS OLS 
Duration -0.662*** -0.011*** -0.010 -0.012** 
 (0.132) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Ind adj. stock return -1.251*** -0.023*** -0.010 -0.014* 
 (0.417) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Volatility 1.960** 0.053*** 0.055* 0.049* 
 (0.773) (0.018) (0.033) (0.026) 
Firm size 0.191*** 0.004*** -0.022** -0.003 
 (0.067) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010) 
Block holder 0.299 0.003 -0.003 0.004 
 (0.264) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.064 0.003 -0.017 0.054*** 
 (0.168) (0.003) (0.015) (0.011) 
Age -0.047*** -0.001*** 0.010** -0.004** 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) 
Stock holding -0.016** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Duality -0.184 -0.005 -0.014 -0.020 
 (0.255) (0.004) (0.010) (0.013) 
Constant  0.044* -0.328 0.163 
  (0.025) (0.268) (0.121) 
Observations 6113 6127 6127 6127 
Adjusted R2  0.030 0.355 -0.002 
Pseudo R2 0.118    
Fixed effects Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time, 
Industry 
& CEO 
Time, 
Industry 
& Firm 
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Table 2.7 
 
Pay Duration and Forced CEO Turnover: Variation with Corporate 
Governance  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard model and linear probability model that examine the likelihood 
of forced CEO turnover. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Duration is the baseline measure of executive pay duration discussed in 
Section 3.2. Independent is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the fraction of outsiders on the firm’s board of directors is 
above the sample median in a given year. Other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered 
by three-digit SIC industry and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 COX Linear probability model 
Duration -0.662*** -0.351* -0.011*** -0.005 
 (0.132) (0.201) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ind adj. stock return -1.251*** -1.299*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 
 (0.417) (0.496) (0.006) (0.006) 
Independent  -0.034  0.007 
  (0.228)  (0.004) 
Independent X Duration  -0.655***  -0.017*** 
  (0.250)  (0.005) 
Volatility 1.960** 1.714* 0.053*** 0.041** 
 (0.773) (1.015) (0.018) (0.019) 
Firm size 0.191*** 0.204** 0.004*** 0.004** 
 (0.067) (0.084) (0.001) (0.002) 
Block holder 0.299 0.410 0.003 0.006 
 (0.264) (0.340) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.064 0.056 0.003 0.005 
 (0.168) (0.170) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock holding -0.016** -0.010 -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Duality -0.184 -0.185 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.255) (0.261) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant   0.044* 0.031 
   (0.025) (0.028) 
Observations 6113 5304 6127 5316 
Adjusted R2   0.030 0.029 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.121   
Fixed effects Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Industry 
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Table 2.8 
 
Pay Duration and the Sensitivity of Forced CEO Turnover to Firm 
Performance  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard model and linear probability model that examine the likelihood 
of forced CEO turnover. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Duration is the baseline measure of executive pay duration discussed in 
Section 3.2. High duration is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if Duration is above the sample median in a given year. Other 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered by three-digit SIC industry and are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 COX Linear probability model 
Duration -0.662*** -0.574*** -0.011*** -0.012**  
 (0.132) (0.130) (0.003) (0.005)  
Ind adj. stock return -1.251*** -0.977** -0.019*** -0.013 -0.038*** 
 (0.417) (0.397) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) 
Duration X Ind. adj. return  0.571** 0.025*** 0.018*  
  (0.263) (0.007) (0.010)  
High duration     -0.019*** 
     (0.005) 
High duration X Ind. adj. stock 
return 
    0.034*** 
     (0.013) 
Volatility 1.960** 1.888** 0.050*** 0.050* 0.053*** 
 (0.773) (0.771) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) 
Firm size 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.004*** -0.003 0.003*** 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) 
Block holder 0.299 0.321 0.003 0.005 0.002 
 (0.264) (0.269) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.064 -0.069 0.003 0.053*** 0.003 
 (0.168) (0.172) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) 
Age -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.001*** -0.004** -0.001*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Stock holding -0.016** -0.016* -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Duality -0.184 -0.188 -0.005 -0.020 -0.006 
 (0.255) (0.256) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) 
Constant   0.041 0.158 0.037 
   (0.025) (0.124) (0.025) 
Observations 6113 6113 6127 6127 6127 
Adjusted R2   0.033 -0.000 0.029 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.121    
Fixed Effects Time & Industry Time & 
Industry 
Time & 
Firm 
Time & 
Industry 
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Table 2.9 
 
Effect of Pay Duration of Other Senior Executives on CEO Succession 
Decision 
 
This table presents the results of a linear probability model that examine the likelihood of outside CEO succession following CEO 
turnover. The dependent variable takes a value of one if the newly appointed CEO has been with the firm for less than a year prior to 
the appointment and zero otherwise. Average duration is the average pay duration of other top executives than the departing CEO in 
the firm included in ExecuComp.  Industry avg. duration is the average pay duration of CEOs from the same industry. Other explanatory 
variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered by clustered by three-digit SIC industry and are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
      
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 Probability of an external hire 
Average. duration -0.12*** -0.08*   
 (0.04) (0.04)   
Industry avg. duration   -0.10* -0.05 
   (0.06) (0.06) 
Ind adj. stock return  -0.11  -0.16** 
  (0.10)  (0.07) 
Volatility  0.16  0.12 
  (0.40)  (0.20) 
Firm size  -0.03  -0.05*** 
  (0.03)  (0.01) 
Block holder  -0.15*  -0.11* 
  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Constant 0.55*** 0.81** 0.57*** 0.90*** 
 (0.06) (0.34) (0.08) (0.20) 
Observations 429 429 437 437 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.05 
Fixed effect Time and Industry Time 
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Chapter 3: Disagreement-induced CEO 
Turnover 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
       Under what conditions are CEOs fired and how do boards determine who to replace them 
with?  This is a crucial issue in corporate governance, and has generated an extensive literature that 
focuses primarily on the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover and the factors 
that affect this relationship.59 While there is broad consensus that firm performance has a 
statistically significant impact on forced CEO turnover, its economic significance is modest relative 
to what extant theory suggests.60  Moreover, Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) find that, despite 
substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms, the relationship between forced CEO 
turnover and firm performance does not change significantly over time.61 These are puzzling 
stylized facts, and suggest the possibility of as-yet-unexplored factors that affect CEO turnover and 
replacement, factors that go beyond firm performance (see, for example, Brickley (2003)).  The 
purpose of this paper is to propose and test a new explanation for forced CEO turnover that is not 
directly related to firm performance, and thereby illuminate another determinant of this corporate 
governance practice. 
       Our analysis focuses on potential disagreement between management and investors as a 
determinant of CEO turnover.  The basic idea is simple. The decision of whether to continue with 
                                                 
59 See, for example, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Weisbach (1988), Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), Denis and Denis (1995), Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Parrino (1997), 
DeFond and Park (1999), Murphy (1999), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), Engle, Hayes, and Wang (2003), Farell 
and Whidbee (2003), Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004), Song (2008), Bushman, Dai, and Wang (2010), and 
Dasgupta, Li, and Wang (2014). Other studies (e.g., Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Jenter and Kanaan, forthcoming) 
suggest that CEOs are forced out not only due to firms’ own performance but also peer firms’.  
60 According to the summary of existing research in Brickley (2003), moving from the top decile to the bottom decile 
of firm performance increases the probability of a forced CEO turnover by four percentage points.  
61 Kaplan and Minton (2012) find that this relation appears to have intensified in the last few years.  
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a CEO or force the CEO out depends on the board’s assessment of how the firm will perform in 
the future. This depends on strategic decisions the CEO is making at present, whose cash flow 
implications cannot be unambiguously determined ex ante because they are estimates that depend 
on assumptions that have limited justification based on historical data. This means rational agents 
may disagree on whether a particular strategy will enhance or destroy firm value (see Kurz (1994)). 
When investors and the board have a high degree of confidence in the CEO, as reflected in a high 
level of agreement, they are more likely to endorse the CEO’s strategies and continue with the 
CEO. However, low levels of agreement with the CEO can induce “second guessing” of the CEO’s 
decisions, and even relatively small performance shortfalls may trigger CEO dismissal because 
they tend to reinforce initial misgivings. This paper uses this intuition and builds on the prior 
literature on investor-management disagreement (e.g., Garmaise, 2001; Van den Steen, 2005 and 
2010b; Boot, Gopalan, and Thakor, 2006 and 2008; Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Boot and Thakor, 
2011) to examine its implications for CEO turnover. We document empirically that disagreement 
between investors and management on the optimal course of corporate actions has a statistically 
and economically significant impact on forced CEO turnover.                                                                                                                                                   
       Specifically, we argue that investors and management may have heterogeneous prior beliefs 
about the profitability of a firm’s future investment opportunities or the strategy of how best to 
implement its investment decisions. The heterogeneous priors constitute “rational beliefs” in the 
sense of Kurz (1994), and can generate different opinions about the optimal course of actions for 
the firm. Moreover, with rational beliefs, they will not revise their beliefs even though it is common 
knowledge that different prior beliefs exist (Kreps, 1990a); nor will they converge to a common 
prior even with sufficient additional information provision (Andreoni and Mylovanov, 2012).  
       The persistence of investor-management disagreement is costly to the firm because higher 
disagreement implies a lower valuation of the firm and a higher cost of external finance, thereby 
affecting the firm’s security issuance decision (see Dittmar and Thakor (2007)). This means that 
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the firm may forgo even those projects that its management believes have positive NPV because 
investor-management disagreement makes the cost of raising external financing prohibitive. Thus, 
firms with relatively high levels of investor-management disagreement may benefit by replacing 
their CEOs. Of course, this does not mean that all firms will expeditiously fire CEOs when the 
level of disagreement exceeds some threshold—the board’s ability to do this may be constrained 
by the “power” of the CEO and the level of entrenchment. 62 Each firm will trade off the benefit of 
reduced investor-management disagreement due to CEO dismissal against the entrenchment-
induced costs/difficulties faced by the board in dismissing the CEO. Cross-sectional heterogeneity 
in entrenchment means that firms will therefore differ in the extent to which disagreement leads to 
the CEO being fired.  
      We use this reasoning to develop three testable hypotheses. First, CEOs are more likely to 
be forced out when the level of investor-management disagreement is higher, ceteris paribus.  
Second, to the extent that those within the executive suite of the firm are more likely to have similar 
beliefs among each other than with investors, firms with higher levels of investor-management 
disagreement are more likely to hire replacement CEOs from outside the firm because an internal 
successor is likely to be burdened, like her predecessor, with a high level of disagreement with 
investors. Third, disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover.  
       Using various measures of investor-management disagreement used in the prior literature, 
we find strong empirical support for these hypotheses. As for the first hypothesis, we test it using 
both the Cox proportional hazard model and the logit model, and find that the impact of 
disagreement on forced turnover is both statistically and economically significant. The odds of 
forced CEO turnover are 0.42-1.27 times higher following a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
level of different disagreement measures. Our findings are robust to the introduction of controls for 
various measures of firm performance as well as other firm characteristics and CEO attributes that 
                                                 
62 Taylor (2010) suggests that the empirically observed low forced CEO turnover rate is, to a large extent, due to CEO 
entrenchment. 
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are previously documented to be related to forced CEO turnover. Moreover, the stock market 
responds more positively to announcements of disagreement-induced forced turnovers (especially 
those with an outsider being hired to replace the fired CEO) than to announcements of other 
instances of forced turnover, which is consistent with the market’s anticipation of a post-dismissal 
decline in disagreement in these firms that will lead to an increase in firm valuation.63 
       We further examine cross-sectional variations in the turnover-disagreement sensitivity that 
are related to varying costs of disagreement and varying constraints that different firms have in 
their CEO firing decisions. Our findings buttress support for the disagreement hypothesis in 
explaining forced CEO turnover, and can be summarized as follows. First, the turnover-
disagreement sensitivity is greater for firms that are financially more constrained and thus are likely 
to be more dependent on external equity financing. To the extent that the adverse impact of 
disagreement on firm valuation (and thus cost of external financing) is more pronounced in more-
constrained firms, these firms tend to be more responsive to disagreement in their forced turnover 
decisions. Second, consistent with the impact of CEO entrenchment and shareholder governance, 
firms are less responsive to disagreement in their turnover decisions when CEOs are more 
entrenched and board oversight is weaker, but more responsive when shareholders have more 
concentrated ownership and thus can exert more influence on firm decisions. 
       As for the second hypothesis, we test it using a logit estimation model and find that an 
external replacement for the departing CEO is more likely when the level of investor-management 
disagreement is higher. This effect is both statistically significant and economically meaningful. 
The odds of an external CEO hire are 0.49-1.34 times higher for a one-standard-deviation increase 
in the level of different disagreement measures.  
                                                 
63 The average five-day (-2, +2) cumulative abnormal returns around CEO turnover announcements are 1% for 
disagreement-induced forced turnovers (and 2.54% for those with external CEO successions among them) and -2% for 
other instances of forced turnover, and the difference is statistically significant.  
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       As for the third hypothesis, we find that investor-management disagreement declines 
following forced CEO turnover, and the decline in disagreement is statistically significant for all 
of the disagreement proxies. Moreover, the decline in disagreement is greater if the fired CEO is 
replaced by an external hire.  
       We note that disagreement and its impact on forced CEO turnover can survive as 
equilibrium phenomena even if investors can “vote with their feet” by selling their shares when 
disagreeing with management. To see this, imagine that there is cross-sectional heterogeneity 
among investors in their propensity to agree with management. Due to risk aversion, wealth 
endowment constraints, or both, investors who display higher agreement with management might 
not be capable or willing to absorb all the shares sold by the selling investors who have lower 
agreement levels. Consequently, depending on the firm, the equilibrium level of agreement of the 
marginal investor might very well remain relatively low, despite high levels of agreement for 
inframarginal investors. This may thus lead to forced CEO turnover. This reasoning is consistent 
with the empirical finding by Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) that institutional selling is followed 
by forced CEO turnover.  
       Huang and Thakor (2013) use this idea of equilibrium cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
investor-management disagreement to show that firms can reduce this disagreement by conducting 
open-market and privately-negotiated share repurchases. Repurchases buy out investors who are 
more likely to disagree with management and concentrate share ownership in the hands of investors 
who are less likely to disagree. However, managing disagreement through share repurchases is 
costly because firms have to use internal cash that may have otherwise been invested in positive-
NPV projects. This means that disagreement may be reduced but not eliminated via repurchases, 
implying that forced CEO turnover in response to disagreement can remain as an equilibrium 
outcome even when firms can use share repurchases. Moreover, the impact of disagreement on 
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forced CEO turnover is likely to be stronger and more persistent for financially-constrained firms 
since they have lesser access to the liquidity needed to repurchase stock and reduce disagreement. 
       Lastly, one might be concerned that both disagreement and CEO turnover are related to an 
omitted variable, and thus their correlation might be spurious. For example, an elevation in 
uncertainty about a firm’s growth opportunities or technological development may increase the 
possibility of different interpretations of the same information by investors and management, and 
this elevated uncertainty may also induce higher management turnover. To see whether our finding 
is affected by this possible omitted variable bias, we conduct three additional tests.  
       First, we conduct a falsification test by examining the relationship between disagreement 
and voluntary CEO turnover. If it is an omitted variable (uncertainty) that generates the relation 
between disagreement and forced CEO turnover, then we should expect a similar relation between 
disagreement and voluntary CEO turnover (not due to mandatory or planned retirement) because 
uncertainty increases voluntary management turnover too. In contrast, our disagreement hypothesis 
does not predict such a correlation. Because they believe that their decisions are value-maximizing, 
CEOs will choose not to depart voluntarily, regardless of the level of investor-management 
disagreement.  
       Second, we employ an exogenous shock, caused by distressed mutual fund fire sales, to the 
composition of investor base and thus investor-management agreement, and examine how it may 
affect forced CEO turnover. In mutual fund fire sales induced by extreme capital outflows, 
distressed funds are forced to sell their equity holdings with significant discounts to liquidity 
providers (Coval and Stafford, 2007). Existing shareholders who are not distressed are unlikely to 
absorb all these shares due to the holding-capacity limitations explained earlier. It follows that, in 
equilibrium, the new marginal investors in the stock are other liquidity providers who have a lower 
level of agreement than the existing shareholders (but trade to avail of a liquidity premium). Such 
a shock that results in a decline in agreement is exogenous because fund fire sales are driven by 
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extreme capital outflows at the fund level (and the resulting need for liquidity), as opposed to 
changes in firm fundamentals for the affected stocks. We expect that the exogenous decline in 
agreement leads to an increased probability of forced CEO turnover.     
       Third, we take the inclusion of a firm in the S&P 500 as a quasi-natural experiment that 
causes an increase in institutional ownership of the firm. To the extent that a greater concentration 
of share ownership in institutional investors enhances shareholder governance, our disagreement 
hypothesis predicts a stronger turnover-disagreement sensitivity following the S&P 500 
inclusion.64 In contrast, the S&P 500 inclusion has no plausible effect on the uncertainty of a firm 
and the turnover-disagreement sensitivity in the firm as a result. The results of all the three tests 
provide strong support for our disagreement hypothesis and show that the omitted variable bias is 
not likely to be a serious concern.       
       Our study has several intended contributions. First, it seeks to add to the literature on 
corporate governance and CEO turnover by showing that investor-management disagreement is an 
important and previously-ignored factor in the firm’s CEO turnover decision, and that the impact 
of this factor is attenuated by governance variables like CEO entrenchment. Consistent with Taylor 
(2010), the latter finding explains the low forced CEO turnover rate despite the wide existence of 
investor-management disagreement in practice. Our study departs from the conventional focus of 
the prior literature on firm performance in examining CEO turnover. A recent study by Jenter and 
Lewellen (2014) finds a closer link between CEO turnover and firm performance if the distinction 
between voluntary and forced turnover is dropped. We show that the impact of investor-
management disagreement persists even after controlling for accounting-based and market-based 
firm performance as well as industry performance.      
                                                 
64 For the role of institutional investors, both passive and active, in corporate governance, see, for examples, Hartzell 
and Starks (2003), Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), Gillan and Starks (2007), Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2014), and 
Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014). Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014) suggest that even passive investors like 
index funds have incentives to intervene and exert influence on corporate management through proxy voting and 
private communication with management. Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2014) show that an increase in ownership by 
passive institutions is associated with an improvement in corporate governance. 
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       Our study also seeks to improve our understanding of a firm’s choice between an internal 
and an external CEO. Specifically, it shows that CEO selection is a process that seeks a CEO-firm 
match, consistent with the literature in which CEO turnover is an efficient outcome in a competitive 
assignment framework in which CEOs and firms match on multiple dimensions (e.g., Eisfeldt and 
Kuhnen, 2013). We provide suggestive evidence that belief-alignment is a consideration in this 
matching process. 
       Lastly, our paper contributes to another strand of the literature that has used the idea of 
disagreement based on differences in beliefs to examine a variety of issues in finance and 
contracting. They include financing of new industries and technologies (Allen and Gale, 1999), the 
entrepreneur’s choice of private versus public ownership (Boot, Gopalan, and Thakor, 2006 and 
2008), optimal capital structure (Boot and Thakor, 2011), financial intermediation (Coval and 
Thakor, 2005), the firm’s choice of debt versus equity financing (Dittmar and Thakor, 2007), 
security design (Garmaise, 2001), share repurchase (Huang and Thakor, 2013), trade around public 
announcement (Kandel and Pearson, 1995), the co-evolution of banks and market in financial 
system (Song and Thakor, 2010), financial innovation and crises (Thakor, 2012), corporate 
investment (Thakor and Whited, 2011), “endogenous optimism” (Van den Steen, 2004), the 
allocation of control (Van den Steen, 2010a), and the theory of firms (Van den Steen, 2010b). 
       The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops testable hypotheses. Discussions of the 
data and sample are in Section 3. In Section 4, we conduct the main analysis of investor-
management disagreement and forced CEO turnover, and test the predictions of the hypotheses. 
Robustness checks and discussions are in Section 5. This section focuses on four issues: the 
reaction of the stock market to disagreement-induced turnover, the robustness of our finding to 
alternative measures of firm and industry performance, endogeneity concerns, and the extent to 
which our disagreement proxies may be measuring things other than disagreement. Section 6 
concludes.  
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3.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
       While the prior literature on CEO turnover focuses primarily on performance-induced CEO 
dismissals and the impact of corporate governance on turnover-performance sensitivity, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that forced CEO departures are often not merely due to poor firm performance. 
Rather, they sometimes result from disagreement between management and shareholders on the 
optimal course of corporate decisions. Examples abound. For instance, Associated Press 
Newswires reported on November 9, 2000, that Lloyd Ward resigned as Maytag Corp’s Chairman 
and CEO over “a difference (of opinion) on the company’s strategic outlook and direction”. 
Similarly, Curtis Huff was ousted as CEO from Grant Prideco over frictions during the 
implementation of its predetermined acquisition strategy, although analysts credited Huff with 
“leaving the company in good shape”.65 There are numerous other reports of CEOs being forced 
out due to difference of opinion over corporate strategy, direction, and implementation.66 
       As suggested in these anecdotes, investors and managers can have divergent opinions about 
the optimal course of actions based on the same evidence. That is, disagreement between investors 
and management arises not because they have different information sets, but because they interpret 
information in different ways. Divergent interpretations can arise from heterogeneous prior beliefs 
– that are all rational in the sense of Kurz (1994) – about the profitability of a firm’s future 
investment opportunities or the strategy of how best to implement its investment decisions.  
       Disagreement is costly to firms because it lowers firm valuation and makes external 
financing more expensive (Dittmar and Thakor, 2007), and this cost is higher for firms that are 
financially more constrained and hence more dependent on external equity financing. This creates 
                                                 
65 See “Grant Prideco Shake-up Has BJ’s McShane in Charge” by Platts Oilgram News on June 25, 2002.  
66 For examples, see the resignations of CEO Richard White from Veritas DGC, of CEO Bruce Albertson from Iomega, 
of CEO Warren Musser from Wayne, and of CEO Edwin Russell from Allete Inc., among many others.  
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a rationale for such a firm to replace a CEO who has a relatively low agreement with investors with 
one who investors agree more with, everything else being equal. 
       However, CEO entrenchment and weakness in shareholder governance can make the board 
reluctant to fire a CEO who may have hand-picked most of the board members or one who is 
deemed to be “powerful” due to tenure in office or other considerations. The prior literature 
suggests that involuntary CEO turnover is less likely and also more costly if the CEO is more 
entrenched and governance is weaker (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 
1996; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 
2001; Taylor, 2011). Therefore, firms balance the disagreement-decline benefit of CEO dismissal 
against the cost/difficulty of firing an entrenched CEO. This leads to our first main hypothesis as 
follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, forced CEO turnover is more likely in firms with higher investor-
management disagreement.   
It should be noted that our analysis does not yield a similar prediction for voluntary CEO turnover. 
Such turnover is unaffected by investor-management disagreement because the CEO believes that 
her decisions are value-maximizing. 
      It is plausible to postulate that those within the executive suite of the firm will share similar 
views and beliefs due to constant interactions and being part of the same corporate culture (e.g., 
Kreps, 1990b; Van den Steen, 2010c; Bouwman, 2013), making them more likely to agree with 
each other than with investors. An immediate implication of this is that investors, who had a higher 
level of agreement with a departing CEO, are more likely to endorse an insider to succeed the 
departing CEO, since this higher agreement level is likely to persist with the successor. When 
agreement with the departing CEO is relatively low, investors prefer an outsider to be the successor. 
This is consistent with the evidence of management turnover, shown by Fee and Hadlock (2004), 
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that senior executive managers are evaluated as a group. Although it might be more costly to search 
for an external CEO than to select one from an internal talent pool (due to search frictions on the 
labor market), the benefit of having an external CEO with a higher level of agreement with 
investors may outweigh the search costs. We therefore have our second testable prediction below.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms are more likely to select an external replacement CEO if investor-management 
disagreement with the existing CEO is higher. 
       It follows that investor-management disagreement is likely to decline when a new external 
CEO successor is selected subsequent to a CEO being forced out. Even if an internal CEO is 
selected to replace the fired CEO in some of the cases (possibly due to a high external search cost 
or the importance of firm-specific knowledge), we expect firms to select an internal successor with 
a higher level of agreement with investors than that enjoyed by the departing CEO, everything else 
being equal. This means that investor-management disagreement is expected to decline following 
a forced CEO turnover, leading to our third testable prediction. 
Hypothesis 3: Investor-management disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover.  
Also, our analysis above indicates that the decline in disagreement will be greater if the replacement 
CEO is selected externally.   
3.3 Data and Variables 
 
3.3.1 Data and Sample 
 
       Our sample construction starts with all U.S. firms in ExecuComp from 1993 to 2010 that 
list their common stock in NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. We exclude all financial (primary SIC 
codes 6000 – 6999) and utility (primary SIC codes 4900 – 4999) firms. We include data on CEO 
characteristics (age, tenure, chairmanship, and stock ownership), firm-level accounting variables 
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(e.g., assets, leverage, book value of equity, and net income), stock price, institutional ownership, 
and proxies for investor-management disagreement.  
      Turnover data: We identify CEO turnover from ExecuComp and use news reports, Boardex, 
and other public sources to classify the turnover as voluntary or involuntary.  
      Disagreement proxies: We construct proxies for disagreement using analysts’ earnings forecast 
data from I/B/E/S, and using data on shareholder proxy proposals (1996–2010), shareholder voting 
(2003–2010), and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) vote recommendations in director 
elections (2003–2010) from Voting Anlytics.67 We follow Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) 
and search news reports to collect data on shareholders’ “just vote no” campaign from 2003 to 
2010. 
      CEO attributes: We obtain data on CEO age, tenure, chairmanship, and stock ownership from 
ExecuComp and whenever needed, supplement it with data from Boardex. 
      Firm attributes: We obtain firm-level accounting data from COMPUSTAT, stock price and 
return data from CRSP, institutional ownership data from CDA/Spectrum, and board and director 
characteristics data from RiskMetrics and Boardex.  
      As we discuss below, our final sample size varies with different disagreement proxies due to 
different degrees of data availability.68 
 
 
                                                 
67 We thank Stuart Gillan for sharing the shareholder proxy proposal data before 1996. 
68 The resulted samples of CEO turnover corresponding to different disagreement proxies are smaller than the universe 
of CEO turnover for firms in ExecuComp during the sample period. However, as we discuss later, the rate of CEO 
turnover and the rate of forced versus voluntary turnover in our samples are consistent with those reported in the prior 
literature.  
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3.3.2 Key Variable Construction 
 
CEO turnover 
       As discussed earlier, our disagreement hypothesis predicts forced, but not voluntary, CEO 
turnover. In this section, we describe the classification of CEO turnover as voluntary or involuntary. 
We start with identifying turnover from changes in CEO designation as documented in 
ExecuComp.  We then search using Factiva and LexisNexis for news reports coincident with the 
change in designation to identify the causes for the change. We drop instances that are due to 
misclassification in ExecuComp, takeovers or spinoffs, sudden death, or departures from interim 
positions. To classify a turnover as voluntary or involuntary, we start with using a similar algorithm 
as in Parrino (1997). Any turnover for which the press reports that the CEO is fired, is forced out, 
or resigns due to poor performance, difference of opinion, or unspecified policy differences is 
classified as forced. Of the remaining instances of turnover, if the departing CEO is under age 60, 
it is classified as forced if either (1) the reported reason for the departure does not involve death, 
poor health, or acceptance of another position elsewhere or within the firm, or (2) the CEO is 
reported to be retiring but there is no announcement about the retirement made at least two months 
prior to the departure.  
       We then complement the above algorithm with a modification as in Huson, Parrino, and 
Starks (2001) and also in more recent studies (e.g., Taylor, 2010; Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata, 
2012; Jenter and Kanaan, forthcoming). We reclassify a forced turnover (identified using the steps 
described above) as voluntary if either (1) the CEO’s employment record, obtained from Boardex, 
Marquis Who’s Who publications, and other press reports, suggests that the CEO obtained a 
comparable position elsewhere upon or immediately following the turnover announcement, or (2) 
the press reports convincingly explain that the departure is due to previously undisclosed personal 
or business reasons that are unrelated to the firm’s activities. All instances of CEO turnover not 
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classified as forced are classified as voluntary, some of which are due to mandatory or planned 
retirements.69   
       We classify a new CEO as being external to the firm if she has been with the firm for no 
more than one year before the succession. We do this by relying on ExecuComp and Boardex for 
information on a manager’s career path, supplemented by Marquis Who’s Who publications, 
Bloomberg Businessweek, and Standard & Poor’s register of corporations, directors, and 
executives. 
Investor-management disagreement 
       Following the literature (e.g., Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Huang and Thakor, 2013), we use 
four proxies for investor-management disagreement: (1) The difference between the analyst 
forecast consensus of a firm’s earnings per share (EPS) and its actual value (“Forecast-Actual 
EPS”), (2) the number of proxy proposals that a firm receives in a year (“Proxy proposal”), (3) the 
vote recommendation in directors’ elections (“Vote recommendation”), and (4) actual voting that 
director candidates receive in directors’ elections (“Actual voting”). Details on these variables 
along with a discussion of the economic rationale for viewing each variable as a proxy for investor-
management disagreement are provided in the Appendix. 
3.3.3  Summary Statistics 
 
       Table 3.1 presents the yearly distribution of the number and frequency of CEO turnover 
between 1993 and 2009.70 Due to its most complete coverage of sample firms, we take the sample 
                                                 
69 Kaplan and Minton (2012) suggest that the usual approach of CEO turnover classification tends to misclassify some 
forced turnovers as voluntary. We note that such a misclassification, if present, results in a smaller sample of forced 
CEO turnover and thus causes a downward bias in the estimated effect of disagreement on forced turnover. That is, the 
documented impact of investor-management disagreement on forced CEO turnover may be an underestimate of the 
actual impact.  
70 Data on CEO turnover end in 2009 instead of 2010 because our analysis requires one more year of data on 
disagreement proxies in examining the change in disagreement following forced CEO turnover.  
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corresponding to the measure of disagreement using the difference between the analyst forecast of 
a firm’s EPS and its actual value in presenting the distribution. Overall, there are 1691 CEO 
successions that occur in about 10% of the sample firm-years. Among them, 345 (about 20% of all 
successions) are forced, and in 520 (about 29%) of all successions, the new CEOs are hired from 
outside the firm. There exist some extent of time-series variations in the number and frequency of 
overall, forced, and external successions. We include year dummies in all of our regressions to 
control for possible time effects. 
[TABLE 3.1 GOES HERE] 
       Table 3.2 reports summary statistics of the key variables we use in our analysis. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the potential impact of outliers. 
Detailed definitions of these variables (except CEO turnover that is discussed earlier) are provided 
in the Appendix. The upper part of Panel A provides summary data on disagreement proxies and 
on forced CEO turnover in each of the four samples with different disagreement proxies. Similar 
to the finding in the prior literature, the unconditional probability of forced CEO turnover in a year 
is between 1.9% and 2.2% across the four samples. The sample firm’s mean (median) Forecast-
Actual EPS is 0.04 (-0.01). Among firms that have received at least one shareholder proxy proposal 
during the sample years 1993-2010, an average of 0.55 proposals are submitted in a year. On 
average, 10% of candidates in a firm-year receive a “withhold” or “against” vote recommendation 
before the director election. Also, 23% of director candidates in an average sample firm-year 
receive a percentage of yes-votes in the election below the yearly median.71 
                                                 
71 As discussed in the construction of the Actual voting measure in Appendix, the yearly median percentage of yes-
votes is defined based on the universe of firms with available actual voting data during 2003-2010, but not on our final 
sample firms. The smaller fraction (23%) of directors in our sample firms receiving below-yearly-median percentage 
of yes-votes than 50% (by construction) suggests a higher average percentage of yes-votes received by director 
candidates in our sample firms (i.e., relatively large firms in ExeuComp) than in firms in the universe.  
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      In the lower part of Panel A, we conduct a univariate test of the relation between forced 
CEO turnover and disagreement. We classify the CEO years into two groups – those involving 
forced turnover and those not involving forced turnover, and compare the disagreement parameters 
in the two groups as of the year prior to turnover. We find a higher level of disagreement in the 
forced-turnover group, and the t-test conducted on the difference of the mean disagreement 
parameters shows that the difference is significant at 1% level for all four disagreement proxies. 
This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. For example, on average, 14% of candidates receive an 
unfavorable voting recommendation before the director election in the year prior to forced CEO 
turnover, while that number is 9% only during other years. Also, 40% of candidates in our sample 
receive a below-yearly-median percentage of yes-votes in the director election in the year prior to 
forced CEO turnover, a number significantly more than 23% – the counterpart statistic during other 
years. 
       In Panels B and C, we present summary statistics of firm and CEO characteristics, 
respectively. As in Table 3.1, we take the sample corresponding to the measure of disagreement 
using the difference between the analyst forecast of a firm’s EPS and its actual value due to its 
most complete coverage of sample firms. On average, 11% of CEOs have over 5% of stock 
ownership in the firm and 62% of CEOs are also Chairmen of the board. The average tenure of the 
CEOs is about 8.6 years. Since we obtain sample firms from ExecuComp (which covers S&P 1500 
firms), the firm characteristics of our sample are similar with those in the prior literature on CEO 
turnover since those papers also use ExecuComp as the major data source.  
 [TABLE 3.2 GOES HERE]      
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3.4 Main Empirical Analysis of Disagreement and Turnover 
 
      In this section, we discuss the empirical tests of our three hypotheses, and examine the 
cross-sectional variations in the turnover-sensitivity of disagreement.  
3.4.1 Test of Hypothesis 1: High investor-management disagreement leads to a 
higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover 
Baseline analysis 
       We test Hypothesis 1 by relating investor-management disagreement to the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnover while controlling for a number of firm and CEO characteristics that the prior 
literature has shown to affect CEO turnover. We follow previous studies (e.g., Hazarika, Karpoff, 
and Nahata, 2012; Jenter and Kanaan, forthcoming) and employ the Cox proportional hazard model 
(Cox, 1972) to conduct our test:  
𝜆(𝑡|𝑋) =  𝜆0(𝛽0𝐼 ∗ 𝑡) exp(𝛽
′𝑋). 
The hazard model presents a CEO’s hazard rate (the dependent variable) – approximately, the 
likelihood that the incumbent CEO will be dismissed in the next year – as a function of the CEO’s 
tenure and other CEO as well as firm characteristics. It thus takes into account both the occurrence 
and timing of forced turnover. The model also accounts for the right-censoring of the data that 
arises from the fact that some CEOs in our sample remain in office by the end of 2009. We allow 
baseline hazards to vary across industries to capture the difference in turnover patterns in different 
industries.  
       Our key independent variable is investor-management disagreement, proxied by the four 
disagreement measures, lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable because it is the 
disagreement parameter in place at the end of the previous year that drives the turnover decision 
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this year. A positive coefficient on the disagreement measures implies a positive marginal impact 
on the hazard and thus a shorter expected time as CEO. The firm characteristics we include in the 
regressions, also lagged by one year, are Firm size, Market-to-Book, Stock return, EW Industry 
stock return, Leverage, Stock volatility and Institutional blockholding.72 When Forecast-Actual 
EPS is used as the disagreement measure, we also include Analyst dispersion to control for 
difference of opinions among analysts. We include Total directors to control for the number of 
director candidates up for elections when the last two disagreement measures regarding director 
election are used. The set of CEO characteristics we include are Age, Age square, CEO 
blockholding, and CEO-Chair Duality. In all regressions, we also include year fixed effects, and 
the standard errors we estimate are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. 
       The results are reported in Table 3.3. Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 1, we 
find that the coefficients of all four disagreement measures are positive and statistically 
significant.73 This indicates that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover increases when investors 
are more likely to disagree with management. From the coefficient estimates of the control 
variables, we find that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is higher in poorly-performing firms 
and in firms with greater stock volatility. Also, CEOs who are also chairmen of the board of 
directors are less likely to be forced out.  
[TABLE 3.3 GOES HERE] 
       We repeat our estimates using a logit model.74 Employing the logit model helps us interpret 
the economic significance of our results in a more intuitive manner. In the interest of brevity, we 
                                                 
72 Following Kaplan and Minton (2012) and Jenter and Kanaan (forthcoming), we control for firms’ stock returns 
(Stock return), industry returns (EW Industry stock return), as well as market returns through yearly fixed effect.   
73 Farrell and Whidbee (2003) find a similar association between the likelihood of CEO turnover and industry-adjusted 
analyst EPS forecast errors for an earlier sample from 1986 to 1997.  
74 We include CEO tenure (Ln(Tenure)) in the logit regressions as an additional control to account for the impact of 
tenure on the likelihood of CEO dismissal. Unlike the Cox proportional hazard model, the logit model by itself does 
not take into account the effect of CEO tenure.  
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do not tabulate the results. The results are consistent with those obtained using the Cox hazard 
model that CEOs are more likely to be forced out when the level of disagreement is higher. The 
impact of disagreement is also economically significant. Specifically, in accordance with the odds 
ratios obtained from the logistic regressions, the odds of forced turnover are 0.42 times higher after 
a one-standard-deviation (0.27) increase in Forecast-Actual EPS, and 1.27 times higher after a one-
standard-deviation (1.09) increase in the number of proxy proposals received.75 Also, there is an 
increase in the odds of forced turnover by 0.53/1.44 times following a one-standard-deviation 
(0.22/0.34) increase in the proportion of director candidates receiving an unfavorable vote 
recommendation/receiving less than the yearly-median percentage of yes-votes, among all 
candidates in the firm who are up for election in a given year.76 
Cross-sectional analysis: Is the effect stronger in more-financially-constrained firms and weaker 
in firms with more-entrenched CEOs? 
       Although we find a significant relation between disagreement and forced turnover on 
average, we expect some heterogeneity in the strength of the correlation cross-sectionally. Because 
the cost of disagreement and constraints in forced CEO turnover can differ across firms, firms will 
vary in the disagreement sensitivity of forced turnover.  
       First, for firms that are financially more constrained, the cost of disagreement is higher 
because equity is a more important source of financing to them, and yet investors may either decline 
to fund investments or may only be willing to provide financing at a higher cost to the firm. Ceteris 
paribus, these firms may thus be more responsive to investor disagreement in forcing out CEOs to 
pursue successors with higher levels of agreement with investors. To test this prediction, we run 
the baseline regressions in Table 3.3 separately on two subsamples of firms – one group consisting 
                                                 
75 The odds ratios are 1.549 and 1.167, respectively. 
76 The odds ratios are 2.409 and 3.350, respectively. 
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of firms that are financially more constrained and another group consisting of firms that are less 
constrained. Specifically, we classify firms as being financially more (less) constrained if their 
Whited and Wu (2006) index is in the top (bottom) tercile of the sample.  
       The results, reported in Panel A of Table 3.4, are consistent with our prediction. The 
coefficient estimates of the disagreement proxies have predicted signs for both subsamples but are 
statistically significant only for the more constrained subsample (except the Actual voting proxy, 
the coefficients of which are both significant in the two subsamples). We include all other 
explanatory variables in Table 3.3 in the regressions here. Their coefficient estimates are similar to 
those in Table 3.3, and thus we do not report them in the interest of brevity. In untabulated findings 
for robustness, we repeat our analysis using a direct measure of equity dependence which is 
constructed following Rajan and Zingales (1998), and find qualitatively-similar results. 
       Second, the cost of disagreement notwithstanding, firms may be constrained in CEO-firing 
decisions, especially when their CEOs are entrenched. Taylor (2010) uses a structural model to 
argue that the low forced turnover rate at large US firms may be due to switching costs that firms 
face in CEO succession, mainly reflecting CEO entrenchment.  Combining this insight with our 
framework, we obtain the prediction that the turnover-disagreement sensitivity is weaker in firms 
with more-entrenched CEOs. Moreover, we expect effective corporate governance to at least 
partially overcome the effect of entrenchment. This yields the prediction that the turnover-
disagreement sensitivity is higher in firms with stronger corporate governance.  
       To measure the extent of which a firm’s CEO is entrenched, we construct an index of CEO 
entrenchment based on the following observations. There is greater entrenchment when: (i) The 
CEO is also the chairman of the board; (ii) the fraction of outsiders on the board (board 
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independence) is below the sample average;77 and (iii) the stock ownership by executive directors 
is greater than the sample average. To the extent that executive directors are more likely to be 
aligned with the CEO and their higher stock ownership gives them greater voice on the board, it is 
intuitive that higher ownership by executive directors is associated with greater CEO 
entrenchment.78 The entrenchment index takes a value of zero to three, depending on the number 
of the three observations that are true. Therefore, a firm’s CEO is regarded as least entrenched 
when the index equals zero and most entrenched when the index equals three. We divide our sample 
into two groups based on the entrenchment index. Firms with the index being two or three are 
grouped and labeled as “Entrenched”, and other firms are grouped and labeled as “Less 
entrenched”.  In testing our prediction, we run the baseline regressions in Table 3 on the two groups 
of firms, respectively.  
       We measure the strength of shareholder governance through their ownership concentration. 
The free-rider problem arising from ownership dispersion (Grossman and Hart, 1980) has long 
been argued as one of the major factors contributing to the weakness of shareholder monitoring in 
corporate governance. For any active shareholder in a firm with dispersed ownership, the cost of 
shareholder intervention, typically borne by the initiating shareholder, often outweighs the benefit 
of the intervention (if any) that is shared with all other shareholders. More concentrated ownership 
can mitigate this free-ride problem and incentivize shareholders with large ownership to use 
“voice” (intervene) when necessary. Moreover, unlike smaller shareholders, shareholders with 
large and concentrated ownership are less likely to exit by selling shares when they disagree with 
management, because of the potentially large price impact of their selling. On the other hand, the 
potentially large price impact of selling allows large shareholders to use exit as a potent threat to 
                                                 
77 For the impact of outside directors on CEO succession, see Weisbach (1988) and Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani 
(1996) for examples. 
78 Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) find that top executive turnover is less likely when the ownership of officers and 
directors in the firm is higher.  
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improve governance in firms.79 Therefore, shareholder governance, through both “voice” and the 
threat of “exit”, is arguably more effective with more concentrated ownership.  
       Specifically, we classify firms as “Concentrated” if their largest five institutional investors 
hold more than 20% of the shares outstanding in aggregate.80 All other firms are classified as “Less 
concentrated”. Hartzell and Starks (2003) show that the share of institutional ownership by the five 
largest holders is positively related to executives’ pay-for-performance sensitivity and negatively 
related to the level of compensation, and thus suggest an effective monitoring role played by the 
top five institutional investors. To test the impact of shareholder governance, we regress forced 
CEO turnover on our disagreement proxies for the two groups of firms, respectively. 
       In Panels B and C of Table 3.4, we present the results that are consistent with our predictions 
on the impact of CEO entrenchment and share ownership concentration. Although the effect of 
disagreement on forced CEO turnover is mostly consistent across the subsamples of “Entrenched” 
and “Less entrenched” and the subsamples of “Concentrated” and “Less concentrated”, it is only 
statistically significant in the subsample of “Less entrenched” and the subsample of 
“Concentrated”. The exceptions are that the coefficient estimates of Actual voting and Proxy 
proposal are also significantly positive in the subsamples of “Entrenched” and “Less concentrated”, 
respectively. But the level of significance is marginal in both cases. As in Panel A, all other 
explanatory variables are included in the regressions but are not tabulated. 
[TABLE 3.4 GOES HERE] 
       In sum, we find that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is positively related to the level 
of investor-management disagreement, and the effect of disagreement is more pronounced in firms 
                                                 
79 See Edmans (forthcoming) for a summary of the literature on both “voice” and “exit” by blockholders. 
80 Our finding remains qualitatively the same if we use a different share ownership cut point, e.g., 15% or 25%. Also, 
it is robust if we use the shareholding by top five active institutional investors that are defined as quasi-indexers and 
dedicated institutions based on Bushee (2001). 
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that are more constrained financially, have less entrenched CEOs, and have stronger shareholder 
governance.       
3.4.2 Test of Hypothesis 2: CEOs who investors disagree with more are more 
likely to be replaced with external hires. 
       We test Hypothesis 2 by examining the effect of disagreement on a firm’s choice of an 
external CEO, conditional on CEO succession. To do this, we apply a logit estimation model where 
the dependent variable is an indicator that identifies if a new CEO has been with the firm for less 
than a year prior to the CEO appointment. The main independent variable is disagreement. Those 
firm-level variables that are used to estimate the likelihood of forced turnover in Table 3 are also 
included as controls here in addition to the yearly and industry dummies. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level in all regressions.  
       The results presented in Table 3.5 strongly support Hypothesis 2. The reported coefficients 
of the marginal effect are positive and statistically significant for all the disagreement proxies. It 
suggests that an external replacement CEO is more likely to be selected when the level of 
disagreement between investors and incumbent management is higher. The effect of disagreement 
on external CEO hiring is also economically meaningful. Specifically, the odds ratios obtained 
from the logistic regressions suggest that the odds of an external CEO hire are 0.49 times higher 
following a one-standard-deviation (0.27) increase in a firm’s Forecast-Actual EPS, and 1.34 times 
higher following a one-standard-deviation (1.09) increase in the number of proxy proposals 
received.81 Also, there is an increase in the odds of an external CEO hire by 1.01/0.95 times 
following a one-stand-deviation (0.22/0.34) increase in the proportion of director candidates 
                                                 
81 The odds ratios are 1.81 and 1.23, respectively. 
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receiving an unfavorable vote recommendation/receiving less than the yearly-median percentage 
of yes-votes, among all candidates in the firm who are up for election in a given year.82 
[TABLE 3.5 GOES HERE] 
3.4.3 Test of Hypothesis 3: Investor-management disagreement declines 
following forced CEO turnover. 
       We test this hypothesis by examining how investor-management disagreement changes 
following forced CEO turnover based on the following specification: 
Change in Disagreement i,t-1 to t+1 = α + β1* Forced turnover i,t + β2 * Controls + μindustry + ηt + εi,t, 
where Forced turnover i,t is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm experiences forced 
CEO turnover in year t and zero otherwise. We also include other explanatory variables as controls 
for public information about the firm as of year t, such as Firm size, Market-to-Book, Stock return, 
Stock volatility, and accounting performance ROA. Year and industry fixed effects are also included 
to all regressions. The dependent variable, Change in Disagreement i,t-1 to t+1, measures the change 
in disagreement from the year prior (year t – 1) to the year subsequent (year t + 1) to the turnover. 
We explain below in more details on how we construct this dependent variable, for each of our 
disagreement proxies.       
       Consider Proxy proposal first. We note that, conditional on the occurrence of a proxy 
proposal submission, the average firm receives two proposals in a year. Therefore, a drop of two 
in the number of proposals received in the average firm implies an aligned view between investors 
and the new management in the year subsequent to CEO turnover. We thus define the change-in-
disagreement variable as a dummy, which equals one if the number of proxy proposals received in 
                                                 
82 The odds ratios are 4.57 and 2.80, respectively. 
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year t + 1 drops by at least two relative to the number of proxy proposals received in year t – 1, 
representing a decline in disagreement, and is zero otherwise. Similarly, in the case of Actual 
voting, the change-in-disagreement variable is also defined as an indicator variable that equals one 
if the fraction of directors receiving less than the yearly-median percentage of yes-votes among all 
candidates up for election in year t+1 is less than that in year t-1, and is zero otherwise, i.e., a value 
of one means a drop in disagreement. For the other two disagreement proxies—Forecast-Actual 
EPS and Vote recommendation, the change in disagreement is the simple difference of the 
continuous measure from year t - 1 to year t + 1. 
       When the change-in-disagreement is defined as a continuous variable, as is the case for 
Forecast-Actual EPS and Vote recommendation, we employ an OLS regression model in 
estimating the effect of forced turnover, and we expect a significantly negative impact in both cases. 
For the other two indicator change-in-disagreement variables, we apply a logistic model in 
estimating the effect of forced turnover (and coefficients of the marginal effect are reported), and 
we expect a significantly positive impact in both cases. The yearly and industry dummies are 
included and robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level in all regressions. The results 
presented in Table 3.6 are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 3. The coefficients of 
Forced turnover have the expected signs for all four change-in-disagreement proxies and are 
statistically significant. It suggests that disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover. 
[TABLE 3.6 GOES HERE] 
       In results that are untabulated for brevity, we also find that the decline in disagreement is 
greater following forced CEO turnover if a replacement CEO is hired externally. This is consistent 
with Hypothesis 2 that firms tend to employ an external successor when the level of disagreement 
is high, because an internal successor is more likely to share similar views and beliefs with the 
departing CEO than an external successor.  
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3.5 Discussions and Robustness Tests 
 
       In this section, we discuss four main issues: (i) how does the stock market react to 
disagreement-induced CEO turnover? (ii) the robustness of our findings to using alternative 
measures of firm and industry performance, (iii) endogeneity concerns, and (iv) the extent to which 
our disagreement proxies may be measuring things other than disagreement. 
 
3.5.1 Market Response to Announcements of Forced CEO Turnover 
       The disagreement hypothesis suggests that, when the board fires a CEO who had a higher 
level of disagreement with investors, the market should react more positively in anticipation of the 
post-dismissal decline in disagreement with the next CEO. And it should be more so if the next 
CEO is hired externally because the decline in disagreement is expected to be greater, as discussed 
above.       
       To confront this reasoning with the data, we examine the five-day (-2, +2) cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the forced turnover announcements. We estimate CARs using the 
market model and the CRSP equal-weighted stock return as the market return.  Specifically, we 
take the sample of forced CEO turnover that corresponds to the measure of disagreement using the 
difference between the analyst forecast of a firm’s EPS and its actual value due to its most complete 
coverage of sample firms.83 We divide the sample into two subsamples – a “high disagreement” 
subsample in which a firm’s EPS falls below its analyst forecast consensus and a “low 
disagreement” subsample in which a firm’s EPS equals or beats its forecast in the year prior to 
turnover. We then compare the CARs between the two subsamples to contrast the market’s 
                                                 
83 Our findings are similar for samples of forced turnover corresponding to other disagreement proxies. 
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response to forced CEO turnover due to disagreement with its response to other types of forced 
turnover. 
       Our finding confirms the prediction of our disagreement hypothesis. The average CARs are 
1% and marginally significant for the “high disagreement” subsample, while the average CARs are 
-2% and significant for the “low disagreement” subsample. And the difference is statistically 
significant at 1% level.84  Moreover, the average CARs for firms with an external replacement for 
the departing CEO in the “high disagreement” subsample are higher at 2.54% and statistically 
significant.  In comparison, the average CARs for their counterparts in the “low disagreement” 
subsample are -1.2% and statistically insignificant. The difference is also statistically significant.  
3.5.2 Alternative Measures of Firm and Industry Performance 
       CEOs are often fired for poor performance, and it is possible that this can happen even 
when investor-management disagreement is low. To deal with this potential commingling of the 
influences of firm performance and disagreement on forced CEO turnover, we have controlled for 
the firm’s stock performance and also the performance of its industry peers. The literature, 
however, suggests that firms may use measures of firm performance other than stock returns in 
their decisions of CEO firing. For instance, Engle, Hayes, and Wang (2003) find interesting cross-
sectional variation in the weights placed on accounting-based and market-based firm performance 
measures and relate it to the properties of these performance measures. Moreover, CEOs can be 
fired for poor performance that is beyond their control (Jenter and Kanaan, forthcoming). 
         We test the robustness of our main finding to alternative performance measures by 
proceeding as follows. First, we replace stock performance with a measure of operating 
performance, return on assets (ROA). Denis and Denis (1995) find in an early sample of top 
                                                 
84 In untabulated regression results, we find that the difference in CARs is significant even after controlling for various 
firm and CEO characteristics. 
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management turnover that forced CEO turnover is preceded by a significant decline in operating 
performance. Second, we follow Jenter and Kanaan (forthcoming) and decompose firm stock 
performance into a systematic component caused by industry peers’ performance (that is out of the 
CEO’s control) and a firm-specific component that should reflect the CEO’s ability.85 We then 
include both components of performance in the regression of forced turnover. Table 3.7 presents 
the results with these alternative measures of firm performance. We find that the effect of 
disagreement on the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is robust to controls involving these 
performance measures. The coefficient estimates of the four disagreement proxies remain almost 
intact in both statistical significance and economic magnitude, compared with the results in Table 
3.3. This confirms that our disagreement hypothesis has incremental power relative to firm 
performance in explaining forced CEO turnover. 
[TABLE 3.7 GOES HERE] 
3.5.3 Endogeneity of Disagreement and Turnover 
       One might be concerned that both disagreement and forced turnover can be related to an 
unobserved omitted variable, and therefore the relation between them might be spurious. One such 
variable is the uncertainty that a firm faces in its growth opportunities or its technological 
development. For instance, such uncertainty is prevalent in high-tech industries with abundant 
investment opportunities. Uncertainty increases the likelihood that agents will arrive at different 
interpretations of the same information set, and thus may contribute to disagreement. Meanwhile, 
we also observe more frequent management turnover in an uncertain growth/technological 
environment.  
                                                 
85 See more details on the methodology of the decomposition in Jenter and Kanaan (forthcoming).  
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       If the omitted variable is time-invariant within the firm, we can tackle the issue by running 
a firm fixed effects estimation of disagreement on forced CEO turnover, using a linear probability 
model.86 The firm fixed effects estimation eliminates the impact of any unobserved firm-specific 
factors in exploiting the within-firm variations of the variables over time. Results of this estimation 
method confirm the robustness of our main finding. Of course, we are aware of the linearity 
limitation involved in this linear-probability estimation. Therefore, we take it as an ancillary 
approach and discuss the results, but do not tabulate them in the interest of brevity. 
       If the omitted variable is time varying, then a firm fixed effects estimation will not be 
effective in addressing the omitted variable bias concern. We deal with this possibility in three 
different ways: (i) by running a falsification test, (ii) by examining the impact of an exogenous 
shock to agreement, and (iii) by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment. Each of these tests is 
discussed below.  
A falsification test 
       Under our disagreement explanation, a CEO always believes she is maximizing firm value, 
so she has no reason to depart voluntarily when disagreement is high. Therefore, disagreement may 
not affect the likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover in a systematic way. In contrast, under the 
uncertainty (the omitted variable discussed above) view, if the difficulty in coping with uncertainty 
increases the likelihood of forced management turnover, we expect to see a similar effect of 
uncertainty on voluntary turnover. This is because managers are more likely to jump ship to other 
firms for better perceived opportunities in industries with greater uncertainty, as highlighted by the 
recent controversy about information technology firms colluding in their hiring practices to limit 
poaching talent from each other.87 That might explain the prevalence of talent retention measures 
                                                 
86 We are unable to include firm fixed effects in the non-linear Cox hazard model and logit model because of the 
incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948). 
87 See Wall Street Journal articles titled “Ebay settles recruiting allegations” dated May 1, 2014 and “Tech companies 
agree to settle wage suit” dated April 24, 2014. 
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in those firms such as non-compete agreements (Garmaise, 2011) and long-duration pay (Gopalan, 
Huang, and Maharjan, 2014). Thus, the contrasting prediction regarding voluntary CEO turnover 
under the uncertainty view provides an opportunity to conduct a falsification test of our 
disagreement hypothesis.  
       In the falsification test, we repeat the baseline analysis about the effect of disagreement in 
Table 3.3 with a replacement of the dependent variable by the hazard rate of voluntary CEO 
turnover. In doing this, we focus on incidents of voluntary turnover that are not due to mandatory 
or planned retirements, although our results are not sensitive to this exclusion. The results, 
presented in Table 3.8, do not support the uncertainty view. Unlike the case of forced turnover, the 
estimated coefficients are negative for all the disagreement proxies, and none of them are 
statistically significant, except Vote recommendation. It shows that disagreement is not relevant to 
voluntary CEO turnover, consistent with our disagreement hypothesis. 
[TABLE 3.8 GOES HERE] 
Impact of an exogenous shock to investor-management agreement 
       Next, to disentangle the impact of disagreement from that of the unobserved omitted 
variable on forced turnover, we identify an exogenous shock to agreement (through an exogenous 
change in the firm’s investor base) that is not related to the omitted variable or other firm 
characteristics and then examine how it may affect forced CEO turnover. Flow-induced mutual 
fund fire sales (Coval and Stafford, 2007) constitute an ideal setting for this purpose. Distressed 
funds that have experienced extreme capital outflows are forced to sell their holdings with 
significant discounts. Existing investors who are not distressed are unlikely to absorb, within a 
short time period, all these shares due to risk aversion, wealth endowment constraints, or both. It 
follows that, in equilibrium, the new marginal investors in the stocks under fire sales are other 
liquidity providers who have a lower level of agreement than the existing shareholders. The change 
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in the investor base results in a decline in the level of agreement between investors and 
management. This decline in agreement, arising from distressed funds’ liquidity demand, is 
exogenous to changes in firm fundamentals for the affected stocks. We expect that such a negative 
shock to agreement would lead to an increased probability of forced CEO turnover according to 
our disagreement hypothesis.88 
       We follow Coval and Stafford (2007) and Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012) to construct 
fund-flow-induced trading pressure for each stock held by mutual funds during our sample period.89 
Specifically, we define fund flows as 
𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑗,𝑠 = [𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑠 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑠−1 ∙ (1 + 𝑅𝑗,𝑠)]/𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑠−1 
to fund j during month s, where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑠 is total net assets for fund j as of the end of the month s and 
𝑅𝑗,𝑠 is the monthly return for fund j at the month s. The data of funds’ total net assets and returns 
are from CRSP mutual fund monthly net returns database. To match with the quarterly fund holding 
data from Thomson Financial, we sum the monthly flows over the quarter to obtain quarterly fund 
flows 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑗,𝑡 for quarter t. We calculate flow-induced trading pressure for stock i in quarter t as  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = [∑ (𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,  ∆𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡)|𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡 > 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒(90𝑡ℎ))𝑗 −
∑ (𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,  −∆𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡)|𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒(10𝑡ℎ))𝑗 ]/𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1. 
As in Coval and Stafford (2007), stocks in the bottom decile of Pressure are considered to be 
experiencing excess selling demand from mutual funds with large capital outflows. 
                                                 
88 Although it is possible that agreement may improve if new investors, who have a more aligned view with 
management, start buying the stock later, Coval and Stafford (2007) find that this does not seem to occur in a short 
time. Moreover, the impact of such equity funds’ fire sales on affected firms appears to be substantial, as suggested by 
several recent studies (e.g., Hau and Lai, 2013; Lou and Wang, 2014) that have documented a significant decline in 
investment and employment in these firms following the fire sales. Such changes in affected firms can be plausibly 
explained by the decline in investor-management agreement resulted from the equity fire sales (see Thakor and Whited 
(2011)).     
89 As in the previous studies, we focus on open-end U.S. equity funds only.  
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       To ensure that the flow-induced selling is not driven by information about potential changes 
in firm characteristics, we first calculate unforced trading pressure for stock i in quarter t following 
Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012) as 
𝑈𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = [∑ ∆𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡|𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒(10𝑡ℎ) ≤ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒(90𝑡ℎ)𝑗 ]/
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1. 
It captures widespread net trading activity by mutual funds with mild capital flows (the middle 
eight deciles). Stocks in the top and bottom deciles of UPressure are thus expected to be 
experiencing information-driven purchases and sales, respectively. To identify an exogenous shock 
to agreement unrelated to firm unobservables, we focus on stocks that are not subject to widespread 
net trading pressure by other mutual funds than funds with extreme flows, i.e., those in the middle 
three deciles of UPressure (deciles four, five, and six). Among them, we define a stock in the 
bottom decile of Pressure to experience a negative shock to agreement. 
       We regress forced CEO turnover on Shock to agreement and other control variables using 
the baseline Cox proportional hazard model as in Table 3.3. Shock to agreement is defined as a 
dummy that equals one if the stock is in the bottom decile of Pressure and the middle three deciles 
of UPressure during any of the four previous quarters and zero otherwise, i.e., a value of one means 
a decline in agreement. The results, presented in Table 3.9, suggest that the likelihood of forced 
CEO turnover is significantly greater following a negative shock to agreement. The estimated 
coefficient of Shock to agreement is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. This finding 
overcomes the omitted variable bias concern and provides strong support to our disagreement 
hypothesis.  
[TABLE 3.9 GOES HERE] 
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Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment 
       Lastly, to further check the robustness of our disagreement hypothesis, we exploit a quasi-
natural experiment in which a group of firms experienced an exogenous increase in institutional 
ownership. The literature suggests that institutional investors, active or passive, play a significant 
role in corporate governance through different channels. They are generally involved in shareholder 
activism (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2007) and other means of intervention and monitoring (e.g., 
Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007; Appel, Gormley, and Keim, 2014; Crane, 
Michenaud, and Weston, 2014). Crane, et al. (2014) suggest that even passive investors like index 
funds have incentives to intervene and can influence corporate management through proxy voting 
and private communication with management if index-tracking-error-constraints or other reasons 
prevent them from selling their shares. Appel, et al. (2014) specifically show that an increase in 
ownership by passive institutional investors is associated with an improvement in corporate 
governance. We expect that a greater concentration of share ownership to institutional investors 
can induce shareholders to exert more influence on corporate decisions.  
       We examine how the turnover-disagreement sensitivity changes in response to the 
exogenous increase in institutional ownership. If the turnover-disagreement relation is driven by 
an omitted variable, we do not expect it to change because the exogenous shock is unlikely to affect 
the omitted variable (e.g., uncertainty). However, since we have shown that shareholder 
governance is important to the disagreement-turnover relation, our disagreement hypothesis 
predicts that an exogenous improvement in institutional ownership will increase the turnover-
disagreement sensitivity.  
       We take the inclusion of a firm in the S&P 500 as the exogenous shock to institutional 
ownership of the firm. S&P 500 inclusion increases a firm’s institutional ownership for the 
following reason. Besides the fact that index funds tracking S&P 500 will add the holding of the 
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company, nonindex funds that typically weigh their managers’ performance against the benchmark 
of S&P 500 will also have an incentive to hold companies in S&P 500. Such an increase in 
institutional ownership, both active and passive, in the newly included company is expected to be 
exogenous to expected performance. According to Standard & Poor’s, the inclusion of a company 
in the index does not imply an endorsement of that company’s investment potential. Aghion, Van 
Reenen, and Zingales (2013) use S&P 500 inclusion as an instrument for institutional ownership 
in their examination of the impact of institutional investors on corporate innovation. 
       S&P 500 inclusion is unlikely to affect the uncertainty in a firm’s growth opportunity and 
therefore should not impact the turnover-disagreement sensitivity under the alternative omitted 
variable story. Furthermore, although the selection of a company in the index is not entirely 
random, the exclusion of firms that have serious bankruptcy risk and the inclusion of firms with 
good past performance in the selection both work against us finding an increase in forced CEO 
turnover (which is supposed to be negatively related to past performance). Therefore, we argue that 
S&P 500 inclusion can affect the disagreement-turnover relation only through its exogenous impact 
on institutional ownership. 
       To test the impact of S&P 500 inclusion on the turnover-disagreement sensitivity, we focus 
on the sample of firms that are included in S&P 500 during our sample period and examine the 
difference in the turnover-disagreement sensitivity between firm-years before the inclusion in S&P 
500 and firm-years after the inclusion in S&P 500.90  Specifically, we augment the baseline analysis 
in Table 3.3 by adding S&P 500 inclusion, a dummy that equals one for firm-years after the 
inclusion in S&P 500 and zero otherwise, and an interaction term of it with disagreement. For our 
disagreement hypothesis to hold, we expect the interaction term to have the same signs with the 
disagreement proxies as reported in Table 3.3 and to be statistically significant. In comparison, we 
                                                 
90 Firms that are already in S&P 500 before the start of our sample period or are included in S&P 500 after the end of 
our sample period 1993-2010 are not included in the sample for this test. 
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do not expect the interaction term to be significant if it is the omitted variable explanation that 
holds.  
       The results, presented in Table 3.10, are consistent with the prediction of our disagreement 
hypothesis. We find a significantly greater sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to disagreement after 
a firm’s inclusion in S&P 500. Overall, it suggests that the potential omitted variable bias is unlikely 
to be a major concern here.  
[TABLE 3.10 GOES HERE] 
3.5.4 Could our Disagreement Proxies be Measuring Other Things? 
      While we take measures of investor-management disagreement that have been used in the 
prior literature, one might be concerned that some of these measures – specifically, Proxy proposal, 
Vote recommendation, Actual voting – could also be related to investors’ concern with potential 
agency issues in the firm in addition to disagreement between investors and management. That is, 
it is likely that investors may submit proxy proposals, recommend “vote no” or cast votes against 
certain directors when they are concerned with the agency problems in the firm, even though they 
share an aligned view with management. This measurement error in these disagreement proxies, if 
exists, might thus confound the interpretation of our finding. 
       We show with significant evidence that the issue of measurement error is of little concern 
and our finding is consistent with our disagreement explanation of forced CEO turnover. First, if 
our Proxy proposal measure mainly captures investors’ agency concerns, we would expect to 
observe a less frequent occurrence of proxy proposal submissions following the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 which arguably enhanced corporate governance standards in public 
firms. We find this is not the case.91  Second, if the agency concerns do not vary over time within 
                                                 
91 We cannot conduct similar checks for Vote recommendation and Actual voting because the data coverage for these 
two measures starts from 2003.  
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a firm and thus is more of an issue cross sectionally, our firm-fixed-effect estimation, discussed 
earlier, will be effective in accounting for it. Third, our examination using mutual fund flow-
induced fire sales as an exogenous shock to investor-management agreement, which does not rely 
on any measures of disagreement, confirms the significant impact of disagreement on forced CEO 
turnover. 
       Lastly, we conduct an additional check that addresses this issue more directly. For each of 
the three disagreement measures concerned, we estimate an adjusted measure of disagreement after 
filtering out potential agency concerns in a firm from the original measure and then examine the 
impact of this adjusted disagreement measure on forced CEO turnover. This is done with a two-
stage regression approach. Specifically, in the first stage, we regress each of these disagreement 
measures on a set of variables that are widely used as proxies for potential agency problems in a 
firm as well as yearly and industry dummies. These variables include Abnormal accruals, Market-
to-book, Free cash flow, GIM index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), and Entrenched (the CEO 
entrenchment index that we develop in the previous section).92  Firms with higher abnormal 
accruals (proxy for a higher likelihood of misaligned managerial incentives), lower market-to-book 
ratios (proxy for fewer growth opportunities), higher free cash flows, more anti-takeover measures, 
or higher entrenchment indices are more likely to be subject to more severe agency problems. In 
the second stage, we repeat our baseline analysis in Table 3.3 with each disagreement measure 
being replaced by the estimated residual in the first stage (which is the adjusted disagreement 
measure).   
       The results of the analyses in both stages are presented in Table 3.11. In Panel A for the 
first-stage analysis, we indeed do not find evidence that these widely-accepted proxies for agency 
                                                 
92 We note that, depending on how well this set of variables capture potential agency problems in a firm, the extent of 
which the adjusted disagreement measure is free of potential agency concerns varies across firms. However, on 
average, it helps to mitigate the impact of potential agency concerns that might be captured in the original disagreement 
measure.  
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problems are correlated with our disagreement measures in a consistent way. For example, while 
Abnormal accrual and Entrenched are positively related to Proxy proposal, GIM index is 
negatively related to it. Also, inconsistent with the agency interpretation of our disagreement 
measure, we find that Entrenched is negatively related to both Vote recommendation and Actual 
voting; Market-to-book is positively related to Vote recommendation and Free cash flow is 
negatively related to Actual voting. Nevertheless, in Panel B for the second-stage analysis, we find 
that the estimated coefficients of all the three adjusted disagreement measures have predicted signs 
and are statistically significant, consistent with our disagreement hypothesis. The coefficients of 
all other control variables, which we do not report in the interest of brevity, are comparable to those 
in Table 3. Overall, the results reassure us that three of our disagreement measures are not subject 
to measurement error, and that even if measurement error exists, it does not affect our disagreement 
explanation significantly.  
[TABLE 11 GOES HERE] 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
       Our paper deviates from the conventional focus on firm performance in the study of 
involuntary CEO turnover, and examines instead the power of investor-management disagreement 
as a driver of CEO turnover. A CEO is more likely to be forced out if there is a higher level of 
investor-management disagreement. And this is more likely to be the case when the firm is 
financially more constrained and thus equity financing is more likely to be needed, and when the 
CEO is less entrenched or shareholder governance is stronger in the firm. Investor-management 
disagreement declines after forced CEO turnover, and anticipation of this results in a stock price 
reaction to the announcement of the firing of a CEO with low agreement with investors that is more 
positive than the announcement effects associated with other types of forced turnover. 
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       We also examine the impact of investor-management disagreement on a firm’s choice of 
an internal versus external CEO. We find that the firm is more likely to select an external CEO 
when the departing CEO has higher disagreement with investors. Overall, our study sheds light on 
the factors affecting CEO turnover and CEO selection, and highlights the role of a previously-
ignored factor – investor-management disagreement.  
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3.7 Appendix 
 
3.7.1 Variable Definitions 
Investor-management disagreement 
A.1.1. Difference between the analyst forecast of a firm’s EPS and its actual value 
       Our first measure of investor-management disagreement, adopted by Dittmar and Thakor 
(2007), is the difference between the analyst forecast consensus of a firm’s earnings per share (EPS) 
for a fiscal year and the actual EPS value, scaled by the absolute value of the actual EPS. The 
analyst forecasts, chosen as the ones most close to the actual EPS disclosure, are made no more 
than 120 days ago. The idea is that investors’ propensity to disagree with management increases in 
the amount of the firm’s EPS falling below the analyst forecast. The lower a manager’s ability to 
outperform beyond expectation, the more likely investors are to question her decisions. Thus, a 
more positive number of this proxy implies a higher level of disagreement. Our final sample using 
this disagreement proxy spans 1990 firms and 17568 firm-years from 1993 to 2010. 
A.1.2. Submission of proxy proposals in a given year 
       Our other three disagreement measures are defined following Huang and Thakor (2013). 
The second proxy for disagreement exploits the idea that investors may submit proxy proposals for 
a shareholder vote when they disagree and therefore press for changes, but the private 
communication with management for changes is not effective or fails. Institutional investors, in 
particular, public and union pension funds, investment firms, and coordinated investors, are found 
to be the most active sponsors of proxy proposals (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000; Thomas and Cotter, 
2007; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). To capture our idea of disagreement, we focus on 
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governance-related proposals only.93 The issues addressed in such proposals include, but are not 
limited to, shareholder voting, takeovers, selection of directors, executive compensation, and the 
sale of the company. Despite the nonbinding nature of voting on shareholder proxy proposals, 
proposal submission sponsored by shareholders is a conspicuous sign of investor-management 
disagreement. We use the number of shareholder proxy proposals that a firm receives in a given 
year to measure the level of disagreement. In untabulated results for brevity, we find that our 
findings are robust if we use an indicator variable of whether or not a firm receives proxy proposal 
submissions.    
       Note that our use of proxy proposal as a disagreement measure does not necessarily suggest 
that investors’ beliefs are always aligned with the firm’s management if we do not observe the 
proposal submissions. It is likely that, in some firms, investors may choose not to submit proxy 
proposals as a means to challenge managerial decisions, because some unobservable factors may 
prevent them from doing so at any time. Therefore, to examine whether investors are more likely 
to disagree with management based on proxy proposal submissions, we follow Huang and Thakor 
(2013) and exclude firms from our analysis that are never observed to have any shareholder proxy 
proposals in any given year of the sample period 1993-2010. In focusing on firms that have 
experienced at least one proxy proposal submission over the sample period, we argue that investors 
are more likely to disagree with management in the years they submit proxy proposals than in the 
years in which they do not. Our final sample in using shareholder proxy proposal as a disagreement 
proxy covers 972 firms and 13121 firm-years from 1993 to 2010.  
 
 
                                                 
93 The other type of proposals is social responsibility related and typically submitted by religious/socially responsible 
investors.  
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A.1.3. Vote recommendations in director election 
       Investors can signal their disagreement with management in the case of director elections. 
Our third and fourth proxies for disagreement exploit this idea. It is observed that some investors 
organize “just vote no” campaigns against one or more director candidates to be elected before a 
director election.  Conducted via letters, press release, or internet communications, such campaigns 
encourage fellow shareholders to withhold votes for the candidate(s). More recently, third-party 
proxy advisors like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) also start issuing vote 
recommendations for all director candidates who are up for election every year. Voting Analytics 
(a product of ISS) provides detailed records of such vote recommendations, either “for” or 
“withhold” (“against”), issued by ISS starting from 2003 for elections in most of the Russell 1000 
firms and many of the Russell 2000 firms.  
       Therefore, for our third disagreement proxy, we relate it to the extent to which a firm’s 
director candidates will receive objections from shareholders or unfavorable recommendations 
from independent proxy advisors before the election. The number of director candidates who are 
up for election may vary across firms and over time, which affects the extent of potential objections 
received in different firm-years. To account for this, we define the measure as the proportion of 
director candidates receiving a “withhold” or “against” recommendation from ISS or/and 
objections from certain shareholders in a “just vote no” campaign, among all candidates in the firm 
who are up for election in a given year. A greater magnitude of this measure shall indicate a higher 
level of disagreement. Our final sample in using this disagreement proxy includes 1613 firms and 
8138 firm-years during 2003–2010. 
A.1.4. Actual voting in director elections 
       The fourth proxy relates to actual shareholder voting during the director election. 
Shareholders may express their disagreement by withholding votes for or voting against certain 
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candidates in the election of directors. Candidates are normally elected with high “for” votes.94 
Therefore, an even slightly lower vote may indicate shareholders’ disagreement. As such, we define 
this proxy as the proportion of director candidates receiving a below-yearly-median percentage of 
“for” votes in a given firm-year, where the yearly median is the median percentage of “for” votes 
of director candidates in the universe of firms with available actual voting data in that year. After 
merging actual voting data with our sample from ExecuComp, the final sample with this fourth 
disagreement proxy covers 1585 firms and 6729 firm-years from 2003 to 2010.95 
Other variables 
 Abnormal Accruals is the difference between total accruals and normal accruals where 
normal accruals is estimated from the Jones abnormal accrual model: 
TAit/Ait-1 = β [1/Ait-1] + α1 [REVit/Ait-1]+ α2[PPEit/Ait-1] + εit 
where TA is the total accruals, A is total assets, REV is revenues, and PPE is gross property, 
plant, and equipment.  
 Age is the age of the CEO (in years). 
 Age squared is the square of Age. 
 Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation of raw (i.e. not split-adjusted) analysts’ 
forecasts. 
 CEO-Chair duality is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the CEO is also the 
chairperson of the board, and zero otherwise.  
 CEO blockholding is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the fraction of 
outstanding shares owned by the CEO is greater than 5%, and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
94 For instance, Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) find that an average director across all firms receives just over 94% 
of the “for” votes for the period of 2003–2005. 
95 The smaller sample size here, compared to that of the vote recommendation sample, is due to the missing information 
in actual votes for many firm-years. 
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 EW firm specific return is the residual component from the regression that decomposes firm 
performance into a systematic component caused by peer group performance (equally 
weighted) and a firm-specific component. Put differently, we run the following regression: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1. The 𝜀?̂?,𝑡−1 term is the estimated idiosyncratic 
stock return. 
 EW industry return is the equally-weighted average stock returns for all firms on CRSP 
from the same two-digit SIC industry as the sample firm. I exclude each sample firm from 
the construction of its industry benchmark to eliminate any artificial correlation. 
 EW industry specific return is ?̂?0 +  ?̂?1𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝,𝑡−1 from the above regression. 
 Firm size is the natural log of the total assets of the firm. 
 Free Cash Flow is the operating income before depreciation deducted by the sum of interest 
expense, total income tax, preferred dividends and common dividends. 
 GIM index is the anti-takeover measure index constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003). 
 Institutional blockholding is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if there is at least 
one institutional investor holding more than 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares, and zero 
otherwise. 
 Leverage is the total book value of debt normalized by the sum of the total book value of 
debt and market value of equity. 
 Ln(Tenure) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the CEO was in office. 
 ROA is the net income deflated by total assets. 
 Stock return is the Fama-French 48-industry adjusted daily stock return compounded for 
the previous 12 months. 
 Stock volatility is the volatility in the firm’s stock return over the previous 12 months. 
 Total directors is the total number of directors who are up for (re)election in a given year. 
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3.7.3   Tables 
 
Table 3.1 
 
Year-wise distribution of CEO turnover 
 
This table presents the distribution by year of the number and frequency of overall, forced, and external CEO successions for sample 
firms with no missing Forecast-Actual EPS data and covered in ExecuComp between 1993 and 2009. Successions due to mergers, spin-
offs, and interim CEO changes are excluded. Forecast-Actual EPS is the difference between the mean analyst forecast of a firm’s EPS for 
a fiscal year and its actual value, scaled by the absolute value of actual EPS. 
 
  
Year All successions Forced successions External successions 
 N % of all firms N % of succession 
firms 
N % of succession 
firms 
1993 39 7.69% 4 10.26% 9 23.08% 
1994 53 8.48% 9 16.98% 6 11.32% 
1995 79 11.67% 9 11.39% 13 16.46% 
1996 74 10.25% 13 17.57% 22 29.73% 
1997 82 10.69% 12 14.63% 24 29.27% 
1998 95 11.11% 15 15.79% 19 20.00% 
1999 117 12.79% 25 21.37% 26 22.22% 
2000 110 11.49% 32 29.09% 30 27.27% 
2001 90 9.06% 14 15.56% 27 30.00% 
2002 91 8.71% 16 17.58% 30 32.97% 
2003 101 8.96% 25 24.75% 40 39.60% 
2004 94 8.01% 19 20.21% 27 28.72% 
2005 152 12.39% 24 15.79% 49 32.45% 
2006 126 9.13% 35 27.78% 55 43.65% 
2007 131 8.53% 29 22.14% 52 39.69% 
2008 151 9.90% 38 25.17% 48 31.79% 
2009 106 6.90% 26 24.53% 43 40.95% 
Total 1691 9.75% 345 19.45% 520 29.36% 
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Table 3.2 
 
Summary statistics 
The upper part of Panel A presents summary statistics for the four measures of investor-management disagreement and for forced 
CEO turnover in each sample of the four measures. The lower part of Panel A reports the univariate evidence of the relation between 
disagreement and forced CEO turnover. The last column of it reports the difference of the mean disagreement measure for firm-years 
prior to forced CEO turnover and other firm-years in the sample. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, 
from t-test conducted on the difference between the two groups. Forecast-Actual EPS is the difference between the mean analyst forecast 
of a firm’s EPS for a fiscal year and its actual value, scaled by the absolute value of actual EPS. Proxy Proposals is the number of proxy 
proposals a firm receives in a given year. Voting Recommendation is the proportion of director candidates receiving a “withhold” or 
“against” recommendation from ISS or/and certain shareholders in a “just vote no” campaign, among all candidates in the firm who 
are up for election in a given year. Actual Voting is defined as the fraction of directors receiving less than the yearly median yes-vote 
casted in all firms with available actual voting data, among all candidates in the firm who are up for election in a given year. Panels B 
and C provides summary statistics of firm and CEO characteristics for an unbalanced panel of firms from 1993 to 2010 that have non-
missing Forecast-Actual EPS data. Definitions of these variables are in Appendix. 
Panel A: Forced CEO Turnover and Measures of Investor-Management Disagreement 
 Mean Median S.D. N 
Forecast – Actual EPS 0.04 -0.01 0.27 17568 
Forced CEO turnover 0.020 0 0.141 17568 
     
Proxy Proposals 0.55 0 1.09 13121 
Forced CEO turnover 0.020 0 0.143 13121 
     
Voting Recommendation  0.10 0 0.22 8138 
Forced CEO turnover 0.019 0 0.138 8138 
     
Actual Voting  0.23 0 0.34 6727 
Forced CEO turnover 0.022 0 0.148 6727 
     
     Forced CEO turnover                   Other Firm-years Difference 
 N Mean N Mean  
Forecast – Actual EPS 345 0.10 17223 0.04 0.06*** 
Proxy Proposals 267 0.75 12854 0.55 0.20*** 
Voting 
Recommendation  
153 0.14 7985 0.09 0.05*** 
Actual Voting  148 0.40 6581 0.23 0.17*** 
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 Mean Median S.D. N 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
     
Firm size (log) 7.61 7.48 1.70 17568 
Market-to-Book 1.70 1.24 1.46 17568 
Leverage 0.22 0.17 0.21 17568 
Stock return 0.03 -0.01 0.42 17568 
Stock volatility 0.41 0.36 0.21 17568 
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.14 17568 
Analyst dispersion 0.24 0.12 0.33 17568 
Institutional blockholding 0.77 1 0.42 17568 
EW Idiosyncratic stock return 0.05 -0.01 0.56 17562 
EW Industry stock return 0.10 0.09 0.32 17568 
EW Industry-induced stock return 0.11 0.11 0.31 17562 
     
Panel C: CEO Characteristics 
     
CEO blockholding 0.11 0 0.31 17568 
Age 55.78 56 7.10 17568 
Tenure 8.64 6.25 7.61 17568 
CEO-Chair Duality 0.62 1 0.48 17568 
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Table 3.3 
 
The effect of disagreement on forced CEO turnover 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnovers. The investor-management disagreement proxy used in each regression is indicated at the top of the table. Forecast-Actual 
EPS is the difference between the mean analyst forecast of a firm’s EPS for a fiscal year and its actual value, scaled by the absolute 
value of actual EPS. Proxy Proposals is the number of proxy proposals a firm receives in a given year. Voting Recommendation is the 
proportion of director candidates receiving a “withhold” or “against” recommendation from ISS or/and certain shareholders in a “just 
vote no” campaign, among all candidates in the firm who are up for election in a given year. Actual Voting is defined as the fraction of 
directors receiving less than the yearly median yes-vote casted in all firms with available actual voting data, among all candidates in 
the firm who are up for election in a given year. All other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Year fixed effects are included 
in all regressions. Different industries (as defined using Fama-French 48 industries) are allowed to have different baseline hazards. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Disagreement Proxies 
 Forecast-Actual 
EPS 
Proxy Proposal Voting 
Recommendation 
Actual 
Voting 
Disagreementt-1 0.40*** 0.16*** 0.75** 1.08*** 
 (0.13) (0.06) (0.32) (0.26) 
Stock returnt-1 -1.27*** -1.36*** -1.17*** -1.18*** 
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.32) (0.33) 
EW Industry stock returnt-1 -0.70** -0.77** -0.35 -0.51 
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.72) (0.73) 
CEO blockholdingt-1  -0.86*** -0.94*** -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.30) (0.32) (0.33) (0.34) 
Aget 0.05 -0.12 0.19 0.19 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) 
Age squaredt -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO-Chair dualityt -0.86*** -0.75*** -0.69*** -0.74*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.20) (0.21) 
Firm sizet-1 0.18*** 0.04 0.19*** 0.24*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Institutional blockholdingt-1 0.20 -0.13 0.24 0.16 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.30) (0.29) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Stock volatilityt-1 1.55*** 1.22*** 2.74*** 2.33*** 
 (0.37) (0.44) (0.61) (0.60) 
Leveraget-1 0.10 0.84** -0.36 -0.59 
 (0.36) (0.40) (0.54) (0.57) 
Analyst dispersiont-1 0.11    
 (0.18)    
Total directorst-1   0.03 0.03 
   (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 17568 13121 8138 6727 
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Table 3.4 
 
The effect of disagreement on forced CEO turnover: Cross-sectional study 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers in different subsample of firms. Panel A reports results for the 
subsamples of “Constrained” and “Not constrained”. Firms grouped into the “Constrained” subsample are those that have their Whited and Wu (2006) index in the top tercile of the sample and thus 
are most likely to be financially constrained. Firms grouped into the “Not constrained” are those that have the index in the bottom tercile of the sample and thus are least likely to be financially 
constrained. Panel B reports results for the subsamples of “Less entrenched” and “Entrenched”. Firms in which at least two of the followings are true are grouped into the “Entrenched” subsample: 
The CEO is also the chairman of the board; the fraction of outsiders on the board is below the sample average; and the fraction of stock ownership by the executive directors is greater than the sample 
average, and therefore their CEOs are more likely to be entrenched. All other firms are labeled as “Less entrenched”. Panel C reports results for the subsample of “Concentrated” and “Less 
concentrated”. Firms whose largest five institutional investors hold more than 20% of their shares outstanding in aggregate are grouped into the “Concentrated” subsample, and all other firms are in 
the “Less concentrated” subsample. The investor-management disagreement proxies used in each regression is indicated at the top of the table. All other explanatory variables used in Table 3 and 
yearly dummies are included but not reported for brevity. Different industries (as defined by Fama-French 48 industries) are allowed to have different baseline hazard. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 Disagreement Proxies 
 Forecast – Actual EPS Proxy Proposal Voting Recommendation Actual Voting 
         
Panel A: Firms’ financial constraints 
 Constrained Less constrained Constrained Less constrained Constrained Not constrained Constrained Not 
constrained 
Disagreementt-1 0.45** 0.13 0.28** 0.08 1.00* 0.86 1.22*** 1.68*** 
 (0.21) (0.33) (0.12) (0.08) (0.58) (0.56) (0.47) (0.42) 
         
Panel B: CEO entrenchment 
 Less 
entrenched  
Entrenched  Less 
entrenched 
Entrenched Less 
entrenched  
Entrenched  Less entrenched  Entrenched  
Disagreementt-1 0.41** 0.70 0.19*** -0.02 1.12*** 1.04 1.24*** 1.98* 
 (0.19) (0.43) (0.07) (0.15) (0.38) (1.38) (0.31) (1.09) 
         
Panel C: Stock ownership concentration by institutional investors 
 Concentrated Less 
concentrated 
Concentrated Less 
concentrated 
Concentrated Less 
concentrated 
Concentrated Less 
concentrated 
Disagreementt-1 0.54*** 0.34 0.23*** 0.22* 0.84** 0.08 1.06*** 0.90 
 (0.19) (0.33) (0.08) (0.12) (0.40) (1.28) (0.32) (0.75) 
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Table 3.5 
 
The effect of disagreement on external CEO hiring 
 
This table presents results from logit regressions (coefficients of the marginal effect are reported) that examine the impact of investor-
management disagreement on the likelihood of external CEO selection, conditional on CEO succession. The dependent variable takes 
a value of one if the newly appointed CEO has been with the firm for less than a year prior to the appointment and zero otherwise. The 
investor-management disagreement proxy used in each regression is indicated at the top of the table. Forecast-Actual EPS is the 
difference between the mean analyst forecast of a firm’s EPS for a fiscal year and its actual value, scaled by the absolute value of actual 
EPS. Proxy Proposals is the number of proxy proposals a firm receives in a given year. Voting Recommendation is the proportion of director 
candidates receiving a “withhold” or “against” recommendation from ISS or/and certain shareholders in a “just vote no” campaign, 
among all candidates in the firm who are up for election in a given year. Actual Voting is defined as the fraction of directors receiving 
less than the yearly median yes-vote casted in all firms with available actual voting data, among all candidates in the firm who are up 
for election in a given year. Other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Year and industry dummies are included in the 
regressions. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Disagreement Proxies 
 Forecast-Actual EPS Proxy Proposal Voting 
Recommendation 
Actual 
Voting 
Disagreementt-1 0.12*** 0.04*** 0.36*** 0.21*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.08) (0.05) 
Stock returnt-1 -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.20*** -0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
Firm sizet-1 -0.01 -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Institutional blockholdingt-1 0.01 -0.05* -0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Stock volatilityt-1 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.19 0.27 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.15) 
Leveraget-1 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) 
Analyst dispersiont-1 -0.02 
   
 (0.03) 
Total directorst-1   -0.00 0.001 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 1687 1298 689 670 
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.082 0.076 0.072 
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Table 3.6 
 
The effect of forced CEO turnover on agreement 
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions (columns (1) and (3)) and logit regressions (columns (2) and (4)) of forced CEO the 
change in investor-management agreement from year t-1 to year t+1 on forced CEO turnover in year t. The dependent variables, defined 
as follows, are the changes in the four disagreement proxies which are indicated at the top of columns: a simple difference of Forecast-
Actual EPS from year t-1 to year t+1, where Forecast-Actual EPS is the difference between the mean analyst forecast of a firm’s EPS for a 
fiscal year and its actual value, scaled by the absolute value of actual EPS; a dummy that equals one if the number of proxy proposals 
received in year t+1 drops by at least two relative to the number of proxy proposals received in year t-1, and zero otherwise; a simple 
difference of Vote Recommendation from year t-1 to year t+1, where Vote Recommendation is the proportion of director candidates receiving 
a “withhold” or “against” recommendation from ISS or/and certain shareholders in a “just vote no” campaign, among all candidates 
in the firm who are up for election in a given year; and a dummy that equals one if the fraction of directors receiving less than the 
yearly-median percentage of yes-votes among all candidates up for election in year t+1 is less than that in year t-1, and zero otherwise. 
Forced turnover is a dummy that equals one if a forced CEO turnover occurs in year t and zero otherwise. Other explanatory variables 
are defined in Appendix. All regressions include year and Fama-French 48 industry dummy variables. Coefficients of the marginal 
effect are reported in the logit regressions. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
   
 
 Proxies for Change in Agreement  
 Forecast–Actual 
EPS 
Proxy Proposal Voting 
Recommendation 
Actual Voting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Forced turnovert -0.07* 0.013* -0.06*** 0.06** 
 (0.04) (0.007) (0.02) (0.03) 
Stock returnt -0.00 0.0004 -0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01) 
Stock volatilityt 0.13*** -0.004 0.04* 0.001 
 (0.03) (0.011) (0.02) (0.03) 
ROAt -0.05 -0.026 0.07 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.033) (0.06) (0.09) 
Market-to-Bookt 0.00 -0.0004 -0.01** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.01) 
Firm sizet 0.01*** 0.009*** 0.00 -0.005 
 (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.003) 
Observations 14993 9851 7503 6564 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.017 0.132 0.020 0.170 
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Table 3.7 
 
The effect of disagreement on forced CEO turnover: Alternative measures of firm/industry 
performance 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The investor-management disagreement proxy 
used in each regression is indicated at the top of the table. Forecast-Actual EPS is the difference between the mean analyst forecast of a firm’s EPS for a fiscal year and its actual value, 
scaled by the absolute value of actual EPS. Proxy Proposals is the number of proxy proposals a firm receives in a given year. Voting Recommendation is the proportion of director candidates 
receiving a “withhold” or “against” recommendation from ISS or/and certain shareholders in a “just vote no” campaign, among all candidates in the firm who are up for election in a 
given year. Actual Voting is defined as the fraction of directors receiving less than the yearly median yes-vote casted in all firms with available actual voting data, among all candidates in 
the firm who are up for election in a given year. All other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Different industries (as defined 
using Fama-French 48 industries) are allowed to have different baseline hazards. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Disagreement Proxies 
 Forecast-Actual EPS Proxy Proposal Voting Recommendation Actual Voting 
Disagreementt-1 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.69** 0.74** 1.08*** 1.08*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.32) (0.32) (0.26) (0.26) 
ROAt-1 -1.13**  -1.51*  -1.65*  -1.41  
 (0.55)  (0.81)  (0.93)  (0.95)  
EW Idiosyncratic stock return -1  -1.30***  -1.44***  -1.15***  -1.18*** 
  (0.23)  (0.28)  (0.32)  (0.33) 
EW  Industry-induced stock returnt-1  -0.65**  -0.77**  -0.32  -0.44 
  (0.31)  (0.36)  (0.85)  (0.87) 
CEO blockholdingt-1  -0.83*** -0.86*** -0.97*** -0.93*** -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) 
Aget 0.07 0.05 -0.09 -0.13 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
Age squaredt -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO-Chair dualityt -0.89*** -0.86*** -0.77*** -0.75*** -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.78*** -0.74*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
Firm sizet-1 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.04 0.04 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Institutional blockholdingt-1 0.20 0.20 -0.13 -0.13 0.26 0.25 0.17 0.16 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.29) (0.30) (0.28) (0.29) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.18*** -0.08 -0.18** -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
Stock volatilityt-1 1.91*** 1.56*** 1.50*** 1.18*** 2.66*** 2.74*** 2.37*** 2.33*** 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.45) (0.44) (0.60) (0.61) (0.58) (0.60) 
Leveraget-1 0.17 0.09 0.92** 0.85** -0.31 -0.37 -0.47 -0.59 
 (0.37) (0.36) (0.40) (0.40) (0.55) (0.54) (0.57) (0.57) 
Analyst dispersiont-1 0.08 0.10       
 (0.17) (0.18)       
Total directorst-1     0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 17568 17562 13121 13112 8138 8134 6727 6724 
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 Table 3.8 
 
The effect of disagreement on voluntary CEO turnover 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of voluntary CEO turnovers. The 
investor-management disagreement proxy used in each regression is indicated at the top of the table. Forecast-Actual EPS is the difference 
between the mean analyst forecast of a firm’s EPS for a fiscal year and its actual value, scaled by the absolute value of actual EPS. Proxy Proposals 
is the number of proxy proposals a firm receives in a given year. Voting Recommendation is the proportion of director candidates receiving a 
“withhold” or “against” recommendation from ISS or/and certain shareholders in a “just vote no” campaign, among all candidates in the firm 
who are up for election in a given year. Actual Voting is defined as the fraction of directors receiving less than the yearly median yes-vote casted 
in all firms with available actual voting data, among all candidates in the firm who are up for election in a given year. All other explanatory 
variables are defined in Appendix. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Different industries (as defined using Fama-French 48 
industries) are allowed to have different baseline hazards. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  
 Disagreement Proxies 
 Forecast-Actual EPS Proxy Proposal Voting 
Recommendation 
Actual Voting 
Disagreementt-1 -0.05 -0.01 -0.63* -0.37 
 (0.10) (0.05) (0.34) (0.23) 
Stock returnt-1 -0.38*** -0.25* -0.34* -0.43** 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.21) (0.20) 
EW Industry stock returnt-1 -0.58** -0.14 -0.14 -0.06 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.46) (0.49) 
CEO blockholdingt-1  -0.24 -0.51* -0.45 -0.63* 
 (0.19) (0.27) (0.34) (0.36) 
Aget 0.49*** 0.60*** 0.88*** 0.81*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17) 
Age squaredt -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO-Chair dualityt -0.70*** -0.89*** -0.28** -0.35** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
Firm sizet-1 0.08** 0.05 0.02 0.09* 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Institutional blockholdingt-1 -0.05 -0.20* 0.05 0.07 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.19) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.13** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
Stock volatilityt-1 0.63** 0.93*** -0.30 -0.31 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.53) (0.56) 
Leveraget-1 -0.09 -0.21 0.37 0.24 
 (0.28) (0.31) (0.42) (0.42) 
Analyst dispersiont-1 0.17    
 (0.12)    
Total directorst-1   -0.00 -0.02 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 16591 12295 8011 6609 
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Table 3.9 
 
The effect of disagreement on forced CEO turnover: Evidence from an 
exogenous shock to agreement 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnover following 
an exogenous shock to agreement. Shock to agreement is defined as a dummy that equals one if the stock is in the bottom decile of Pressure and 
the middle three deciles of UPressure during any of the four previous quarters and zero otherwise. Pressure is mutual fund flow-induced trading 
pressure defined as in Coval and Stafford (2007). UPressure is unforced trading pressure, defined as in Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012), by 
mutual funds that experience mild capital flows (the middle eight deciles of flows). All other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. 
Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Different industries (as defined using Fama-French 48 industries) are allowed to have different 
baseline hazards. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
 
  
Shock to agreementt-1  0.71*** 
 (0.25) 
Stock returnt-1 -1.19*** 
 (-0.36) 
EW Industry stock returnt-1 -0.69 
 (-0.42) 
CEO blockholdingt-1  -0.72* 
 (-0.40) 
Aget 0.05 
 (0.13) 
Age squaredt 0.00 
 (0.00) 
CEO-Chair dualityt -1.05*** 
 (-0.17) 
Firm sizet-1 0.21*** 
 (0.06) 
Institutional blockholdingt-1 0.29 
 (0.20) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.09 
 (-0.08) 
Stock volatilityt-1 1.82*** 
 (0.51) 
Leveraget-1 0.82* 
 (0.48) 
Observations 10095 
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Table 3.10 
 
The effect of disagreement on forced CEO turnover: Evidence from S&P 500 
addition 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers for 
firms that are included in S&P 500. The investor-management disagreement proxy used in each regression is indicated at the top of the table. 
Forecast-Actual EPS is the difference between the mean analyst forecast of a firm’s EPS for a fiscal year and its actual value, scaled by the absolute 
value of actual EPS. Proxy Proposals is the number of proxy proposals a firm receives in a given year. Voting Recommendation is the proportion 
of director candidates receiving a “withhold” or “against” recommendation from ISS or/and certain shareholders in a “just vote no” campaign, 
among all candidates in the firm who are up for election in a given year. Actual Voting is defined as the fraction of directors receiving less than 
the yearly median yes-vote casted in all firms with available actual voting data, among all candidates in the firm who are up for election in a 
given year. S&P 500 inclusion takes a value of one for subsequent years after the inclusion of the firm to the S&P 500 index, and zero for years 
prior to the year of inclusion. All other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Different 
industries (as defined using Fama-French 48 industries) are allowed to have different baseline hazards. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
  
   Disagreement Proxies 
 Forecast – Actual 
EPS 
Proxy 
Proposals 
Voting 
Recommendation 
Actual Voting 
     
Disagreement X S&P 500 
inclusion 
2.42*** 0.32*** 5.84*** 1.57* 
 (0.80) (0.13) (0.03) (0.88) 
 
Observations 
 
3171 1441 184 140 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
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Table 3.11 
 
The effect of disagreement on forced CEO turnover: Adjusted measures of 
disagreement 
 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of the disagreement measures on proxies for agency problems. Panel B presents 
coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard regressions of forced CEO turnovers on the estimated residuals obtained in the first-stage 
regressions of Panel A and other control variables as in Table 3.3. The investor-management disagreement proxy used in each regression is 
indicated at the top of the table. Proxy Proposals is the number of proxy proposals a firm receives in a given year. Voting Recommendation is the 
proportion of director candidates receiving a “withhold” or “against” recommendation from ISS or/and certain shareholders in a “just vote no” 
campaign, among all candidates in the firm who are up for election in a given year. Actual Voting is defined as the fraction of directors receiving 
less than the yearly median yes-vote casted in all firms with available actual voting data, among all candidates in the firm who are up for 
election in a given year. All other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
Different industries (as defined using Fama-French 48 industries) are allowed to have different baseline hazards in Panel B. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: First-stage regression of disagreement measures on proxies for agency problems 
 Proxy proposal Voting 
Recommendation 
Actual Voting 
Abnormal Accruals 0.047*** 0.003 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) 
Market-to-Book -0.012 0.005*** -0.000 
 (0.095) (0.000) (0.001) 
Free Cash Flow -0.379 -0.080 -0.339*** 
 (0.233) (0.054) (0.080) 
GIM index -0.046*** -0.000 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) 
Entrenched 0.130*** -0.041*** -0.023** 
 (0.030) (0.008) (0.012) 
Constant 1.717** 0.174*** -0.087 
 (0.846) (0.060) (0.085) 
Observations 6832 4977 4052 
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.031 0.207 
 
 
 
Panel B: Second-stage regression of forced CEO turnover on adjusted disagreement measures 
 Proxy proposal Voting 
Recommendation 
Actual Voting 
Adjusted 
Disagreementt-1 
0.220*** 1.045** 1.374*** 
 (0.066) (0.418) (0.394) 
Observations 6671 4662 4006 
Controls Yes  Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.126 0.165 
 
 
